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Abstract 
Segregation in workplaces and individuals' social networks based on ethnicity, race, 
and/or religion may have serious social and economic consequences. The 
relationship between social segregation and workplace segregation has been 
traditionally studied as a one-way causal relationship mediated by referral hiring. In 
this thesis, an alternative framework is introduced which describes the dynamic 
reciprocal relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, 
individuals' homophily levels, and referral hiring. 
An agent-based simulation model was developed based on this framework. The 
model describes the process of continuous change in composition of workplaces and 
social networks of agents (individuals), and how this process affects levels of 
workplace segregation and the segregation of social networks of the agents. 
The simulation results indicated that a labour market may experience significant 
levels of worl<place segregation and social segregation even when the hiring of 
workers occurs mainly through formal channels. The results also show that majority 
groups tend to be more homophilous than minority groups, that referral hiring may be 
beneficial for minority groups especially when the population is highly segregated, 
and that the relationship between referral hiring and minority unemployment is 
curvilinear. Levels of workplace and social segregation were found to be negatively 
correlated with minority proportion, average size of individuals' social network, and 
firm size, while they were positively correlated with overall unemployment level and 
hiring discrimination. 
The research is based on primary data involving structured interviews with a sample 
of 39 employers and 122 workers (81 Muslim and 41 Coptic workers) in industrial 
firms in Egypt. Two secondary data sets were also used: the Social Contract Survey 
2 
(SCS) and Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES). The data were 
used to assess the levels of social and workplace segregation in Egypt (which found 
to be high), and to validate the simulation model. 
3 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims of This Chapter 
The purposes of this introductory chapter are to: describe the research questions that 
animate the thesis and the answers which it provides, provide some background 
concerning the research context, present definitions of social and workplace 
segregation and provide evidence on the levels of these phenomena in Egypt, and 
finally give the reader an overview of how the thesis is organized. 
1.2 The Origin of This Study 
Egypt's Muslim and Coptic Christian communities have cohabitated peacefully for 
most of the last fourteen centuries. Yet, in recent years the clashes between the two 
communities have been increasing both in number and intensity. For example, 
Ibrahim (2006:19) estimated the number of sectarian clashes between Copts and 
Muslims to be more than 120 events in period between September 1972 to October 
2005, that is, nearly 4 clashes per year. 
These clashes often arise over everyday matters (for example, a dispute between 
farmers, or an argument between kids) but once sparked they often deteriorate into 
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large-scale conflicts. The authorities usually attempt to defuse these situations by 
holding a "customary session 1" in which the two parties are urged to reconcile. 
In his attempt to answer the question: why are clashes between Muslims and Copts 
becoming a fixture of newspaper headlines, EI-Sayed (2007) denies what Egyptian 
officials always try to confirm, that Copts and Muslims live in an integrated society: 
1
'The routine flash of cameras taking photographs of senior 
Muslim and Coptic clerics embracing one another on major 
religious occasions can no longer hide the less convivial reality, 
one in which attempts to build a church, the staging of a play 
about Muslim extremism by a Coptic youth group, the 
publication of improper photographs of a Coptic cleric, can all 
lead to violent clashes leaving tens of people injured and 
damage costing hundreds of thousands of pounds." 
According to the Contact Hypothesis {Allport 1954, Amir 1969), more contact 
between different social (ethnic, racial or religious) groups would lead to more 
tolerance among members of these groups. So, these observed high levels of 
intolerance among Egyptians, both Copts and Muslims, may indicate that there is not 
"enough" contact between the two communities; in other words, Egyptians' social 
networks became more segregated based on religion. 
Based on this initial guess, that segregation in social networks (simply called "social 
segregation") may be one of the reasons for the observed high level of intolerance, I 
have thought to measure this level of segregation, but unfortunately found no suitable 
1 A "customary session" is an informal meeting usually attended by community 
leaders (for example, the governor, the representative parliament member, and 
religious leaders) in addition to the people involved in the dispute. 
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published data. However, some data were available from the Workers' Status in 
Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES) (2005) which could be used to measure the 
level of workplace segregation based on religion in a random sample of workplaces, 
and it was found to be very high (the Gini index of workplace segregation was 0.932). 
This high level of workplace segregation supported the assumption that there is 
limited contact between Copts and Muslims (at least) at work. 
Based on the previous cursory investigation, a study to assess levels of social and 
workplace segregation in the Egyptian society, and to help understanding the 
emergence and dynamics of segregation (both in social networks and workplaces) 
would be useful (especially for decision makers) to control it and promote a more 
integrated society. 
1.3 Research Overview 
Workplace segregation based on ethnicity, race, and/or religion may have serious 
negative effects on a society. It has been documented that employed adults spend a 
large fraction of their time at work, and that a large fraction of non-family social 
interactions takes place at the workplace (Grossetti 2005). Thus, if workplaces 
become segregated based on ethnicity, race, or religion this would lead to less 
contact and Jess tolerance between different social groups; and, consequently, lower 
levels of social peace and social integration. In addition to these negative social 
effects, workplace segregation may have negative economic consequences. For 
example, it may introduce high levels of income and employment inequality between 
different groups in a society (Carrington & Troske 1998, Glass 1990, Tassier & 
Menczer 2005). Besides, workplace segregation may affect the whole economic 
system as it decreases the efficiency of allocating workers to jobs (Becker 1971 ). 
While there is voluminous literature on the determinants and consequences of 
occupation and workplace segregation by sex (for a review, see Anker 1997), most 
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of the research on the ethnic segregation of workplace focused on the consequences 
(for example, income and employment inequality) rather than the determinants 
(Mittman 1992, Mouw 2002). Even for this little research on the determinants of the 
ethnic segregation of workplace, the underlying causal mechanisms between the 
determinants and the observed level of segregation have received little attention 
(some exceptions include ｃ｡ｬｶＶｾａｲｭ･ｮｧｯｬ＠ & Jackson (2007, 2004), Tassier (2005), 
and Tassier & Menczer (2005)). 
According to the sociological literature, referral hiring (hiring employees through the 
use of social or familial contacts) is one of the most important determinants of 
workplace segregation. Using social networks and social contacts in matching jobs to 
job seekers is ｷ･ｬｬｾ､ｯ｣ｵｭ･ｮｴ･､Ｎ＠ For example, more than half of the workers in US 
find their jobs through friends, relatives, and other social contacts (Granovetter 1995, 
1973). Montgomery (1991) summarizes this prevalence of referral hiring with the 
adage "it is not what you know but who you know" that matters. 
Besides, the homophily hypothesis implies that people are more likely to create social 
ties with similar others, or 1'birds of a feather flock together" (Lazarsfeld & Merton 
1954, McPherson et al. 2001 ). This similarity among network actors may be 
evaluated, among other factors, on the basis of race, religion and ethnicity. Thus 
when using social networks to search for jobs, it is more likely that people will have 
job information from others of the same ethnicity, race and/or religion as their own, 
and this may promote workplace segregation. 
According to the previous analysis, researchers have studied the relationship 
between social segregation and workplace segregation as a ｯｮ･ｾｷ｡ｹ＠ causal 
relationship. In this relationship, the independent variable is the level of social 
segregation and the dependent variable is the level of workplace segregation, with 
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the level of referral hiring as a moderating variable (Elliott 2001, Tassier 2005, 
Tassier & Menczer 2005). 
In the current thesis, it is argued that the relationship between social segregation and 
workplaces segregation can also go in the other direction, that is, workplace 
segregation can affect (as well as be affected by) social segregation. Empirical 
literature confirms that a large proportion of social relations is embedded in 
organizations (Grossetti 2005). Organizations contribute to the construction of the 
pool of candidates with whom people might create social relations. Thus, when these 
pools become segregated social segregation is promoted and vice versa. 
Based on this analysis, a general framework is introduced to study the dynamic and 
reciprocal relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, 
homophily levels, and referral hiring within the Egyptian society. An agent-based 
simulation model for the Egyptian labour market has been developed based on this 
framework. The model creates an artificial society where agents (people) use their 
social networks to search for jobs. As simulated time passes, agents change their 
social networks by creating new social links (ties) with each other while other links 
dissolve. Also, the composition of workplaces (the proportion of workers from different 
social groups) may change through the turnover of workers. 
The main objective of the model is to describe this process of continuous change in 
the composition of workplaces and social networks of agents, and how it affects the 
emergence and levels of segregation. The model is used as an experimental tool to 
investigate the potential effects of various factors on levels of segregation. These 
factors include: minority proportion, firms' sizes, social networks' sizes, overall 
unemployment rate, and hiring discrimination. 
Three data sources have been used to build and validate the proposed model. One of 
these sources involved structured interviews with 39 Egyptian employers (owners or 
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mangers of small-to-medium industrial firms), and 122 workers (81 Muslim and 41 
Coptic worl{ers) in four Egyptian governorates. The other two sources are two 
national-level Egyptian surveys: Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey 
(WSIES 2005) and Social Contract Survey (SCS 2005). 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The direct objective of current research is to model the emergence of social and 
workplace segregation to get a better understanding of the dynamics that govern 
these phenomena. Within this general objective, specific research objectives include: 
• Assessing the levels of workplace segregation, social segregation, hiring 
discrimination in Egypt. 
• Investigating the effects of the following factors on the levels of social and 
workplace segregation: 
• Referral hiring 
• Overall unemployment rate 
• Sizes of social networks of agents (people) 
• Hiring discrimination 
• Minority group's proportion 
• Firms' sizes 
• Investigating the relationship between segregation and employment 
inequality for majority and minority groups 
1.5 Importance of the Research 
The current research contributes to the theoretical understanding of the causal 
mechanisms of the relationship between segregation of social networks for religious 
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minority and majority groups and workplace segregation mediated by the use of 
referral hiring. 
This research is the first to discuss the issue of segregation within the Egyptian 
society, and it is the first attempt to assess levels of segregation and hiring 
discrimination in Egypt. So, the research is novel in studying a minority-majority 
relationship in different context than the traditional settings. Being conducted in US or 
UK, most of the research on segregation (residential, occupation, or workplace) 
assumes two groups: a privileged majority (usually Whites) and an unprivileged 
minority (usually Blacks or immigrants). However, the Egyptian case provides a 
different context, where the minority, around 6 percent of the population, own more 
than 20 percent of the national wealth, and have generally better levels of education 
(Ibrahim 1996). 
1.6 Research Context: Egypt in Brief 
In the following, a brief background is given about Egypt: social, economic, historical, 
and ethnic and religious composition. This would clarify the context in which the 
research has been conducted. 
1.6. 1 Geography 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is the centre of the Arab world, geographically and 
culturally, and it has a central position in the whole world as well. Egypt lies on the 
Mediterranean coast of North Africa, with Libya to the west, Sudan to the south and 
Gaza Strip, Israel, Jordan and the Red Sea to the East (see the map in Figure 1.1 ). 
The total area of Egypt covers approximately one million square kilometres; however, 
only 6 percent of this area is inhabited, the majority of the country is desert. Egypt's 
population was estimated in 2008 (excluding Egyptians abroad) at 76 millions 
(CAPMAS 2009), and it is concentrated in a narrow strip around the Nile River and 
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Figure 1.1: Egypt's political map 
(source: www.mapsofworld.com) 
its Delta. The Nile, the main artery for Egypt, flows from Sudan in the south through 
Egypt into the Mediterranean at the Nile Delta near Alexandria, Egypt's second 
largest city after the capital, Cairo. 
Administratively, Egypt is divided into 262 governorates in addition to Luxor City. 
There are four Urban Governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez) that have 
2 In April 2008, two new governorates were declared: Helwan and 6th of October. 
Helwan included some parts of the administrative division of Cairo, and 6th of October 
included some of Giza's. Since all data used within this thesis have been gathered 
before the creation of these two new governorates, the 26-governorate division will be 
assumed thereafter in this thesis. 
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no rural areas, while the other 22 governorates are subdivided into urban and rural 
areas. Nine of these governorates are located in the Nile Delta (Lower Egypt), and 
eight are located in the Nile Valley (Upper Egypt). The remaining five Frontier 
Governorates are located on the eastern and western boundaries of Egypt (CAPMAS 
2009). 
1.6.2 History 
Egypt has been known as "The Cradle of Civilization", and its history goes back more 
than five thousand years. The Nile Valley has hosted imperial powers since the 
Pharaonic era. Then came the Persians, the Alexandrian Greeks {332 BC), and three 
centuries later the Romans took over in the year 31 BC. Christianity had been quickly 
spread in Egypt from the middle of the first century AD by St Mark the Evangelist. 
However, Copts broke from the rest of the Eastern Orthodox Church in the fifth 
century because of a theological difference over the essence of Christ. Copts 
suffered from the persecution of the Byzantium which reached its peak with the rule 
of Diocletian (284 AD) who was considered the most bloody and oppressive against 
Christians; that is why his era was known as the Age of Martyrs (303-11 AD) (Wakin 
1963). 
Struggle with Byzantium continued until the Muslim Arabs had conquered the country 
(640 AD). Roughly 200 years after the Arab conquest, Copts fell into the minority 
among their Muslim counterparts. From then until now, Coptic Christians have been a 
minority among Muslims. In 1517, Egypt became a part of the Ottoman Empire. 
During Ottoman times, Copts were quite spatially segregated from Muslims in Egypt 
because the empire organized its religious minorities into millets. Millets were highly 
autonomous areas set aside for Copts, Jews, Greek Orthodox, etc., each was 
controlled by a community's religious leader. However, this spatial segregation faded 
greatly after Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, and finished the Ottoman rule. 
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The French rule was concluded by an Anglo-Ottoman alliance in 1801, and the 
Albanian Mohamed Ali came to power. His dynasty witnessed westernization of 
Egypt, the building of the Suez Canal, and colonization of northern Sudan. Mohamed 
Ali and his dynasty treated Copts with all due respect. He surrounded himself with 
Coptic aids, abolished all repressive laws against them, and suppressed any 
outbreaks of fanaticism. Generally, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
concept of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims had a great support. 
Exceptional taxes on Copts were cancelled and Copts were enlisted in the military 
service (Wakin 1963). 
In 1882, a British force occupied Cairo, and the British Consul-General became the 
effective ruler. An Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance was signed in 1936, which 
recognized Egypt's full independence and introduced a phased withdrawal of British 
forces. Despite this, and the installation of an Egyptian royal family descending from 
Mohamed Ali's family, the British military presence and influence remained until 1956, 
when the final British troops left the Suez Canal zone. Coptic participation in the 
political life increased from the early twentieth century, two Copts became prime 
minister in the first two decade of the century. Coptic participation in the 1919 
revolution has confirmed their role in the civil national state. 
Recent Egyptian history originates with the revolution of 1952 by the Society of Free 
Officers (who did not include any Copts) in which the Egyptian king, Farouk, was 
overthrown and a republic was declared. Gamal Abdul Nasser became the president 
in 1954. After the 1952 revolution, the role of the Copts lessened in the community, 
and there was the first wave of Coptic migration. By the year 1977, the numbers of 
Coptic emigrants to Canada and US reached 85 thousands. Nasser died in 1970, 
without having recovered his popularity after the disastrous defeat of 1967 against 
Israel, and was succeeded by his deputy, Anwar Sadat. Sadat defeated Israel in 
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October war; after that, he brokered peace with Israel following his famous trip to 
Jerusalem in November 1977, when he addressed the Knesset. 
Following the assassination of Sadat in 1981, his vice president Hosni Mubarak was 
appointed a president (a post he has been occupying till now). 
In the recent decades, the relationship and interaction between Copts and Muslims 
have suffered from some disturbances because of the following: 
• The rise of Islam militant groups in 1970s and 1980s which aimed to 
establish a political system based on Islamic rules ("shari'a" in Arabic). These 
groups created and mounted social tension and stress between Copts and 
Muslims, which lead to sectarian violence between them (Ibrahim 2006) 
• The rise of Coptic groups since 1990s asking for equality and special 
treatment to compensate for periods of discrimination and persecution. For 
example, they have been asking for the abolition of the Hamayouni decree3, 
broadcasting their belief on the government TV and Radio stations, ending 
the discrimination in job appointments and promotions; teaching the Coptic 
history, language, and culture in schools and universities, and having a quota 
3 The Hamayouni Decree is based on an 1856 Ottoman law governing the 
construction of Christian places of worship. It was amplified as the AI-Ezabi Decree in 
1934 as a set of ten conditions which have to be met before any application to 
construct places of worship can take place. Applications require personal approval 
from the President of Egypt. These requirements are not necessary for the 
construction of Muslim places of worship. 
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of the seats in the national parliament and regional assemblies. (Bebawi 
2001) 
• The rise of the immigrant Coptic groups in 1990s- in Europe, US, Canada, 
and Australia - who produced many studies and press releases to speak 
about the Copts ... persecution in Egypt. Furthermore, they tried to transfer the 
Coptic issue to outside Egypt by inviting international society to protect Copts 
in Egypt (Brown 2000). 
However, according to the Egyptian constitution, educational, employment and 
political rights are provided on a basis of equal opportunity. 
1.6.3 Egypt's Ethnic and Religious Composition 
Egypt is considered one of the most homogeneous countries with regard to its ethnic 
composition. The vast majority, 98 percent, of the population are Egyptian. The 
remaining minorities include: Berber, Nubian, Bedouin 1 percent, and Greek, 
Armenian, and other European (primarily Italian and French) 1 percent. The main 
religion of the Egyptian people is Islam, with 94 percent of the population being Sunni 
Muslims. The other main religious grouping is that of Coptic Christians, who make up 
most of the remaining 6 percent that are not Muslims4. 
Copts are concentrated more in the Upper Egypt where they constitute about 11 
percent of the population, while they constitute only about 2 percent of the Lower 
Egypt's population. Within Cairo and Alexandria, Copts are concentrated in some 
4 The exact percentage of the Copts in Egypt is contested. The 1976 census records 
six percent of the total population, while some sources, based on Church statistics, 
estimate the percentage to be18 percent (AI-Gawhary 1996). 
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districts (for example, Shoubra, Heliopolis, and Zeitoun in Cairo), but the general 
pattern in the cities is a spatial integration of Copts and Muslims (Purcell 1998). 
Before the Arab conquest of Egypt in 640 AD, all Egyptians were l<nown as Copts, 
and early Arabs called Egypt the Land of Copts. Actually, the word "Copt" is derived 
from the Greek word "Aigyptos" which means Egyptian (Wakin 1963). Copts follow 
three different denominations: the Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic. However, the 
majority follow the Orthodox Church which is known as the Egyptian Church (Ibrahim 
1996). As it will be used here, the term "Copts" is commonly used to refer to all 
Christians' community in Egypt. 
Copts are distinct in Egypt only on base of religion. They are not linguistically distinct, 
virtually all Copts speaks Arabic. However, there does remain most of the original 
Coptic language which has its roots in the languages of ancient Egypt. Some names 
are predominantly Coptic, such as Hanna, Girgis or Samuel, while others such as 
Mohamed or Ahmed are predominantly Muslim, but many can be both. Copts are not 
physically distinct from Muslims. Visual clues such as a crucifix or an icon of the virgin 
or a particular garment might identify a Copt as non-Muslim (Purcell1998). 
1.6.4 Economy and Labour Market 
Egypt started an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 
1991 to address its problematic social and economic situation which manifested itself 
in rising unemployment rates, increasing external debt, high inflation rates, and 
increasingly negative fiscal and external deficits. The budget deficit was reduced to a 
sustainable level, from 15 percent of GOP in 1991 to less than 1 percent in 1997 
onward, and inflation dropped from 21 percent to 6 percent during the same period. 
However, the growth of the economy dropped by half from an annual average growth 
rate of 3 percent during 1987-1990 to an annual rate of 1.4 during 1991-1994, then 
increased again to the average of 4.3 percent during 2003-2008. 
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Estimates of unemployment and poverty in Egypt show a rising trend since the late 
1980s. The unemployment rate was estimated, according to official figures, in 2008 to 
be around 8.9 percent (5.9 percent for male and 18.6 for female) (CAPMAS 2009), 
but it is believed to be higher (ERFAIT 2004). 
Egyptian labour market can broadly be divided into public (government and public 
enterprises) and private sectors. The public sector includes those activities owned by 
and under the control of the state, for example, jobs in government agencies and 
public sector enterprises. The public sector has been the most important source of 
employment opportunities in Egypt, especially for graduates. In 1995, it constituted 
the largest share of employment (62 percent). However, with the privatization of 
public enterprises, the opportunities offered by this sector have been steadily 
declining (Assaad 1997). The private sector involves activities that are owned and 
directed by non-governmental economic units. In 1995, private wage work in Egypt 
constituted 18 percent of the total wage employment. 
The Egyptian labour market can also be divided into formal and non-formal sectors. 
This distinction involves some procedures such as formal registration of firms and 
their workers, social insurance for workers, etc. The contribution of the private formal 
sector to total employment is relatively low. The informal sector has been growing 
substantially during the past decade, absorbing the increasing numbers of new 
entrants into the labour market, especially new graduates. This sector, which includes 
small establishments (less than 10 employees) and employment outside 
establishments, has shown increasing importance in livelihood opportunities since the 
early 1980s. According to Assad (1997), it constitutes around 60 percent of the total 
workforce in the private sector. 
There are gender gaps in hiring and income levels in the Egyptian labour market. 
Women are more than three times as likely to be unemployed than men. Those who 
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work earn significantly less than men, even after education and experience have 
been taken into account. The main reason for these gender gaps appears to be the 
slowdown in hiring in the government, a sector that treats women fairly equally to 
men. Besides, there is evidence of the high level of gender segregation in the labour 
market. Most employed women, outside the government, are relegated to a small 
number of industries and occupations. Women are disproportionately represented in 
textile and garment manufacturing, social services, and banking and insurance. On 
the other hand, females are concentrated in some professional occupations, such as 
teaching (40 percent), nursing {68 percent), and medical doctors (27 percent) (World 
Bank and the National Council for Women 2002). 
1. 7 Chapters in Brief 
In addition to this introductory chapter, this thesis contains ten more chapters: 
Chapter 2: Intergroup Relations: Theoretical Background 
This chapter introduces the relevant literature about intergroup relations and the main 
theories that explain intergroup behaviour including Social Identity and Social 
Categorization Theories, Social Dominance Theory, and System Justification Theory. 
In addition, the chapter discusses how stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination can 
be reduced based on the Contact Hypothesis and affirmative action practices. Also, 
segregation is introduced as a complex and multi·dimensional concept that imposes 
restrictions on intergroup contact and how it relates to other concepts referring to 
these restrictions. 
Chapter 3: Workplace Segregation 
In this chapter, the concept of workplace segregation is discussed, and then different 
measures of workplaces segregation are introduced and evaluated. After that, a 
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review to the literature about the main factors affecting workplace segregation based 
on ethnicity, race, and religion is presented. The chapter ends with an assessment of 
workplace segregation by religion in Egypt based on data from Workers' Status in 
Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES). 
Chapter 4: Social Networks and Social Segregation 
This chapter presents a review of the literature about social networks, their 
importance as a job search method, and the consequences of using social networks 
as a job-search method on workplace segregation. The chapter starts by reviewing 
the recent history of social network analysis and the most famous networl< models 
including: Random Model, Small-World networks, and Scale-Free networks. Then, 
the chapter introduces some of the most famous theories of network formation and 
origins of social relations, and discusses the potential impact of social networks on 
individual's behaviour using Social Impact Theory. 
Chapter 5: Agent-Based Social Simulation 
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce agent-based social simulation 
(ABSS) as a research method. First, a brief history of the origin of social simulation is 
presented, then simulation is compared with other modelling approaches; for 
example, mathematical modelling. Chapter 5 also discusses the epistemologies of 
social simulation within the debate between rationalists and empiricists on how 
scientific knowledge could be gained. A justification for the use of simulation as a 
method for the current thesis is provided, and the chapter concludes with presenting 
the Schelling model as one of the most famous models of segregation. 
Chapter 6: Methodology 
This chapter includes a description of the main methods used to carry out the 
research. it provides a description of the sample design and survey instruments used 
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in data collection, the main problems found in the empirical study, and how these 
problems were solved. 
Chapter 7: Statistical Analysis of the Primary Data 
The empirical results and statistical analysis for interviews with workers and 
employers are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 8: Agent-based Simulation Model for Social and Workplace 
Segregation 
This chapter presents a simulation model for the relationship between workplace 
segregation (based on race, ethnicity and/or religion) and segregation of the social 
networks of individuals. The simulation model is based on the suggested framework 
for the relationship between social segregation and workplace segregation. Some 
experiments with the model are presented to test its validity qualitatively. 
Chapter 9: Model Verification and Validation 
This chapter discusses verification and validation of the simulation model that has 
been developed in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 10: Experimenting With the Model 
Using the simulation model, this chapter presents some experiments that aim to study 
the effects of factors such as unemployment level, size of social networks, hiring 
discrimination, size of minority group, and firms' sizes on social and workplace 
segregation. 
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Chapter 11 : Concluding Summary 
The main research findings are summarized in this chapter, and directions for future 
research are discussed. 
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2 INTERGROUP RELATIONS: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Aims of This Chapter 
The main purpose of this chapter is to briefly introduce, in Section 2.2, the literature 
about intergroup relations and the main theories explaining intergroup behaviour 
during intergroup contact: Social Identity and Social Categorization Theories, Social 
Dominance Theory, and System Justification Theory. Purely psychological theories, 
which consider prejudice as a personality disorder, are not considered relevant, so 
they will be skipped from the review. Then in Section 2.3, how stereotyping, prejudice 
and discrimination can be reduced based on the Contact Hypothesis and affirmative 
action practices is discussed. Finally, in Section 2.4, "segregation" is introduced as a 
complex and multi-dimension concept that imposes restrictions on intergroup contact. 
2.2 Theories of Intergroup Relations 
Creating and belonging to groups seems to be an intrinsic feature of mankind. People 
had been living in social groups since before the dawn of history. For a "group" to be 
constructed there should be clear criteria for membership which demarcate who is in 
and who is out of the group. Moreover, these criteria must be recognizable and 
valuable for the interacting individuals. Examples of these demarcation criteria are 
those referring to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, social class, physical proximity, etc. 
(Tajfel 1982b) 
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Intergroup relations refer to those interactions involving people from different social 
groups; as Sherif (1966:12) puts it: 
"Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, 
collectively or individually with another group or its members in 
terms of their group identification, we have an instance of 
intergroup behaviour." 
Although intergroup relations, according to this definition, may refer to a wide range of 
interactions on many levels, the current thesis focuses only on individual-to-individual 
relations (specifically between Muslim and Coptic individuals in the Egyptian context). 
Social groups usually differ in their social power and status which may introduce the 
risk of intergroup conflict. This conflict can be manifested in stereotyping, ingroup 
favouritism, prejudice, and/or discrimination that members of each group may 
practice against the outgroup members. 
In the following, three of the most well known theories about intergroup relations are 
introduced to help understanding the motivational processes that explain people's 
responses to the members of outgroups. 
2.2. 1 Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories 
The "group identity" or "social identity" of individuals defines them as members of a 
particular social group, and differentiates them from the members of other different 
groups. Tajfel defines "social identity" as: 
"that part of the individuals, self-concept which derives from 
their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance of 
that membership" (Tajfe/1981 :255) 
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_________ ....._ _________________________________ -- - - .  
The main premise of Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1982a, 1982b) is that social 
behaviour is a mixture of individuals' perception of themselves as individuals and as 
representatives of their ingroup. Thus, social behaviour usually falls somewhere on a 
continuum from interpersonal (when individuals' perception of their group 
membership does not play any role in their behaviour) to intergroup (when people's 
behaviour is fully determined by their group membership). The position of actual 
social behaviour on that personal-group continuum depends on the context of 
interaction. When group membership is salient, people will act as representatives of 
their groups rather than as individuals on the basis of their personal characteristics. 
People tend to think of their ingroup as better than other groups, that is, to display 
ingroup favouritism. lngroup favouritism is usually accompanied by negative 
stereotyping of outgroups and/or positive stereotyping of the ingroup. Stallybrass 
(1977:601) defines stereotyping as: 
"an over-simplified mental image of (usually) some category of 
person, institution or event which shared, in essential features, 
by large numbers of people .. . Stereotypes are commonly, but 
not necessarily, accompanied by prejudice, i.e. by a favourable 
or unfavourable predisposition toward any member of the 
category in question" 
Self-esteem is one of the explanations of this ingroup favouritism suggested by 
Lemyre and Smith (1985) who found empirically that individuals' self-esteem is 
enhanced when they behave as group representatives. 
While SIT hypothesizes that social behaviour is placed somewhere on the 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum, Social Categorization Theory (SCT) explains why 
and when a situation is considered interpersonal or intergroup by examining how 
people conceive of themselves (Tajfel 1981, Tajfel 1982a). According to the SCT, 
there is a tendency for individuals to categorize themselves in the group that will 
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provide association with a higher status. For example, in one setting, it may be more 
advantageous for someone to group himself/herself according to group identity (or 
characteristics) such as race or religion whereas in another setting, benefit may be 
derived from categorizing himself/herself based on personal characteristics such as 
educational experience. Group behaviour is possible when social identity rather than 
personal identity becomes salient. 
2.2.2 Social Dominance Theory 
While SIT and SCT focus on the individual-level factors that govern intergroup 
relations, Social Dominance Theory (SDT) pays great attention to the structural 
causes, and consequences, of group discrimination. The main concern of SDT is to 
explain how hierarchical social relations are formed and maintained (Sidanius et al. 
2004). According to SDT, people tend to form and maintain group-based hierarchies, 
and all known forms of group-based oppression (for example; racism, ethnocentrism, 
classism, and sexism) are manifestations or special cases of this tendency. Sidanius 
et al. explain this in detail: 
ｾｾｒ｡ｴｨ･ｲ＠ than merely asking why people stereotype, why people 
are prejudiced, why they discriminate, or why they believe the 
world is just and fair, social dominance theory asks why human 
societies tend to be organized as group-based hierarchies. By 
framing the question in this way, social dominance theory ... [is 
focused] on the universal and exquisitely subtle forms of 
discrimination and oppression that large numbers of people 
face in their everyday lives all over this planet." (Sidanius et a/. 
2004:846-84 7) 
SDT proposes that human societies are stratified mainly along three qualitatively 
distinct systems of group-based hierarchies: age (elders have disproportionate power 
over youngsters), gender (men have disproportionate power over women), and an 
arbitrary set system not linked to the human life-cycle, which includes social groups 
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formed on the basis of, for example, race/ethnicity, class, or religion. Groups in these 
hierarchies differ in their social power and material resources (Pratto et al. 2006, 
Sidanius et al. 2004). 
SOT suggests that group-based social hierarchy is produced and maintained by the 
net effects of discrimination across three levels: institutions, individuals, and groups 
(Pratto et al. 2006:275), and that this discrimination, to the favour of dominant groups 
over subordinate groups, is endorsed by using Legitimizing Myths (LMs) (Sidanius & 
Pratto 1999). LMs are ideologies, stereotypes, attitudes, or values that promote either 
the maintenance of group-based social inequality (hierarchy enhancing, HE-LMs) or 
greater levels of social equality (hierarchy attenuating, HA-LMs). Classic examples of 
HE-LMs are belief in a just world, racism and sexism. HA-LMs are illustrated by 
examples, such as universal human rights, feminism, and socialism. 
On the Institution-level of discrimination, hierarchy-enhancing institutions (HEI) are 
those promoting inequality by disproportionately allocating more positive social value 
(or less negative social value) to dominant groups than to subordinate groups. In 
contrast, hierarchy-attenuating institutions (HAl) disproportionately support 
subordinate social groups (for example, ethnic and religious minorities). 
Hiring discrimination, when an employer decides not to hire or promote a given job 
applicant due to his/her ethnicity, religion, or gender, is an example of individual-level 
discrimination. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), a central construct in SOT, 
refers to and assesses individuals' desires for group-based dominance and 
inequality. For example, men, as a group, score higher in SDO than women as a 
group, and people belonging to dominant groups are, in general, higher in SDO than 
subordinates (Sidanius & Pratto 1999). 
On the group-level, inequality can also be produced and maintained by intergroup 
processes between dominant and subordinate groups (Pratto et al. 2006). According 
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to Pratto et al., some of the mechanisms that play key roles in promoting groups 
hierarchy and inequality on that level include: 
• Asymmetrical ingroup bias. Members of dominant groups tend to show 
ingroup favouritism, more than subordinate groups do. This is called the 
"behavioural asymmetry hypothesis" (Sidanius & Pratto 1999:227), and it 
reinforces the dominance hierarchy since the behaviour of the subordinate 
group does not balance the effect of ingroup favouritism of the dominant 
group. 
• Asymmetry in Self-debilitation. When members of subordinate groups 
engage in ingroup-damaging behaviour, crimes for example, that contributes 
to their own group's subordination, this negative effect is usually weaker 
when dominant groups engage in the same behaviour (Sidanius & Pratto 
1999). 
• Ideological asymmetry. Many of the factors that help promoting group 
dominance work better for people in dominant than in subordinate groups. 
For example, as mentioned earlier, SDO and people belonging to their 
groups are, in general, higher in dominant groups than subordinates 
(Sidanius & Pratto 1999). 
2.2.3 System Justification Theory 
A third theory of intergroup relations is System Justification Theory, SJT (Jost et al. 
2004, Jost & Banaji 1994). SJT suggests that people are motivated to accept and 
perpetuate features of existing social arrangements, or status quo, even if those 
arrangements are not fair. In doing so, members of disadvantaged groups may 
support actions or beliefs that run contrary to their group's interests to maintain the 
current social system and group-dominance hierarchy. Zinn (1986:16-17) describes 
this tendency as follows: 
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{{Society's tendency is to maintain what has been. Rebellion is 
only an occasional reaction to suffering in human history; we 
have infinitely more instances of forbearance to exploitation, 
and submission to authority, than we have examples of revolt ... 
What we should be most concerned about is not some natural 
tendency towards violent uprising, but rather the inclination of 
people, faced with an overwhelming environment, to submit to 
it." (cited in Jost eta/. 2004:886) 
One of the social psychological mechanisms by which people legitimize and support 
the existing system is "sour grapes" and "sweet lemon" rationalization (McGuire & 
McGuire 1991 ). McGuire & McGuire postulate that people adjust their preferences to 
fit with their expectations about what is lil<ely to occur. For example, they might 
support the existing system just because they expect that it is not possible to change 
it. 
2.3 How Can Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination be Reduced? 
In the following, two mechanisms are presented that can help to enhance intergroup 
relations and reduce stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination: increasing intergroup 
contact and adopting affirmative action practices. 
2.3. 1 Contact Hypothesis 
The Contact Hypothesis suggests that intergroup contact, particularly close and 
prolonged contact with members of different cultural or social groups, promotes the 
reduction of prejudice and more positive and tolerant attitudes toward members of 
outgroups (Allport 1954). The rational behind this positive effect is the idea that 
intergroup contact provides direct information and first-hand experience about other 
groups; for example, their values, behaviours and life-styles. 
41 
Significant attitude changes due to intergroup contact have been reported in much 
earlier empirical research across different contexts (for example, Ellison & Powers 
1994, Emerson et al. 2002, Robinson 1980, Sigelman & Welch 1993, Williams 1964, 
Yancey 1999). For example Emerson et al (2002) found that those who had 
experienced prior interracial contact in schools and neighbourhoods were more likely, 
as adults, to have more racially diverse general social groups and friendship circles. 
However, it would be nai've to assume that any intergroup contact will produce the 
same (positive) results {Amir 1969). Mere contact is not enough to promote positive 
changes in attitudes and behaviour. Allport {1954) identified four key conditions that 
need to be satisfied before the desired effects of contact can be expected: 
a. Equal status of contact groups: For contact to be successful (in reducing 
prejudice), it should take place between equal-status participants {Blanchard 
et al. 1975). Many prejudiced stereotypes of outgroups comprise beliefs 
about their inferior ability and performance. When the contact situation 
involves an unequal-status relationships with the outgroup person in the 
subordinate role, the existing stereotype are likely to be reinforced rather than 
hindered {Brown 1995). Relevant examples of previous empirical research, 
including Harding and Hogrefe {1952) and Minard (1952), showed that when 
Blacks and Whites worked together on equal-status base, the relationships 
between them were often harmonious. 
b. Acquaintance potential: Contact should be of sufficient frequency, duration, 
and closeness. As Cook (1978:97) explains, it should be ''high acquaintance 
potential". One would not expect that infrequent, short and/or causal contact 
would have a great impact on attitudes (Latane 1981 ). 
c. Pursuit of Common Objectives: Cooperation to achieve common goals is a 
favourable condition for contact to reduce prejudice. Alport (1954:276) 
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stresses that "this type of contact that leads people to do things together is 
likely to result in changed attitudes". He continues, "in factories, 
neighbourhood, housing units, [and] schools, common participation and 
common interests are more effective than the bare fact of equal-status 
contact". Many empirical studies support this cooperation condition, 
especially when groups are successful in achieving their common goals (for 
example, Blanchard et al. 1975, Cook 1978). 
d. Social and institutional support: With explicit social sanctions and rewards, 
intergroup contact will have more positive effects. An authority, in the 
workplace for example (Morrison & Herlihy 1992), usually supports 
establishing norms of acceptance (Pettigrew 1998). An example is affirmative 
action, as discussed in the following. 
2.3.2 Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action refers to all voluntary and compulsory undertakings by 
governments and organizations to promote equal opportunity in employment and 
education for all people, regardless of social group (Crosby et al. 2003). By 
increasing the chance for different social groups to share the same workplace or 
educational institutions, affirmative action can be seen as a means of increasing 
intergroup contact and, thereby, promoting the reduction of group stereotyping, 
prejudice and discrimination. 
One caveat that policy-makers should be aware of when applying affirmative action 
programmes is that affirmative action itself may promote discrimination instead of 
decreasing it; what is known as the reverse discrimination argument (Crosby et al. 
2003:101 ). To promote, and monitor, equal opportunity, people have to be 
categorized into groups. This categorization process itself may promote stereotyping 
and prejudices. 
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2.4 Segregation as a Limitation on Intergroup Contact 
There are many definitions of segregation, most of which share the same notion of 
segregation as a "restriction on the access of people to one another" (Freeman 
1978:412), especially people from different social groups. For example, for van der 
Zanden (1972): 
"Segregation may be thought of as a process or state whereby 
people are separated or set apart. As such it serves to place 
limits on social interaction." (p. 185) 
Similarly, Berry (1958:273) defined segregation as a '1form of isolation which places 
limits upon contact, communication, and social relations." 
All previous definitions refer to physical restrictions on people accessing some 
physical space. This kind of segregation is called spatial segregation. Residential 
segregation, workplace segregation, and school segregation are all examples of this 
kind of spatial segregation. By limiting the physical access of people to each other, 
the chance of intergroup contact is reduced which may promote prejudice, 
stereotyping, and group discrimination. 
However, as Freeman (1978) argues, what is more significant (because of its direct 
effect on intergroup contact) for intergroup relations is the limitation on interaction 
rather than limitation on access. Limitations on interaction represent what can be 
called "segregation in social space" (Freeman 1978:413), and it refers to segregation 
in the social networks of people, what is referred to here as social segregation. 
People may have access to each other, they may live in the same neighbourhood, go 
to the same schools; yet, their interaction may be still limited. For example, ｬｩｶ･ｾｩｮ＠
servants may share the same physical space with their employers; yet, their 
interaction is limited, and their social space is segregated. 
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2.5 Segregation as a Complex Concept 
Segregation 1 is a complex concept in the sense that it has many dimensions and 
intertwines with many other concepts. Massey and Denton (1988) mention five 
dimensions of segregation: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and 
clustering. Although these dimensions of segregation are distinctive, they are highly 
correlated. For example, if there is a high level of unevenness we expect a high level 
of exposure and clustering. Usually, the term "segregation" is used to refer to one or 
more of these dimensions. 
2.5.1 Evenness 
The term "Evenness" refers to the extent that all social groups are proportionally 
presented in the spatial units of interest (for example, workplaces, residential areas, 
and schools) (Duncan & Duncan 1955). A minority group is said to be segregated if it 
is overrepresented in some units while underrepresented in others. Evenness is the 
dimension of the focus for the current thesis because it is the most commonly-used 
dimension of segregation (for example, most of segregation indices capture this 
dimension of segregation), besides it can be used to refer to both spatial and social 
segregation. 
Egyptian Copts are not evenly distributed among the Egyptian governorates. They 
are overrepresented in some governorates in Upper Egypt, such as Assuit, more than 
Lower Egypt. Moreover, they are not evenly distributed inside governorates; they are 
more concentrated in urban areas and big cities rather than villages (Ibrahim 1996). 
1 When the term "segregation" is used without any preceding adjective, it will refer to 
spatial segregation. 
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2.5.2 Exposure 
According to Massey and Denton (1988): 
"Residential exposure refers to the degree of potential contact, 
or the possibility of interaction, between minority and majority 
group members within geographic areas of a city." (p, 287) 
The "degree of potential contact', in Massey and Denton's definition, refers to the 
probability of the two groups, majority and minority, to live in the same geographic 
area. For example, if a member of a minority group is picked at random, a measure of 
exposure should refer to the probability for this person to share the same 
neighbourhood with one of the majority group members. In this sense, all exposure 
indices are asymmetric and dependent on the minority proportion2• That is, the 
exposure of the minority to the majority is bigger than exposure of the majority to the 
minority. Since they represent a relatively small proportion of population, around 6 
percent, Copts have a high exposure to Muslims while Muslims have a lower 
exposure to Copts. 
2.5.3 Concentration 
Concentration is the third dimension of segregation, and it refers to "the relative 
amount of physical space occupied by a minority group in the urban environment" 
(Massey & Denton 1988:289). For example, if we have two cities A and 8, each with 
the same minority proportion and the same level of evenness (that is the minority 
2 Hence, most of exposure indices are compositionally invariant, and cannot be used 
for comparison among different cities or countries (for more details see Section 3.5.7 
of the next chapter). 
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group members are evenly distributed among residential areas inside each city), but 
most of the minority of city A living in lesser number and/or smaller areas than the 
minority of city 8, then the minority concentration of city A is more than that of city B; 
hence, A is more segregated than B. 
2.5.4 Centralization 
The fourth dimension of segregation is Centralization, which is 11the degree to which a 
group is spatially located near the centre of an urban area" (Massey & Denton 
1988:291 ). Living near city centres may provide more access to some resources (for 
example, schools, jobs, transportation, and safety) than living in suburban or 
peripheral areas. Hence, preventing minority groups from living in these locations is 
considered a source of discrimination, and is considered a dimension of segregation. 
Copts show high level of centralization. They tend to be concentrated in urban areas 
and city centres more than rural and peripheral areas. The main reason is that urban 
areas, where police stations are easily accessible and anonymity is greater, are 
usually safer for Copts than other areas (Ibrahim 1996). 
2.5.5 Clustering 
Clustering is the last dimension of segregation suggested by Massey and Denton, 
and it refers to: 
11the degree of spatial clustering exhibited by a minority group, 
that is, the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority 
members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space" (Massey & 
Denton 1988:293). 
A high degree of clustering would result in a residential pattern where minority areas 
are contiguous creating some sort of ethnic or racial enclaves similar to that 
presented in the famous Schilling model (Schelling 1971 ). 
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2.6 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, a brief introduction to the main theories of intergroup relations was 
presented. This covered Social Identity and Social Categorization Theories, Social 
Dominance Theory, and System Justification Theory. The Contact Hypothesis and 
affirmative action were introduced as factors that increase the chance for intergroup 
contact. It was concluded that for a contact to be successful in reducing prejudice, 
stereotyping and group discrimination some favourable conditions have to be 
satisfied. These favourable conditions include: (a) equal status of contacting groups, 
(b) contact should be acquaintance potential, (c) groups should pursue common 
objectives, and {d) there should be social and institutional support. 
On the other hand, segregation was introduced as a barrier against intergroup 
contact. Segregation was discussed as a complex and multi-dimensional concept 
that subsumes other concepts such as evenness, exposure, concentration, 
centralization, and clustering. 
48 
3 WORKPLACE SEGREGATION 
3.1 Aims of This Chapter 
In the previous chapter, the concept of "segregation" has been introduced as a 
limitation on the intergroup contact. In the current chapter, the main focus is on a 
special kind of segregation: workplace segregation (while social segregation will be 
discussed in Chapter 4). The main objectives of this chapter are to introduce the' 
concept of workplace segregation, and to review the main theories that explain why 
workplaces become segregated based on gender, race, ethnicity, and/or religion. In 
Section 3.2, the concept of 'Workplace Segregation" is defined, and then a review is 
presented of the main factors affecting the demographic composition of workplaces in 
Section 3.3. The consequences of workplace segregation for workers, social groups, 
and firms are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents some popular measures 
of segregation and a comparison of these measures. Finally, Section 3.6 provides an 
assessment of workplace segregation (based on religion) and hiring discrimination in 
Egypt based on data from Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WS/ES 
2005). 
3.2 The Concept of Workplace Segregation 
According to Mittman (1992 :7), "organizational demography consists of the patterns 
or distributions of demographic traits within and across organizations and their 
ｳｵ｢ｵｮｩｴｳＧｾ＠ Workplace segregation refers to the relative demographic composition of 
organizations to that of entire labour market. Workplaces are said to be segregated 
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based on some attribute or trait (for example, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, age, 
and education) if the distribution of employees according to this factor or trait in these 
workplaces is different from their distribution in the labour force. The larger the 
difference between the two distributions the larger is the segregation level. 
Beside the firm level, researchers have addressed the topic of ethnic and gender 
segregation at the levels of occupation and industry (see for example, Blackburn & 
Jarman 2006, Carlson 1992, Fossett et al. 1986, Glass 1990, Olzak 1989). But both 
occupations and industries are abstract levels rather than a tangible environment in 
which people work, 11••• occupations and industries do not employ workers or 
constitute settings in which people work" (Reskin et al. 1999 :336). Firms are also 
actors in employment decisions. Hence, it is important to study segregation and the 
stratification of the labour market on the firm level. That is why Baron and Bielby 
urged the researchers of labour market stratification to ｾｾ｢ｲｩｮｧ＠ firm back in" since 
'/firms link the ｾｭ｡｣ｲｯＧ＠ and ｾｭｩ｣ｲｯＧ＠ dimensions of work organization and inequality" 
(Baron & Bielby 1980 :738). 
The current thesis focuses on one aspect of demographic composition of 
organizations: the religious affiliation of workers. The research is relevant to the 
literature on ethnic and racial segregation of the workplace. Although religious 
affiliation, ethnicity, and race are conceptually different, they have the same effect of 
dividing the population into distinctive, usually competing, groups. 
3.3 Factors Affecting Demographic Composition of Workplaces 
Factors that affect the demographic composition of workplaces can be broadly 
categorized into pre-hire and post-hire factors (S0rensen 2004). The pre-hire 
category includes factors affecting the hiring process, that is, the process of matching 
jobs to job seekers. These factors can be further divided into: demand side factors 
(pertaining to the demand of labour, that is, employers and firms) , supply side factors 
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(pertaining to the supply of labour, that is, employees), and the information flow about 
vacant jobs and prospective employees that matches the two sides 1• 
The post-hire category includes factors that affect the employees' turnover and their 
attachment to their firms. In the following, a brief review is presented of the literature 
about each of these two categories of factors, and how they affect the demographic 
composition and segregation of workplaces. Firstly, different modes of job matching 
are introduced. 
3.3. 1 Modes of Job Matching 
Two major modes of job matching can be identified within the literature of labour 
market: informal matches (which can be further subdivided into non-search matches 
and active search through personal intermediaries) and formal matching (Elliott 2000, 
Granovetter 1995). 
In non-search matches, the employment occurs without an active search on the part 
of the employee. Direct job offering from an employer of a firm to a prospective 
employee is an example of this kind of recruitment. This type of job matching is 
mainly used for recruiting professional, technical, and managerial employees (which 
Granovetter (1995) called PTM jobs). In Granovetter's study of PTM jobs in Newton, 
Massachusetts, about 30 percent of the sample did not actively search for their jobs. 
Active search through personal intermediaries, that is, referral hiring, represents 
another type of informal matching. Using social ties is beneficial for both job seeker 
1 The information flow and use of social networks in job search will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
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and employers. For a job seeker, using social ties increases the probability to find a 
job (Battu et al. 2004, Elliott 2001, Green et al. 1999, Tassier & Menczer 2005}, and it 
is less costly in terms of time and money than any other method (Holzer 1988). 
Employers also regard the friends and relatives of their employees as a reliable 
source of information. Besides, using social ties reduces the cost of hiring; for 
example, screening process, advertising costs, and interviewing (Fernandez et al. 
2000, Holzer 1988, Montgomery 1991, Rees 1966). 
In formal job matching, a job seeker uses formal or "open" recruitment channels; for 
example, answering a classified advertisement, sending a resume, or using an 
organizational liaison such as a school placement office or a state employment 
agency. This type of job matching involves an active and relatively open search on 
the part of both employers and employees (Elliott 2000). 
3.3.2 Differentials in Job-Search Strategies 
Although crucial for obtaining jobs, social contacts are not equally important for 
everyone. Empirical research reveals variations in the extent and outcome of using 
social contacts as a job-search method. There are variations by race/ethnicity, class 
position, gender, age and level of education. 
3.3.2. 1 By Race/Ethnicity 
Racial and ethnic groups vary in their job-search strategies. Moreover, the outcomes 
of these job-search strategies may vary for racial and ethnic groups (Battu et al. 
2004, Green et al. 1999} and for different classes of labour (Elliott 2000, Granovetter 
1995). 
Green and colleagues (1999} examined job-search strategies among individuals from 
four ethnic and racial groups: White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian. They analyzed the 
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specific effects on earnings of using informal versus formal job-search strategies, 
strong versus weal< ties among job contacts, and multiplex versus one-dimensional 
social ties among job contacts. Their results showed that Hispanics rely on informal 
search strategies much more than other race and ethnic groups do, and the use of 
these informal strategies leads to lower-paying jobs. They also found that using 
multiplex ties (that is, a person who is a friend or relative, a co-worker, and a 
neighbour) leads to lower-paying jobs for Blacks and higher-paying jobs for Whites. 
Battu and colleagues, in a similar study, examined the job finding methods of different 
ethnic groups in the UK. They found important differences in using social networks as 
a job search method across ethnic groups, and in the outcomes of this method. Their 
results show that Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups and those born outside the UK 
(recent immigrants) lose out disproportionately from using personal networks (Battu 
et al. 2004). 
3.3.2.2 Bv Class of Labour 
Job-search strategies and outcomes may also differ for different classes of labour. 
Elliott (2000, 2001) and Granovetter (1995) show that nonsearch matches play a 
more vital role in filling managerial positions than skilled and general labour positions. 
The rationale is that the loyalty and trust required in this class of labour increase 
organization incentives to search for employees. Besides, managerial positions are 
relatively few in number, so matching can often be more direct. Skilled labour, on the 
other hand, flows more readily through formal channels supported by educational 
credentials, with formal channels also serving to increase the geographic scope of 
prospective searches and hires. In contrast, general labour which possesses neither 
organizational authority (such as managers) nor socially recognized expertise (such 
as skilled labour) favour informal matches that bring active searchers to employers 
(Granovetter 1995). 
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3.3.2.3 By Education 
Many empirical studies show that relying on social contacts for attaining a job is more 
important among less-educated workers than highly-educated ones (for example, 
Battu et al. 2004, Santamaria-Garcia 2003, 2004). However, the reasons for this 
result are not quite clear. Battu et al. (2004) found that the highly educated are more 
likely to offer themselves directly to potential employers and are more likely to 
respond to advertisements. "The highly educated are in a sense more pro-active in 
selling themselves to potential employers via more mainstream methods" (p. 16). 
For Santamaria-Garcia (2003, 2004), the lower cost of using social contacts is the 
driving force behind the reliance on such a channel. Workers with a low level of 
education are expected to be hired in homogeneous jobs and to be paid less. Thus, 
they find social contacts, as a cheaper alternative to formal search, more attractive. 
On the other hand, those with high levels of education prefer to pay higher formal-
search cost in order to find the right job. 
3.3.2.4 By Employment Status 
While unemployed individuals search for jobs, employed ones may also search for 
better jobs. Holzer (1987) argued that the higher costs of search for unemployed 
than for employed job seekers may make the former spend more effort in the search 
and to have lower reservation wages. He provided empirical evidence that young 
male job searchers use more search methods and spend more time per method than 
employed ones. 
3.3.3 Demand-Side Factors 
On the side of employers and firms, the following factors may affect the demographic 
composition of workplaces. 
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3.3.3.1 Hiring Discrimination 
Hiring discrimination implies that employers may be reluctant to hire workers of a 
certain sex or race just because they feel uncomfortable with or hostile to persons 
from these social groups. In his seminal worl< "The Economics of Discrimination': 
Becker (1971) quantifies this "taste for discrimination" by the Discrimination 
Coefficient, DC. DC indicates the "extra cost that an employer feels he/she pays 
when hiring a worker from a group he/she dislikes" (Becker 1971 :14). 
According to Becker's theory, which is based on the assumptions of a competitive 
labour market, employers who express discrimination will pay extra cost to avoid 
hiring workers from the groups they dislike and to hire from different groups. By doing 
so, they will be eventually excluded from the market because they will be less 
efficient than other more egalitarian employers who do not pay this extra cost. 
However, this theory is controversial, especially in situations with high levels of 
unemployment, which make it easier for employers to discriminate without paying 
such extra costs. 
Empirically, hiring discrimination has been considered the main factor affecting the 
demographic composition of workplaces. For example, Carrington and Troske 
(1998:250) show that firms whose owners and/or managers are black are more likely 
to hire more Black workers, and that is assumed to be due to hiring discrimination. 
Similarly, the WSIES data provide strong evidence of widespread hiring 
discrimination among Egyptian employers. 
The relationship between hiring discrimination and workplace segregation is both 
theoretically and empirically established. Becker argued that llthe trade [of labour and 
capital] between two societies is maximized when there is no discrimination, and it 
decreases with all increases in the discrimination" (1971 :22). Becker shows that the 
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minority group is hurt more than the majority as a result of discrimination even if it 
decided to retaliate and discriminate against the majority group. 
However, Carrington and Troske (1998) found that the relationship between hiring 
discrimination and workplace segregation is mediated by the proportion of Blacks 
who are employers. So, although a strong relationship exists between the race of 
employers and that of workers, only a low level of segregation was found, mainly 
because "there are not many Black employers' (1998:232). 
3.3.3.2 Statistical Discrimination 
Statistical discrimination implies that firms use race or sex as a proxy for productivity, 
skills, or employment costs (Reskin et al. 1999:339). Statistical discrimination differs 
from hiring discrimination in that the former is built upon a belief (which may be false) 
that some groups (Whites or Men) are better (for example more productive) to hire 
than others. So, while hiring discrimination is based on employer's "taste" (Becker 
1971 ), statistical discrimination is based on a rational decision to hire the most 
productive workers. 
Statistical discrimination may act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, illustrated by Merton 
(1968:477): "In the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new 
behaviour which makes the original false conception come true". According to the 
statistical discrimination model of Arrow (1972), which explicitly models labour market 
outcomes as a rational expectations equilibrium, employers' beliefs about worl<ers' 
skill levels determine their willingness to hire, which in turn determines the rate of 
return on human capital investment, which determines worl<ers' actual skill levels. 
Blume (2006) introduced a model for statistical discrimination to highlight the role of 
learning in belief formation and in driving equilibrium selection. According to Blume's 
model, there is an outgroup which is the potential victim of statistical discrimination. 
56 
Firms have beliefs about the productivity of this outgroup, and these beliefs are 
revised for each new cohort based upon firms' collective experience with the previous 
cohort. On the other hand, workers must make a decision about investing in skills 
before entering the market, and in making this decision they rely upon their beliefs 
about labour market outcomes, which also arise from learning. Empirically, Mittman 
(1992) shows that the more establishments practice statistical discrimination, the 
more women and minorities will be underrepresented, and the higher the level of 
segregation will be. 
3.3.3.3 Hiring Practices 
The demographic composition of firms is strongly affected by their hiring practices. 
Formalized practices and the existence of formal organizational structures such as 
human resources departments usually increase the opportunities for women and 
minority groups (Baron & Bielby 1980). On the other hand, recruiting through informal 
channels, such as referral hiring, reproduces an establishment's composition 
because workers tend to pass job information to people similar to them (Elliott 2001, 
Fernandez et al. 2000). 
Elliott (2001) provides a systematic examination of the role of insider referrals in 
matching workers to jobs, emphasizing the contribution this process makes to the 
reproduction of ethnic segregation in local labour markets. As Elliott explains: 
"... [Referral hiring] creates a built-in bias toward incumbents: 
members of a particular ethnic group concentrate in particular 
jobs and when new employment opportunities become 
available at their workplace, they pass this information along to 
social contacts, often of the same race and ethnic background" 
(Elliott 2001 :401 ). 
The results of Elliott's work showed that insider referrals account for a third of all new 
hires in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles during the early 1990s with some variation 
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by different ethnic groups. Latinos are more likely than other ethnic groups to gain 
employment through insider referrals. Also, Elliott shows that native-born Blacks who 
acquire jobs through insider referrals are significantly more likely than other types of 
workers to enter, and thus help to sustain, ethnically homogeneous jobs (Elliott 2001 ). 
Mouw (2002) estimated that about 10 percent of the observed workplace segregation 
of the blue-collar employees in the Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality (MCSU I) 
data can be attributed to a combination of informal hiring practices and racial 
homophily in social networks. Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2003) show that 
referral hiring contributed to the overrepresentation of Asians in firms, relative to both 
the pool of people who could be expected to apply for the jobs and the pool of actual 
applicants. 
Employers might also favour job referrals when hiring new employees. Referral hiring 
allows employers to use employees' social ties for their own advantage (Fernandez et 
al. 2000, Montgomery 1991 ). Insider referrals make the pool of job applicants richer 
since they usually enhance the number and the quality of applicants. Besides, an 
insider referrer is likely to help the newcomer in the organizational socialization 
process and perhaps even with job training, thereby boosting productivity and 
enriching the nascent bond between the employer and the new worker (Bacharach et 
al. 2005). 
3.3.3.4 Market-Based Incentives 
An organization's clients sometimes create a biased demand towards some 
ethnic/gender groups. For example, the proportion of Black workers was found to be 
correlated with the number of Black customers of organizations (Carrington & Troske 
1998 :251 ). 
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3.3.3.5 Firm size 
Many scholars document a strong relationship between an establishment's size (in 
terms of number of employees) and the hiring of racial and ethnic minorities. For 
example, Holzer (1998) tried to answer the question: why do small establishments 
hire fewer Blacks than large ones? He concluded that discrimination in hiring may be 
much more pervasive at smaller establishments than larger ones. The main reason 
behind this, according to Holzer, is that smaller firms are less likely to have formal 
human resources departments than larger firms, so they rely heavily on less costly 
informal recruitment channels and subjective hiring procedures such as interviews. 
These informal recruitment methods create greater disadvantages for Blacks. 
3.3.4 Supply-Side Factors 
The following factors may affect the structure of the supply of labour. 
3.3.4.1 Composition of the Labour Pools 
The composition of the labour pool from which firms hire their workers is an important 
determinant of their demographic composition. If firms hire workers based on 
objective bases (skill level for example) regardless their sex or race, it would be 
expected that the sex and race composition of these firms is roughly proportional to 
that of the supply of qualified workers in the labour pool (Raskin et al. 1999). 
Carrington and Troske (1994) found that, among small-to-medium firms, the more 
female-intensive the industry, the greater women's share of the jobs in these firms. 
Similarly, Raskin et al. (1999) found a positive correlation (r=O. 71) between women's 
share of full-time jobs in a national sample of establishments and their share of jobs 
in their establishments' industry. 
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Two important factors may affect the composition of the labour pool for a firm: firstly, 
the types of skills required by the firm and the distribution of these skill by sex and 
race; and, secondly, the composition of the local labour market. The distribution of 
individuals across occupations and workplaces is partly determined the underlying 
demographic distribution of human capital and skills (S0rensen 2004). Factors 
causing these differences (in human capital and skill) across social groups include 
segregation in the educational system which leads to higher sex/racial segregation in 
jobs with greater general skill and training requirements (Farkas & Vicknair 1996). 
The composition of the local labour pool may lead to segregation in workplaces 
through the role of residential segregation and its implications for the matching of 
workers to jobs (Holzer 1991, Mouw 2002). If employers rely on local labour pools, 
workplaces will reflect this uneven racial distribution. For example, Mouw (2002) 
estimated that approximately 10 percent of the observed workplace segregation of 
blue-collar workers in the MCSUI data was caused by residential segregation. Also, 
Holzer {1991, 1996) found that firms' proximity to African Americans affects the 
likelihood of Blacks to apply and to acquire jobs in these firms. 
Thus, when measuring segregation at the level of the workplace it is a good idea to 
control for the effects of occupational and residential segregation. A firm's tendency 
to hire more Blacks may be due to the fact that more Blacks live around this firm, or 
because the proportion of Blacks in the industry or the activity of this firm is high. 
3.3.4.2 Relative Numbers. Group Power. and Threat 
The demographic composition of labour market influences a firm's composition 
because it may affect the balance of power between different groups (Reskin et al. 
1999). In general, the more attractive an organization, in terms of wages, benefits, 
and promotion opportunities, the greater the current workers' tendency to exclude 
outsiders especially from ethnic and minority groups (Carrington & Troske 1998). 
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3.3.4.3 Labour Costs and Group Status 
Employment costs may vary for equally productive workers who differ in race or sex. 
For example, White male labour usually costs more than hiring women or nonwhite 
male workers. So, firms that can afford hiring White males are likely to hire them 
because this may imply a higher status for the employers (Raskin et al. 1999). In his 
audit study of sex discrimination in hiring in a sample of restaurants in Philadelphia, 
Neumark (1996:928-931) found that in high-price restaurants, job applications from 
women had an estimated probability of receiving a job offer that was lower by about 
0.4 (even after controlling for human capital and skill level), and an estimated 
probability of receiving an interview that was lower by about 0.35. 
3.3.5 Post-Hire Factors 
Most labour market research has focused on the pre-hire factors, that is, those 
factors affecting the probability of a job seeker to get a job and enter a firm (for 
example, job search and recruitment processes). However, exit factors, factors that 
may cause worker to leave the firm, should have similar attention. As S0rensen 
(2004) explains, a firm may recruit its employees based on equal opportunity 
practices, and may start with all social groups proportionately represented in it, and 
yet segregation may occur due to the exit patterns of employees and their responses 
to changes of the racial composition of their workplaces. 
Smensen (2004) studied how workers respond to changes in the racial composition 
of their workplaces. The results indicated that workplace's racial composition 
significantly affects employees' turnover. Exit rates were found to be inversely related 
to the level of same-race representation at the time of organizational entry and 
increases when workers experience declines in same-race representation. However, 
S0rensen found that turnover rates do not decline in response to increases in 
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representation of same-race. This indicates that initial status can have a lasting 
impact on the attachment of employees to their firms. 
3.4 Consequences of Workplace Segregation 
A firm's sex and race composition is an important structural property that would affect 
employees' social behaviour. Pfeffer stressed this importance: 
1
'{T]he relative proportions of [groups] condition the form and 
nature of social interaction and group processes that in turn 
affect workers' psychological well-being, attitudes, and even job 
performance." (Pfeffer 1983:303-304) 
An establishment's sex and race composition could have consequential effects on the 
worker, group, and firm levels (Reskin et al. 1999). 
3.4.1 Effects on Workers 
3.4. 1. 1 Performance Pressure: 
Workers from minority groups may feel highly visible to others in their workplaces, 
and this visibility may increase their feeling of performance pressure. According to 
Kanter's (1977:21 0-214) theory of proportional representation, individuals who hold 
minority positions experience greater symptoms of psychological distress and anxiety 
compared to others working in settings dominated by members of the same gender or 
race. The source for this stress, according to Kanter, is partly that minority group 
members, or "tokens" in Kanter's terms, feel that they are symbolic representatives of 
their "type". This feeling adds more pressure on them to perform well as this may be 
consequential to other individuals of their social group. 
Empirically, in a sample of Black leaders in the US, Jackson et al. (1995:550-551) 
found that Black leaders who were outnumbered by Whites in their workplaces 
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suffered higher levels of stress than those who worked in balanced situations or 
situations where Blacks outnumbered Whites. They also found that men and women 
who were outnumbered in their worl< settings by the opposite sex exhibited higher 
scores of distress and anxiety than those who were surrounded by equal or greater 
number of the same sex. 
3.4. 1.2 Job Satisfaction and Turnover 
Empirical research on work groups supports the hypothesis that negative reactions of 
majority group members to minorities are correlated with the proportion of the 
minority. For example, Wharton and Bird (1996:11 0) found that men in predominantly 
male and mixed-sex work groups were more satisfied than men in all-male groups. 
Moreover, both male and female workers in gender-balanced groups expressed more 
satisfaction than workers in homogenous groups. Regarding workers' turnover, as 
explained earlier, S0rensen (2004) showed that the racial composition of a workplace 
affects employees' turnover. He found that exit rates are inversely related to the level 
of same-race representation at the time of organizational entry and increase when 
workers experience declines in same-race representation. 
3.4.2 Effects on Groups 
Empirical research emphasises the importance of workplace sex and race 
composition on the probability of intergroup contact and group cohesion (for example, 
Jacobs 1986, South et al. 1983). In a sample of 76 workgroups in a public agency, 
South et al. (1983:594-596) found that having a higher proportion of female group 
members leads to less frequent contact between females and male group members 
and to less social support from those members. Furthermore, South et al. showed 
that the female proportion in a workgroup is negatively correlated with the amount of 
encouragement for promotion they receive from their male supervisors. 
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Empirical results concerning the effect of the demographic composition of workplace 
and the outcome of the intergroup contact and group cohesion seem controversial. 
Interpersonal attraction and trust hypothetically increase with workgroup homogeneity 
(Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954, McPherson et at. 2001 ). Although South et al (1983) 
support this hypothesis (as they found a negative correlation between female 
proportion and the social support they receive from male colleagues), Wharton and 
Bird (1996:1 09) do not. They found a positive correlation between the percentage of 
women in university departments and workers' perception of cohesion, where men in 
all-male departments expressed the least cohesion and men in predominately female 
departments expressed the most. 
3.4.3 Effects on Firms 
The effect of the organization's composition on its performance seems to be 
contradictory at both theoretical and empirical levels (although most empirical 
research indicates that the relationship is curvilinear). On the theoretical level, 
Kanter's (1977:21 0-214) theory of proportional representation implies that the 
performance pressure on minorities decreases as their proportion increases in 
worl<place. So, a group's performance is expected to enhance as the minority-
majority ratio approaches parity (that is heterogeneity). In contrast, as homogeneity 
fosters trust and cohesion and facilitates communication (McPherson et al. 2001) it 
should enhance group performance. 
Empirically, and supporting Kanter, the proportion of women was found positively 
correlated to an organization's profitability, which may be considered a proxy for 
performance (unpublished data for JK Hellerstein, D Neumark and KR Troske cited in 
Reskin et al. (1999:350)). In contrast, Allmendinger and Hackman (1995:435-437), in 
their study of 78 symphony orchestras, found that measures of performance decline 
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as the proportion of women increases until it approaches 50 percent, then, the 
downward trend flattens or reverses. 
3.5 Measuring Workplace Segregation 
The level of workplace segregation can be quantified using one of segregation 
indices. Although researchers have shown a great interest in studying and measuring 
segregation at different levels {by residence, occupation, job, and workplace), no 
consensus has emerged on how segregation should be measured, nor what the best 
measure is. 
One reason for this lack of consensus {as discussed in Chapter 2) is the complexity 
of the concept of segregation which has many dimensions {Massey & Denton 1988). 
Another reason, proposed by James and Taeuber {1985), is the absence of a clear 
definition of segregation: 
"the absence of a clear set of criteria, derived from a 
comprehensive definition of segregation , which can be used to 
evaluate the different measures that have been proposed." 
(James & Taeuber 1985:2) 
Duncan and Duncan (1955) showed that most segregation indices can be expressed 
as a function of the geometrical construct segregation curve (1955 :21 0). In the 
following, a summary is presented of the segregation curve and some of the popular 
segregation indices. 
3.5. 1 The Segregation Curve 
The "Segregation Curve" is the core concept in the literature on segregation indices. 
It is usually plotted to give a whole picture of segregation, and to compare 
segregation between two or more populations. Following Duncan & Duncan (1955), 
to illustrate how to plot the segregation curve, suppose that there are a number, F, of 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -
firms in total. The firm i contains c; Coptic workers and m; Muslim ·workers, totalling to 
F 
t;=C;+m;. The total number of Coptic workers is C = L:c;, the total number of Muslim 
i=l 
F F 
workers is M = L:m;, and the total number workers is T = L:t;. For each firm, 
i=l i=l 
the Copts proportion, p; = c; I t; is computed, then, firms are arranged in descending 
order according to the value of p;. Then, we compute the cumulative proportions 
Xr=(c1+c2+ ... +c;)IC and Yr=(m1+m2+ ... +m;)IM of Copts and Muslims respectively. The 
segregation curve is the function Y; = f(XJ, as graphed in Figure 3.1 . This segregation 
curve, together with the overall Copts proportion P = CIT, contains all the necessary 
information to calculate most of the segregation indices. 
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Figure 3.1: Hypothetical segregation curve 
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As plotted in Figure 3.1 , the diagonal (the line segment ab) represents the case of 
complete integration (zero"segregation), the case where the proportion of Coptic 
workers within each firm equals the proportion of Copts in the workforce, i.e., Pi=P for 
all i. On the other hand, the case of complete segregation is represented by the curve 
afb (the horizontal and vertical axes), and it is the case where Copts and Muslims 
never work together in the same firm. The position of the segregation curve (aceb) 
relative to the diagonal (complete integration) and the curve afb (complete 
segregation) indicates the level of workplace segregation. 
Segregation curves can be used to compare levels of segregation among several 
populations. For example, the curves Band C, in Figure 3.2, represent higher levels 
of segregation than that of curve A. However, it is problematic to compare levels of 
segregation when segregation curves cross (the case of the curves 8 and C in Figure 
3.2). Using different segregation indices to compare segregation levels for crossing 
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Figure 3.2: Using segregation curves to compare levels of segregation 
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segregation curves may produce contradictory results. In this case, the researcher 
should put some weights to each part of the curves, and compare the curves 
according to these weights. For example, if the lower part (below the crossing point 
e), which represents firms with high proportion of Coptic workers, should contribute 
more to the level of segregation, then curve B should be considered to represent 
higher level of segregation than curve C. 
As will be shown below, most of the segregation indices measure or describe this 
relative position of segregation curve. 
3.5.2 G/ni Index 
The Gini index, G, was developed by Jahn, Schmid, and Schrag (1947). One 
mathematical expression for the Gini index is given by James & Taeuber (1985:5): 
F F 
G = LLt;tjiP;- pjlt2T 2P(l-P) 3·1 
i=l j=l 
The numerator in Gini index is the weighted mean of the absolute value of all possible 
differences between firms in the proportion of Copts. The denominator is the 
maximum possible value for the numerator. With reference to the segregation curve 
in Figure 3.1 , the Gini index represents the size of the area between the segregation 
curve and the diagonal (the dotted area) expressed as a proportion of the total area 
under the diagonal (Duncan & Duncan 1955:211 ). 
Like other segregation indices discussed here, G varies between 0 and 1 . It attains 
the value 0 in the case of complete integration (where the segregation curve 
coincides the diagonal, that is, when p;=Pfor alii); and attains the value 1 in the case 
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of complete segregation (where segregation curve coincides with the curve afb, in 
this case p;may be either 0 or 1). 
3.5.3 Index of Dissimilarity 
The index of dissimilarity, D, is one of the most often used segregation indices in 
empirical research because it is simple to calculate and easy to interpret. D is the 
maximum vertical distance between the diagonal and the segregation curve in Figure 
3.1 (Duncan & Duncan 1955:211). One simple expression forD is given by James & 
Taeuber (1985:6): 
F 
D = L:t;IPi -PI12TP(l-P) 3-2 
i=l 
Dis the weighted mean of the absolute deviation of proportion of Copts in each firm, 
p;, from Copts proportion in the workforce, P, expressed as a fraction of its maximum. 
D can also be interpreted as the proportion of Coptic (or Muslim) workers that should 
be displaced from their firms in order for Copts and Muslims to be proportionally 
represented in all firms, that is, in order for p;=P for all i. That is why D is sometimes 
called the displacement index (Duncan & Duncan 1955:211). 
3.5.4 Cowgills' Index 
Cowgill and Cowgill (1951) developed their index to measure residential segregation, 
and they argued that an adequate measurement of segregation must be based on 
small residential units, such as blocks, because this would reveal the real lines of 
division between majority and minority populations. In the context of workplace 
segregation, the general form of Cowgills' Index, Co, is the ratio of the number of 
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Muslim workers working in firms containing only Muslims to the total number of 
Muslims. 
In Figure 3.1, the Co index represents the length of the part be of the segregation 
curve which coincides with the vertical line bf. 
3.5.5 The Variance Ratio Index 
The Variance Ratio Index, V, is given by (James & Taeuber 1985:6): 
F 
V = L>;(P; -P) 2 /TP(l-P) 3-3 
i=l 
Thus, Vis the weighted mean square deviation of p; from P expressed as a fraction of 
its maximum possible value. 
3.5.6 The Information Theory Segregation Index 
The Information Theory Segregation Index, H, was introduced by Theil and Finizza 
(1971), and is defined by (James & Taeuber 1985:8): 
F 
H= l:J;(E-E;)I ET 3-4 
i=l 
Where: 
E = Plog 2 (1/ P) + (1- P)log2 [1/(1- P)] 
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H is considered as a measure of the average extent to which the overall ethnic {or 
religious) composition differs from that of each firm expressed as a fraction of its 
maximum possible value. 
3.5.7 Atkinson's Family of Inequality Indices 
This family of inequality indices was introduced by Allison {1978) to measure the 
inequality in the distribution of income. However, it can be adapted as a measure of 
segregation. It can be expressed as (James & Taeuber 1985:9): 
3·5 
Where 8 is a shape parameter, which ranges from 0 to 1. This parameter indicates 
how to weight the increments to segregation contributed by firms located at different 
place on the segregation curve. For values of 8>0.5, firms with p;>P produce a larger 
increment to A than do firms with p,<P. When 8=0.5, firms will have the same 
importance regardless the values of Pi· The correct selection of 8 may help solving 
the problem when comparing levels of segregation of two populations when 
segregation curves cross, as discussed before. 
3.5.8 Evaluation of Segregation Indices 
As noted before, different indices may produce different, and sometimes 
contradictory, implications about the segregation level. So, it is very important to 
select the right index based on the assumptions and objectives of each study. 
However, there are a set of desirable properties that any index should satisfy. James 
and Taeuber {1985) outlined these properties as follows: 
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1. Organization Equivalence: the measured level of segregation should not be 
changed if one firm is divided into a number of firms with an identical 
proportion of Copts, or if two or more firms with the same proportion combine 
into one. 
2. Size /nvariance: the measured level of segregation should be unaffected if 
the numbers of workers, Muslims and Copts, in each firm are changed with a 
constant proportion. 
3. Transfers: segregation level should be reduced if Coptic workers move from 
firms of higher to lower proportion of Copts (or if Muslim workers move in the 
opposite direction). 
4. Composition lnvariance: proportional changes in the numbers of workers of 
a specific religion in each firm should not affect the measured level of 
segregation. For example, if the number of Coptic workers is doubled in each 
firm, this should not affect the segregation index. 
5. Lorenz Criterion: if segregation curve A is somewhere above and nowhere 
below the segregation curve B, then the segregation index should rank A as 
having lower segregation than B. 
Table 3.1 summarizes how the six segregation indices previously presented satisfy 
some or all of the five desirable properties listed above, with each property 
corresponding to one column, and with "Y" in any cell indicating that the 
corresponding index in the row satisfies the property in the column and "N" indicating 
the opposite. The table shows that only two indices, G and A, satisfy all five 
properties. Beside these properties, the popularity, simplicity, and its clear relation to 
the segregation curve make G the preferred index to use in the current thesis. 
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Table 3.1: Evaluation of segregation indices. 
Properties 
Indices 1 2 3 4 5 
Gini,G y y y y y 
Index of Dissimilarity, 0 y y N y N 
Cowgills' Index, Co y y N N N 
The Variance Ratio Index, V y y y N N 
The Information Theory Index, H y y y N N 
Atkinson, A y y y y y 
3.5.9 Modified Gini Index 
The standard Gini index (G), like most other segregation indices, measures the 
deviation of the distribution of workers (represented by the segregation curve aceb in 
Figure 3.1) from the diagonal straight line ab which represents the case in which all 
workplaces have the same proportion of Copts. As Carrington and Troske (1997) 
show, it is quite possible, even with a completely random allocation of workers to 
firms, that the segregation curve is not identical to the diagonal line (especially in the 
case of firms of small sizes and/or low a proportion of the minority group P). For 
example, with a 10 percent proportion of minority, it is impossible for firms with a 
number of workers of 7, 15, or any other number not divisible by ten, to have perfect 
proportional representation for minority and majority groups (since we can not have 
0.7 or 1.5 worker(s)l). This implies that, even with the random allocation of workers to 
firms, the index of segregation, G, will be greater than zero. 
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Carrington and Troske (1997) suggested a modified Gini index , G , which measures 
the deviation of segregation curves from the curve of randomness (which represents 
the case in which workers are randomly allocated to firms) (as presented by the 
dotted area x in Figure 3.3): 
r-G* if G;zG* "_ 1-G* 3-6 G- G-G* 
if G<G* G* 
Where G is the calculated standard Gini index and G* is the calculated Gini index if 
the workers (with minority proportion P) were randomly distributed to the firms (with 
the given sizes)2• G can take a negative value when the segregation curve lies 
above the random curve and closer to the diagonal of evenness. In this case the 
negative value of G not only indicates that there is no segregation in the workplaces 
but also indicates a higher tendency of people to work with others of different groups 
than to work with same-group people. 
The modified Gini index is more suitable for the proposed models in this these than 
the standard Gini index, or other indices which measure the deviation from the 
evenness, for two reasons. Firstly, we are interested in simulating a labour market 
2 G* can be calculated by simulating a random allocation of workers, with given Nand 
P, to a number of firms F, with specified size distribution. The value of G* used in 
subsequent sections is the average of value obtained through 200 simulations of a 
random allocation of workers to firms (see Appendix C for the NetLogo code of this 
simulation). 
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Figure 3.3: Modified Gini Index 
(Based on Carrington & Troske 1997) 
with small-to-medium firms (which increases the possibility of getting a high Gini 
index with a complete random allocation of workers). Secondly, we are particularly 
interested in measuring the systematic rather than random changes in workplace 
segregation. So when the model indicates an increasing level of workplace 
segregation this should be related to the behaviour of the agents and the model 's 
settings rather than to random effects. 
3.6 Workplace Segregation and Hiring Discrimination in Egypt 
This section presents an assessment of workplace segregation and hiring 
discrimination based on religion in Egypt. The objective here is not to give an 
accurate measure for workplace segregation as there are no data available for this 
purpose, but rather to give an overview of the phenomenon. The assessment is 
based on data from the Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES) (for 
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detailed description of WSIES see Section 6.4). Only a subsample of those small-to-
medium enterprises with between 10 and 50 workers inclusive are considered. This 
subsample includes 165 enterprises with 1765 workers. 
3.6.1 Workplace Segregation 
Within the subsample, 93 (around 5.4 percent) of 1728 workers were Copts. With the 
absence of workplace segregation, one would expect the proportion of Copts in each 
firm to be close to 5.4 (which is the overall proportion of Copts in the subsample). 
However, the data show that this is not the case. As Table 3.2 presents, about 81 
percent of enterprises (133 enterprises) have no Copts at all. 
Table 3.2: Frequency and percent of distribution of percentages of Copts. 
Percentage of Copts Number of Firms Percentage of all firms 
0 133 81 
6 3 2 
7 
9 
10 8 5 
14 
16 2 
20 3 2 
25 
30 2 
36 2 
50 3 2 
60 
70 2 
80 
100 
Total 165 100 
Source: based on data from (WS/ES 2005). 
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Figure 3.4: Percent distribution of Copts in firms with Coptic worker(s) 
The Copts are distributed over 32 enterprises (out of 165), and the distribution 
exhibits a high level of segregation. For example, 27 enterprises (84 percent) of those 
enterprises with Coptic workers have 1 0 percent or more Copts, 8 enterprises (25 
percent) have 50 percent or more Copts, and one enterprise was found to employ 
only Copts (see Figure 3.4) . 
Figure 3.5 presents the segregation curve for the subsample of WSIES data. The 
segregation curve is very close to the horizontal and vertical lines ab and be 
respectively indicating a high level of segregation. 
The level of segregation can be quantified using one of the segregation indices 
presented earlier in Section 3.5. Using WSIES data, the Gini index, G=0.932, which 
indicates a high level of segregation. The Dissimilarity Index was also computed, 
0 =0.825, which means that about 83 percent of the Coptic (or Muslim) workers would 
have to change their workplace in order to attain perfect integration at Egyptian 
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Figure 3.5: Segregation curve for WSIES data 
workplaces (when the proportion of Copts in each firm equals their overall proportion) 
(Duncan & Duncan 1955:211 ). 
Comparing that level of workplace segregation in Egypt with other studies may give a 
clearer picture of its magnitude. For example, using Worker-Establishment 
Characteristics Database (WECO) from 1990, Carrington and Troske (1998:243) 
estimated the Gini coefficients of Black-White interfirm segregation in a sample of 
manufacturing establishments. They found high levels of segregation at the national 
level (with Gini coefficient, G=0.78) and more modest segregation when computed as 
a weighted mean of the index's values for different geographic areas (weighted Gini 
coefficient is 0.60). This shows that there is a relatively high level of segregation in 
the Egyptian labour market compared to the US context. 
78 
3.6.2 Hiring Discrimination 
The WSIES data provide strong evidence that employers practice hiring 
discrimination based on religion. As Figure 3.6 shows, there is a tendency for the 
employers to hire workers of the same religion as their own. Muslim employers hire 
only 1.5 percent of their workers from Copts (while Copts represent about 5.4 percent 
of total labour force in the subsample). Similarly, Coptic employers practice hiring 
discrimination against Muslim workers. They hire only 63.4 percent of Muslim workers 
(while they represent about 94.6 percent of the labour force). 
Using the Chi-Square test of independence (results are shown in Table 3.3) confirms 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between employers' religious identity 
and the religious identities of hired workers. To measure the strength of the 
relationship, the Eta3 coefficient was calculated between Employers' religious identity 
(the independent variable, coded as 1 =Muslim and 2=Copt) and the percentage of 
Coptic workers in the firm (the dependent variable), and it was 0.718 which is a high 
value indicating a strong relationship. 
3 Eta coefficient is a nominal by interval measure of association. 
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Coptic and Muslim workers by employer's religion 
Table 3.3 Distribution of workers by employer's religious identity. 
Employer 
Total 
Muslim Copt 
Worker 
Muslim 1511 23 1534 (1451) (83) 
Copt 121 70 191 (181) (10) 
Total 1632 93 1725 
The numbers between parentheses are the expected counts when assuming independence of 
employer and worker's religious identities. 
Pearson Chi-Square= 411.42, degrees of freedom (d.f.)=1, Significance<0.05 
Source: based on data in (WSIES 2005) 
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3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the concept of workplace segregation has been introduced, and the 
empirical literature about the factors affecting the demographic composition of 
workplaces has been reviewed. These factors were categorized into two groups: 
1. Pre-hire factors which affect the hiring process: 
• Demand-side factors include: hiring discrimination, statistical discrimination, 
hiring practices, market-based incentives, and firm size. 
• Supply-side factors include: composition of labour pools; relative numbers, 
group power, and threat; labour costs and group status; 
• information flow about vacant jobs (to be discussed in Chapter 4) 
2. Post-hire factors which affect the employees' turnover 
Then, the negative consequences of workplace segregation were discussed at the 
worker, group, and firm levels. Some of the most popular indices of workplaces 
segregation were evaluated, and it was shown that the Gini and modified Gini indices 
are the most suitable for the current thesis. 
Finally, an overview of levels of worl<place segregation and hiring discrimination in 
Egypt based on data from WSIES showed that they are high. 
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4 SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SEGREGATION 
4.1 Aims of This Chapter 
This chapter provides a review of the literature about social networl<s as a means for 
job search and recruitment. Section 4.2 provides an introduction and definition of 
social networks, and explains the importance of studying social networks. In Section 
4.3, the core principles of the network approach are discussed, and in Section 4.4 a 
brief historical background for social network analysis and some popular network 
models are presented. Then, Section 4.5 introduces the main theories of network 
formation, and Section 4.6 discusses the challenges in collecting social network data. 
The origins of social relations, and how social networks change during the life course 
are presented in Section 4.7 while social impact theory and the effects of social 
networks on individuals' behaviour are discussed in Section 4.8. The concept of 
social segregation is presented in Section 4.9. Section 4.10 discusses the use of 
social networks as a job-search method, and, finally, Section 4.11 discusses the 
relationship between social networks and workplace segregation. 
4.2 Introduction 
Understanding social networks, and the social processes that form them, is a central 
concern for many disciplines including sociology (Wasserman & Faust 1994). Social 
networks have been found to have important implications for attitude formation (Lee 
et al. 2004}, social mobility (Lin 1999), getting a job (Granovetter 1973, 1995), 
cascading dynamics of fads and fashion, and diffusion of norms and innovation 
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(Watts 2002), the spread of infectious disease (Morris & Kretzschmar 1995, 1997), 
media and ICT use for information exchange at work (Haythornthwaite & Wellman 
1998), and in personal communications (Licoppe & Smoreda 2005). 
A social network is a set of actors ("nodes") and the relations ("ties" or "edges") 
between these actors. The nodes may be individuals, groups, organizations, or 
societies. The ties may fall within the same level of analysis (e.g., individual-to-
individual ties) or may cross levels of analysis (for example, individual-to-group ties) 
(Wasserman & Faust 1994). 
4.2. 1 Ego-centric, Socio-centric, and Open-system Networks 
Based on the main subject and focus of research, social networks can be classified 
into three kinds: ego-centric, socio-centric, and open-system networks. 
Ego-centric network studies concentrate on specific actors or "egos" and those who 
have relations with them, called alters. That is, from the participant's perspective, 
ego-centric networks constitute a ｾｮ･ｴｷｯｲｫ＠ of meJJ or a network of actors (alters) with 
whom the participant has some relationship. Socio-centric networks are considered 
closed systems, or networks in a box. Networks of children in a classroom or of 
worl<ers in a firm are closed system networks and the ones most often studied in 
terms of the fine points of network structure. Open system networks are networks in 
which the boundaries are not necessarily clear; they are not in a box. A society itself 
is an example of this kind of open system networks. 
4.2.2 Essential Dimensions of Social Ties 
Network ties can be classified into a number of categories according to their nature 
(Katz et al. 2004). These include communication ties (such as who talks to whom, or 
who gives information or advice to whom), forma/ties (such as who reports to whom), 
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affective ties (such as who likes whom, or who trusts whom), material or work flow 
ties (such as who gives money or other resources to whom), proximity ties (who is 
spatially or electronically close to whom), and cognitive ties (such as who knows who 
knows whom). 
However, actors may share more than one type of tie (described as sharing a 
multiplex tie). For example, two academic colleagues might have a formal tie (one is 
an assistant professor and reports to the other, who is the department chairperson) 
and an affective tie (they are friends) and a proximity tie (their offices are two doors 
away) (Scott 1991 ). 
Network ties can also be categorized according to the tie strength into strong ties 
(such as immediate family members and close friends) and weak ties (such as 
acquaintances) (Granovetter 1973, 1995). According to Granovetter: 
"the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the 
tie." (1973:1361) 
The distinction between strong and weak ties involves a multitude of facets, including 
affect, mutual obligations, reciprocity, and intensity. Strong ties are particularly 
valuable when an individual seeks socioemotional support (Wellman 1990) and often 
entail a high level of trust. Weak ties are more valuable when individuals are seeking 
diverse or unique information from someone outside their regular frequent contacts. 
This information could include new job or market opportunities. 
Ties may be symmetric (nondirectional) (for example, X attends a meeting with Y) or 
asymmetric (vary in direction) (for example, X gives advice to Y vs. X gets advice 
from Y). Ties may also vary in content (for example, X talks to Y about the weather 
and to Z about sports), frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), and medium (face-to-
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face conversation, written memos, e-mail, instant messaging, etc.). Finally, ties may 
vary in sign, ranging from positive (X likes Y) to negative (X dislikes Y) (Scott 1991 ). 
4.3 Core Principles of Network Approach 
Wellman (1988) has identified five fundamental principles that provide some 
"underlying intellectual unity" to the network approach. 
1 . People's behaviour is best predicted by examining the web of relationships in 
which they are embedded rather than examining their drives, attitudes, or 
demographic characteristics. That web of relationships presents opportunities 
and imposes constraints on people's behaviour. 
2. The focus of analysis should be the relationships between units, rather than 
the units themselves or their intrinsic characteristics. 
3. Analytic methods must not hinge on the conventional assumption of 
independence. A population or sample is defined relationally rather than 
categorically. Therefore, interdependence among units is assumed. 
4. Understanding a social system requires more than merely aggregating the 
dyadic ties. The flow of information and resources between two people 
depends not simply on their relationship to each other but on their 
relationships to everybody else. 
5. Groups sometimes have fuzzy rather than firm boundaries. The building 
blocks of organizations are not discrete groups but rather overlapping 
networks. Individuals generally have cross-cutting relationships to a multitude 
of groups. 
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4.4 Historical Background for Social Network Analysis 
The roots of social network analysis go back to the 1930s with a group of German 
psychologists specialized in "Gestalt psychology" (associated principally with the work 
of Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Kurt Koffka) (Scott 1991 ). The word 
"Gestalt" in German means "shape" or "figure", and it was used refer to a concept of 
"wholeness". The Gestalt Theory started as a theory of perception to explain how the 
human brain recognizes objects, and it proposes that figures are recognized as 
organized patterns or "wholes" that have properties distinct from those of their parts. 
For example, a dog is not recognized by first identifying its parts (feet, ears, nose, tail, 
etc.), and then inferring the dog from those component parts. Instead, the dog is 
perceived as a whole, all at once. According to Gestalt Theory, people have 
preconceived conceptual schemes, or patterns, built into their minds, and perception 
is a kind of pattern-matching process. So, the importance of structures is greatly 
stressed in this theory. 
Jacob Moreno (1889-1974), one of the Gestalt psychologists, is considered the father 
of ｾｾｳｯ｣ｩｯｭ･ｴｲｹＢＮ＠ Sociometry is a quantitative method for measuring social 
relationships. Moreno was studying whether the psychological state of individuals 
within a group is related to the relationships between the group members (Scott 
1991). He invented the "Sociogram" as a diagrammatic representation of the 
relationships between people in a social group. Typically, sociograms consist of dots, 
or "nodes" that represent people, with the relations or connections between them 
represented by lines. In a book Who Shall Survive firstly published in 1934, Moreno 
described or alluded to many concepts that eventually defined social networks and 
their analysis (Moreno 1953). 
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4.4. 1 Graph Theory and Random Network Model 
Like a sociogram, a graph, in mathematical terms, is a structure or diagram consisting 
of points (vertices or nodes) that are connected by lines (edges) representing the 
relations between them. Graph theory is the branch of mathematics that describes 
these graphs. The history of graph theory goes back to 1736 with the paper written by 
Leonhard Euler on the famous problem of Seven Bridges of Konigsberg. 
One of the earliest attempts to model social networks dates back to the seminal work 
on random graph theory by Paul Erdos and Alfred Renyi (the so-called E-R model) in 
the 1950s. The basic E-R model requires connecting a number of N nodes through n 
edges chosen randomly. The systematic study of random graphs was initiated by 
Erdos and Renyi with the original purpose of studying, by means of probabilistic 
methods, the properties of graphs as a function of the increasing number of random 
connections. 
The next significant development in research on network analysis was the publication 
of a paper by Cartwright and Harary (1956), when they showed that sociograms such 
as Moreno's could be analysed using graph theory. Before Cartwright and Harary's 
work, social scientists who were working on sociograms had described the relations 
represented by their diagrams qualitatively using words. The significant contribution 
of Cartwright and Harary was to linl< these entirely qualitative sociograms of social 
science, with the quantitative analyses of graph theory. 
4.4.2 The Small-World Problem 
In 1967, the social psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment to 
estimate the average path length in a social network, and to test the hypothesis that 
members of any large social network (in his case, the population of the United States) 
would be connected to each other through short chains of intermediate 
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acquaintances; a phenomenon that had been colloquially known as "the small world 
problem". 
In order to test this idea, Milgram introduced a simple experiment by sending packets 
to 296 randomly-selected individuals in Nebraska and Kansas, with the aim of 
sending the pacl<ets to one of two target persons in the Boston area. The task 
Milgram set for his subjects had the additional constraint that each person could send 
the packet (after recording certain demographic details about themselves) only to 
someone whom they knew on a first-name basis, and who they thought was more 
likely to know the target than they were themselves. To inform their decisions, 
Milgram provided some information about the targets, including their names, 
addresses, and occupations. He then tracked each of the packets, by requesting that 
participants tear off a card and mail it directly to him at Harvard. 
The result of Milgram's experiment was as follows: out of 296 chains, only 217 chains 
started, and 64 completed. The number of intermediate nodes varied from 2 to 10, 
with a median of 5 and a mean of 6, which suggesting that the average number of 
intermediaries that connect any random two people in US is 6. This result was has 
been referred to by the phrase "six degrees of separation". 
4.4.3 Granovetter and the Strength of Weak Ties 
Another influential work in the development of contemporary social network analysis 
was Mark Granovetter's paper 1'The Strength of Weak Ties'' which was developed 
from the "Small World" hypothesis proven by Milgram (Granovetter 1973). 
Granovetter was studying the ways in which people acquire information about job 
opportunities through their informal social contacts and the nature of links, or ties, 
involved in this transmission of information: are they "strong" or "weal(' ties. 
Granovetter conducted a survey of successful job applicants in the Boston area of the 
United States. After interviewing 1 02 of these people, Granovetter noted that his 
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question about ttwhether the person whose information that led to a job was ,a 
friend": often provoked the reply: ttNo, just an acquaintance". Granovetter developed 
the idea that the significant links (for information transfer) in a networl< are not the 
strong connections, but the weaker and more tenuous ones. 
Based on the results of his survey, Granovetter found that strong ties within a 
network, for example those between close friends or family members usually create 
closed groups of people. For example, in a family, there may be close ties between 
parents and children, and also between the children, in effect creating "triangulated" 
groups of strong links. Weaker links, however, tend to connect between social 
groups. For example, we may have a friend who lives in a different country with 
whom we only make contact occasionally. However, this friend is likely to have an 
entirely different group of close contacts to our own, and our "weak" link puts us in 
connection with an otherwise far"removed social group. Without this weak link, we 
might have no contact with these other people at all. 
In terms of job"hunters, Granovetter surmised that the close"knit groups of strong 
contacts were unlikely to provide job prospects because they were in effect "closed"; 
the members only have contact with each other, and the group is unlikely to be very 
large. In contrast, weak ties put a job hunter in contact with a much larger network, 
where through tenuous links, they are more likely to encounter someone who they 
had not heard about before, who was looking to employ someone. Granovetter's work 
is also significant because he was the first to introduce the concept of the network 
bridge. A network bridge is a link connecting different groups of close contacts that 
would otherwise be unconnected. This is exactly how the weak ties in a network act. 
4.4.4 Small-Worlds Model 
The work of Granovetter inspired researchers worldwide to look for small world 
phenomena in many different domains during the 1970s and 1980s. Another 
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breakthrough in network theory was made in 1998 when Duncan Watts and Steven 
Strogatz published a paper titled ucol/ective dynamics of 'small-world' networks, 
which provided a mathematical model and explanation for the small world 
phenomenon proven by Milgram (Watts & Strogatz 1998). This paper is considered to 
be one of the most influential works in the history of network theory. 
As explained earlier by Granovetter, social networks contain both random and non-
random elements. Non-randomness originates from the overlap of close friends, or 
strong ties, and it is manifested in cliques where friends of a given individual are more 
likely to be friends with each other than they are with other randomly chosen 
members of the population. However, each individual also tends to have some 
number of urandom" friends who do not know the individual's other friends. These 
friends are generally not as close (in social terms) as an individual's best friends, and 
they represent weal< ties. The properties of a social network are greatly affected by 
the amount of randomness. Non-random networks are usually highly clustered and 
have longer path lengths on average than random networks. 
Watts and Strogatz showed that social networks can be modelled by controlling the 
amount of randomness. They started with a regular graph representing the state of 
complete non-randomness (regularity). For example, in the regular graph in the left-
hand side of Figure 4.1, nodes are arranged into a circle where each node is 
connected to four other nodes: two to the left and two to the right. We can move in 
the direction of randomness by re-wiring the links between these nodes. Each link 
from node j to node k, L (j,k) is broken with a specific probability p, and when a link is 
broken we choose a new node k' with uniform probability and replace the link L(j, k) 
with the link L(j,k). As p increases the network loses structure (regularity) and 
becomes more random (Watts & Strogatz 1998). 
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Figure 4.1 : Small-world model for Watts and Strogatz. 
Since the conditions required for any network to be small-world are relatively weak 
(local clustering, combined with a small fraction of random shortcuts), many real-
world networks are classified as small-world networks. Examples include the 
affiliation network of movie actors, and the power transmission grid of the western 
United States (Watts 2004). 
4.4.5 Scale-Free Networks and the Importance of ｾｾｈｵ｢ｳＢ＠
Another key worl< in the field of network theory is that of Albert-Laszlo Barabasi 
(Barabasi et al. 2000, Barabasi 2002, Barabasi & Albert 1999). Barabasi found that in 
real-world networks there are often a number of nodes that are more connected than 
the others; they have far more links connecting them with other nodes than the 
average node. Barabasi called these nodes "hubs" and postulated that they have 
greater significance than other nodes, since when they are removed from the 
network, the impact of their loss on the entire network is greater than nodes that have 
relatively few connections. 
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Barabasi and Albert (1999) noticed that in many real-world networks, the degree 
distribution (the distribution of the number links for each node) is right-skewed with a 
"heavy tail". That means a small number of nodes (hubs) are much better connected 
and have many more links than average, while the majority of nodes have less-than-
average degree. A good example for this skewed distribution is the linking pattern in 
the World Wide Web, where a small number of websites, Google for example, receive 
links from millions of other sites, many more than the average site. 
Real-world scale-free networks emerge based on the mechanism of preferential 
attachment which means that newly created nodes will tend to connect to already 
well-connected nodes rather than to poorly connected ones. Barabasi and Albert 
(1999) used a power-law formula to describe the degree distribution where the 
probability of a randomly chosen node having degree k decreases as a power of k 
and takes the form: p(k) ,... k ·a, where the constant a (usually between 2 and 3) 
determines the rate of decay. 
The reason behind the name scale-free network is that when power-law distributions 
are plotted on a double logarithmic scale, a power law appears as a straight line with 
negative slope a (panel a of Figure 4.2), and this contrasts with a normal distribution, 
which curves sharply after a certain "cutoff" value (panel b of Figure 4.2). A cutoff 
therefore implies a characteristic scale for the degree distribution of the network, and 
because a power-law degree distribution lacks any such cutoff value, it is often called 
a scale-free distribution (Watts 2004). 
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Figure 4.2: Degree (k) distribution for Scale-free network vs. Normal distribution 
4.5 Theories of Network Formation 
Why do people create and dissolve network ties? And with whom? There are multiple 
schools of thought that approach these questions. These include theories of self-
interest, theories of social exchange or dependency, theories of mutual or collective 
interest, cognitive theories, and theories of homophily. 
4.5. 1 Theories of Self-Interest 
According to the rational self-interest paradigm, people form social ties in order to 
maximize their personal preferences and desires. Individuals consider the creation of 
ties as an investment in the accumulation of social resources or "social capital." They 
expect to deploy this social capital and reap returns on their investment in the form of 
opportunities from which they can profit (Coleman 1988). 
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4.5.2 Theories of Social Exchange 
Theories of social exchange imply that people establish ties to others with whom they 
can exchange valued resources (Homans 1951 ). Whether a relationship will be 
sustained over time will depend on the payoffs to each of the two parties. Homans 
(1951) argues that when individuals or groups exchange valued resources, this is 
made possible due to a large-scale network of relationships. Individuals' motivation to 
create ties is based on their ability to minimize their dependence on others from 
whom they need resources and maximize the dependence of others who need 
resources they can offer. 
4.5.3 Theories of Mutua/Interest 
The main premise of the theories of mutual interest and collective action is that 
mutual interests and the possibility of benefits from coordinated action often outweigh 
individual self-interests (Olson 1965). For example, Public goods theory argues that 
creating and maintaining public goods requires the development of communication 
networks. For individuals, the motivation to forge ties and form a group is to maximize 
their collective ability to leverage resources and mobilize for collective action in their 
environment. 
4.5.4 Cognitive Theories 
One of the most famous cognitive theories of network formation is Heider's (1958) 
balance theory. According to this theory, if two individuals are friends, they would 
have similar evaluations of other objects. The object can be a third person in a 
communication networl<. If the two individuals did not consistently evaluate the third 
person, they would experience a state of discomfort or ,'psychological strain" and 
would strive to reduce this cognitive inconsistency by altering their evaluations of 
either the third person or their own friendship (Heider 1958). 
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4.5.5 Theories of Homophily 
The homophily principle implies that contact between similar people (that is, having 
the same race, ethnicity, religion, gender, social class, etc.) occurs at a higher rate 
than among dissimilar people (Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954, McPherson et al. 2001 ). 
The colloquial adage, "birds of a feather flock together" implies that similarity is 
thought to ease communication, increase predictability of behaviour, and foster trust 
and reciprocity. According to Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), homophily can be 
classified into two types: status homophily and value homophily. 
In status homophily, similarity is based on individual's status including the major 
sociodemographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity, sex, or age, and acquired 
characteristics such as religion, education, occupation, or behaviour patterns. On the 
other hand, in value homophily, similarity is based on values, attitudes, and beliefs. 
There is a voluminous empirical literature documenting the effects of homophily of 
both types on the formation of social networks in a wide range of relationships. 
Homophily was found to affect the formation of intimate relationships such as 
marriage (Kalmijn 1998) and confiding (Marsden 1987), in addition to ties of school 
friendship (Shrum et al. 1988) and work relations (Ibarra 1995). 
But why do people prefer to create social ties with others similar to themselves? 
Carley (1991) tried to explain this homophilous attitude based on a cognitive process. 
According to Carley, people are more likely to interact when they share knowledge 
with one another. Demographic similarity usually tends to indicate shared knowledge, 
so people tend to be attracted to similar others for ease of communication and the 
smooth coordination of activities. 
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4.6 Social Networks Data Collection 
There is a long tradition concerning the techniques of collecting social network data; 
for an in-depth review, see Marsden (1990). Overall, some of key challenges of this 
kind of data collection are: 
• Network boundaries are usually difficult to define 
• People do not easily recall their network members, and need appropriate 
prompts to elicit them. In addition, networks are large in general, and different 
social network members may have differing importance depending on the 
phenomenon studied 
• Information about network members needs to balance detail and the burden 
on interviewee. 
4.7 Origins of Social Relations 
Kinship ties are the first source of social relations people have. When a person is 
born, he or she usually acquires a mother and father as primary kin, along with 
indirect ties to siblings and other relatives (Howell 1988). As years pass, people are 
introduced to different social circles and structure; for example, schools and 
workplaces, and their social networks become wider and more complex. 
In a study of personal networks in the Toulouse area of France, Michel Grossetti 
examined the distribution of social ties and relations according to their origins 
(Grossetti 2005). According to Grossetti, contexts for constructing personal relations 
could be grouped into three types. Firstly, relations could be derived from (/circles". 
Circles are collective social forms or entities (for example, family, school, or other 
organizations). Interactions among members of the same circle may generate 
relations if sufficiently repeated. 
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Secondly, relations may be constructed around common concerns. A typical example 
of this context is neighbourhood. A neighbourhood does not necessarily imply a form 
of collective identification. However, it implies common concerns {for example, shared 
walls and utilities in a building) that facilitate the exchange of services {for example, 
loaning out garden tools, food items, and small maintenance favours). Thirdly, 
relations could be derived from other relations. This might happen when some people 
are introduced to us by other friends or during recreational or other social activities 
(Grossetti 2005). 
The results of Grosseti's study show that the majority of relations, about 59 percent, 
arise from circles (divided equally between families, 30 percent; and organizations, 29 
percent); similar results were found by (Wellman 1990). The remaining relations are 
distributed between neighbourhoods (about 8 percent) and relations derived from 
other relations through the network {about 27 percent), for example, from 
husband/wife or through other friends, in addition to about 6 percent of relations 
constructed by other means such as chance acquaintances. 
The results of Grosseti's study show variation in the weight of each source of relation 
by age and level of education. For example, after the age of 25, the weight of familial 
relations tend to decrease, and other "constructed' relations tend to increase 
particularly those resulting from organized frameworks and relations arising from 
networl< effects; similar results was found by Marsden (1987). The proportion of 
relations from school/work increases with educational level whereas network effects 
diminish as educational level increases. 
The importance of kinship ties was elaborated in Wellman's (1990) worl<. He showed 
that the stronger the relationship used to define a network, the higher the proportion 
of the members who are kin. As presented in Table 4.1, Wellman {1990:199) shows 
that though kin represent only 0.3 percent of the potentially-available ties, they 
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Table 4.1: Number and percent of kin ties In average networks. 
Type of Ties Number of Ties Number of Kin Ties %Kin Ties 
Potentially Available 16,000 55 0.3 
Directly Available 2,700 55 2 
Actual 400 35 9 
Active 20 6 30 
lnteractor 10 4 40 
Intimate 5 3 50 
Confidant 2 1-2 50 
Source: based on Table 1 in (Wellman 1990:199) 
represent 50 percent of both intimates (distinctively close friends) and confidants: "the 
1-3 network members to whom people pour out their hearts"(Wellman 1990:202). 
The size of an ego-centric network is simply the number of alters in ego's social 
network, and "it provides a direct measure of the integration of the ego in the social 
life" (Marsden 1987:232). Although it may be easy to define, network size has been 
found to be difficult to measure directly (Killworth et al. 1990). People may not be 
willing to reveal some or all of their contacts, and it is hard to keep track of so much 
data (Pool & Kochan 1978). 
For these reasons, researchers have searched for proxies for the of a person's 
network instead of measuring it directly (Killworth et at. 1990, Marsden 2005). 
Methods used include personal diaries (Pool & Kochen 1978), counts of names that a 
respondent recognizes in telephone books (Freeman & Thompson 1989, Killworth et 
at. 1990), network scale-up estimates based on the likelihood of informants knowing 
members of some population groups of known sizes such as prisoners (Bernard et al. 
1989, 1998, Killworth et at. 1990), surveys that ask respondents to name close 
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friends or members of support networks, that is, core networks (Grossetti 2005, 
Marsden 1987, McPherson et al. 2006, 1979, Wellman 1990), number of Christmas 
cards sent by informants (Hill & Dunbar 2003), and the "reversal small-world" 
technique in which respondents are given a long list of target persons and are asked 
to record to whom they would send the messages if they were initiating a small-world 
experiment (Killworth & Bernard 1978). 
As presented in Table 4.1, Wellman (1990) estimated about 16,000 adults are 
potentially available to ego for interaction, and 2, 700 from them are potentially direct 
ties. Most people have about 400 actual ties, and only 5 percent (20) of them are 
active or strong ties (those persons who are significant in one's life because of 
repeated sociable contact, supportiveness, or feelings of connectedness (Scott 
1991 :74)) while the remaining 95 percent are weak ties. From the active ties, people 
usually have about 1 0 frequent interactors, many of whom are neighbours or 
workmates, who are not necessarily intimates or close friends. About 25 percent of 
the active ties are considered distinctively close and supportive intimates, who tend to 
have equal numbers of kin and friends. Finally, there is a tiny set of two persons who 
are very socially-close or confidants (Wellman 1990:202). 
Marsden (1987) used data from the 1985 General Social Survey to examine "core 
discussion networks of Americans"; interpersonal networks in which Americans 
discuss "important matters" (this may be analogous to "strong ties" as described by 
Granovetter (1973}). The results show that the mean size of such networks was 3 
persons. Strikingly, nearly a quarter of respondents had networks of size 0 or 1. 
Overall network size was found to: decrease with age, increase with education, vary 
by race/ethnic group, and be indifferent to gender. Nearly two decades tater, 
McPherson et al. (2006) replicated the study of Marsden (1987) to assess social 
change in core network structure based on 2004 General Social Survey data. the 
mean network size had decreased by about a third, from 3 in 1985 to 2.08 in 2004. 
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4. 7. 1 Social Networks' Change During Life Course 
An important question in the area of social networks is how networks change in size 
and composition as people move through the life course (Bott 1971, Kalmijn 2003). 
Kalmijn examined how social networks change with the transition through five life 
course stages: entering an intimate relationship, living together with the partner, 
having children with the partner, the children growing up, and children leaving the 
parental home (2003:234). 
Kalmijn's study provides further empirical evidence for the dyadic withdrawal 
hypothesis which argues that friendship networks become smaller when people enter 
a cohabiting relationship and that friendship networks become more overlapping with 
the partner during the course of the relationship (Bott 1971, Johnson & Leslie 1982, 
Milardo 1982, Parks et al. 1983). 
Sociological studies provide evidence that among married persons, there is a 
negative association between the duration of the marriage and the size of the 
friendship networks (Fischer & Oliker 1983, Wellman et al. 1997). SociaiM 
psychological studies also find that people who begin dating have fewer contacts with 
friends than others (Johnson & Leslie 1982). When the dating relationship becomes 
more serious, the overlap in the two friendship networks becomes larger, as is 
indicated by the frequency with which people have contact with the friends of their 
partner (Milardo 1982) and the degree to which people like the friends of their partner 
(Parks et al. 1983). 
The dyadic withdrawal hypothesis has several implications. Joint social networks are 
a form of marital capital (Kalmijn 2003). The more friends spouses have in common, 
the more dependent they become on each other. Lil<:e having children, joint social 
networks increase the exit costs of marriage because both spouses usually lose more 
friends after divorce if they have most of their friends in common. Another implication 
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from the dyadic withdrawal hypothesis and the overlap of social networks is related to 
behaviour and attitude formation and change. Shared personal networks of husbands 
and wives provide an environment of value consensus for the couple, which may lead 
to more traditional sex roles in the family, or at least to more norm-conforming 
patterns of behaviour (Bott 1971 ). 
Two arguments are presented to explain why network changes would occur. Firstly, 
the principle of competition argues that friends and spouses fulfil similar functions, 
thereby competing with each other for ego's time (Johnson & Leslie 1982). So, with 
dating and cohabitation, some (or much) of the time that was devoted to contacts with 
friends will be directed to the spouse and to children who may serve as an additional 
source of competition. However, it is still possible that the number of friends stays the 
same, while the frequency of contact and/or the amount of time people spend on 
each friend decline. 
A second argument lies in the balance principle. According to Heider's theory of 
cognitive balance, triads between people should be transitive (Heider 1958). More 
specifically, the product of the three sentiment relationships in a triad-with positive 
values for liking and negative values for disliking -should be positive. If a strong 
positive relation exists between two persons (e.g., a couple), a negative product 
emerges when someone does not like the friend of his or her spouse. According to 
Heider's theory, such a situation causes "psychological strain" or tension which can 
be resolved by changing the value in one relationship or by dropping the relationship 
altogether. Which means that the person will either learn to like the friends of the 
spouse, or the spouse will discontinue the friendship (Parks et al. 1983). According to 
this mechanism, the number of shared friends will increase by keeping friends whom 
the spouse dislikes, and/or constructing new positive (may be strong) ties with the 
spouse's friends. 
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4.8 Social Impact Theory 
People affect each other in many different ways. 
'TW]e are drawn by the attractiveness of others and aroused by 
their mere presence, stimulated by their activity and 
embarrassed by their attention. We are influenced by the 
actions of others, entertained by their performances, and 
sometimes persuaded by their arguments... We are threatened 
by the power of others and angered by their attack. Fortunately, 
we are also comforted by the support of others and sustained 
by their love." (Latane 1981:343) 
Latane called the effect that people exercise on each other "Social Impact", and 
defined it as: 
"... any of the great variety of changes in physiological states 
and subjective feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and 
beliefs, values and behaviour, that occur in an individual, 
human or animal, as a result of the real, implied, or imagined 
presence or actions of other individuals." (Latane 1981 :343) 
According to this definition, social impact is distinct from other concepts such as 
conformity, power, and authority. Conformity implies that an individual expresses a 
particular opinion or behaviour in order to fit in to a given situation or to meet the 
expectations of a given other, though he or she does not necessarily hold that opinion 
or believe that the behaviour is appropriate. Power involves the ability to force or 
coerce someone to behave in a particular way. Authority is the power that is believed 
to be legitimate (rather than coercive) by those who are subjected to it. 
The social impact theory, developed by Latane (1981 }, proposes that the impact of 
any information source (for example, networl< alters) is a multiplicative function of 
three factors (or forces in Latane's terms): 
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1. Number of others who make up that source 
2. Their immediacy, that is, their closeness in space or time, and absence of 
intervening barriers or filters 
3. Strength, that is, salience, power, or intensity of the source. 
Based on these ideas about social impact, Latane (1996) developed dynamic social 
impact theory to describe and predict the diffusion of beliefs through social systems. 
According to dynamic social impact theory, a social structure is a result of individuals 
influencing each other in a dynamic and iterative way. The likelihood of being 
influenced by someone nearby, rather than far away, (the immediacy factor noted 
above) produces localized patterns of consensus in attitudes, values, practices, 
identities, and meanings within communication networks. This process can lead 
initially randomly distributed attitudes and beliefs to become clustered or correlated; 
less popular beliefs become consolidated into minority subcultures. Dynamic social 
impact theory views society as a self-organizing complex system in which individuals 
interact and impact on each others' beliefs. 
Most models involving social networks, including the models in the current thesis, 
adopt some of the assumptions of dynamic social impact theory. These include 
models of attitude formation (Lee et al. 2004), cascading dynamics of fads and 
fashion, and diffusion of norms and innovation (Watts 2002). 
4.9 Social Segregation 
The term "social segregation" is used here to mean the segregation of the ego-centric 
social networks of individuals in a society. An Individual's social network is said to be 
segregated based on some demographic characteristic (religion for example in case 
of Egypt) when people of different social groups (identified based on this 
characteristic) are not proportionally represented in the individual's social network. 
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For example, the empirical data showed that both Muslims and Copts tend to have 
their own social groups overrepresented in their social networks. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, social segregation poses restrictions on 
intergroup interaction; thus, it may lead to negative consequences; for example, 
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. The main suggested cause of social 
segregation is the homophilous attitudes of individuals which creates a bias towards 
creating social links with similar others. 
4.9. 1 Measuring Social Segregation 
In Section 3.5 in the previous chapter, some segregation indices have been 
presented. All these indices measure what is called "spatial segregation", that is, 
physical restrictions on people accessing some physical space. The focus of the 
current section is on measuring segregation in social networks, that is, the limitation 
on people interacting with each other. 
The segregation index, S, developed by Freeman (1978) is the most popular and 
widely-used measure of social segregation. S measures the deviation of the 
distribution of links between individuals from two different groups from the distribution 
expected when linl<s are created at random, and it is given by the following formula 
(Freeman 1978:416): 
{
E(e*)-e* 
S = E(e*) 
0 
if ｅＨ･ＪＩｾ･Ｊ＠
Otherwise 
4-1 
where E(e*) is the expected number of links between two individuals from different 
groups (intergroup links) under the assumption that links are created at random, while 
e* is the actual number of such links. 
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E(e*) is given by (adapted from Freeman 1978:418): 
E(e*)= 2NLP(l-P) 
N-1 
4-2 
Where L is the total number of links in the global social network, N is the number of 
individuals, and P is the proportion of the minority group. Although Freeman has 
developed this index to measure segregation in social networks with undirected 
{symmetric) links, it can be shown that the formula is also valid for the case of 
directed links. 
4.10 Using Social Networks as a Job-Search Method 
Granovetter's work (1973, 1983, 1995) on the role of social ties in the process of 
information diffusion provides much of the conceptual basis for studies of the diffusion 
of information about job openings. Social networks emphasize two functions that 
personal contacts may play in the labour market. First, contacts can provide job 
seekers with timely information about employment opportunities. Second, contacts 
can refer (or recommend), or sponsor job seekers thereby improving their chance of 
acquiring particular jobs {Elliott 2001 ). 
A huge literature has been devoted to studying how social networks and social ties 
affect job search methods and outcomes (for example, Battu et al. 2004, Elliott 2000, 
Elliott & Sims 2001, Wahba & Zenou 2005) and studying the importance of social ties 
to job-contacts especially what is known as "insider referrals" (for example Elliott 
2001, Fernandez et al. 2000, Tassier & Menczer 2005). The following is a brief review 
of this literature. 
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4. 10. 1 Tie Strength 
In "Strength of Weak Ties", Granovetter (1973) demonstrates that most individuals 
attain jobs through social contacts rather than through formal channels. Besides, 
acquaintances (or weak ties) provide links to better jobs than do friends and relatives 
(or strong ties) because they are more likely to have different information than job 
searchers and their close friends. 
However, tie strength does not affect all individuals in the same way. For example 
Wegener (1991 ), in his study about job mobility and social ties, argues that the 
"strength of weak ties" theory is "valid only for individuals in high social strata" (p. 69). 
He suggests that most networks are heterogeneous, and job searchers with low 
social status may be able to contact persons of higher status within their own 
networl<. These job seekers are able to exploit strong ties with the contact persons. 
Individuals with high prestige positions must use weak ties to reach beyond the 
bounds of their network to contact persons with even higher prestige, which is usually 
more difficult. But one may find some contradiction in Wegener's argument. He does 
not explain why persons with high prestige positions do not have links to other 
persons with higher positions than their own as long if his assumption about the 
heterogeneity of the social networks is valid. 
The relationship between using weak ties as a job-finding method and income level 
has been controversial. While many studies suggest that there is a little evidence of a 
relationship between weak ties and income (for example, Bridges & Villemez 1986, 
Marsden & Hurlbert 1988), Tassier {2006) provides an empirical support for the 
notion that having more weak ties in one's social network increases income. Tassier 
(2006) showed that the methods used by previous studies to estimate the effect of 
weak ties on income usually underestimate this effect. These studies, usually, 
estimate the effect of job-finding method on income while controlling for other labour-
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market variables (education, experience, gender, etc.). Specifically, these studies test 
the hypothesis that weak ties provide superior job information that leads to higher 
paying jobs. However, it is not necessary that weak ties specifically provide superior 
information to lead to better jobs. Weak ties can positively affect income through 
increasing the size of a social network. Individuals with a larger proportion of weak 
ties in their social network should expect to learn of more job information compared 
with individuals with a smaller proportion of weak ties: 
''if there is an effect of weak ties on income, it is more likely to 
occur because having more weak ties in ｯｮ･ｾ＠ social network 
allows one to learn of more job information, not better job 
information" (Tassier 2006:706). 
4.1 0.2 Network Structure 
"Network structure" refers to the pattern in which social actors (or nodes) are 
connected to each other in a social network. As employee referrals are used in a 
widespread and purposive way, social structure is expected to play an important role 
in determining labour-market outcomes (Calv6-Armengol & Jackson 2007, Calv6-
Armengol & Jackson 2004, Calv6-Armengol & Zenou 2005, 1994, 1992, 
Montgomery 1991, Tassier & Menczer 2005). 
Social integration and network structure of both minority and majority groups were 
found to have direct implications for employment levels. For example, Tassier and 
Menczer (2005) introduced an agent-based simulation model of referral hiring to 
study the effects of social network structure on group level (rather than individual 
level) inequality. They used small-world network model (Watts 1999, Watts & 
Strogatz 1998) (as described in Section 4.4.4) as they started with a regular (or "non-
random" as they called it) graph and controlled network structures (for the minority 
and majority groups) by "re-wiring" network links. To control the level of segregation, 
Tassier and Menczer started with two separate graphs, representing the case of 
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complete segregation, and used the re-wing technique again to create links across 
group boundaries with a controlled probability. 
In addition to social networks of individual agents, Tassier and Menczer introduced 
another (small-world) network for jobs to show that the information about job 
vacancies that a referrer may provide are related to his job position relative to other 
jobs. 
On the one hand, the results of the simulation showed that social networks with 
random links produce higher employment rates than those with more structured links 
if the population is integrated (low level of segregation in the social networks of 
minority and majority groups) or information flows about job vacancies are random. 
On the other hand, if the population is highly segregated and information flows about 
job vacancies are non-random then less random social networks have higher 
employment rates than more random social networks. In this case non-random social 
networks allow a group to better keep job information inside the group when a 
population is segregated. 
Using agent-based simulation Calv6-Armengol and Jackson (2007, 2004} showed 
that employment is positively correlated across time and agents. That is employment 
statuses of any path-connected agents are positively correlated. When some agents 
are employed, then it is more likely for other agents in contact with them to receive 
job information from them. This holds even in different points in time, that is, for any 
two path-connected agents i and j, agent i's employment status at time t is positively 
correlated with agent l status at time t'for general values oft and t'. 
Moreover, Calv6-Armengol and Jackson found that unemployment exhibits duration 
dependence, that is, the probability of obtaining a job decreases the longer time that 
an agent has been unemployed. They examined also inequality between two arbitrary 
groups and showed that when one group starts with a worse employment status, then 
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that group's dropMout rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be 
persistently below that of the other group. 
4.10.3 Network Size 
Calv6MArmengol (2004) and Calv6-Armengol and Zenou (2005) were the first to study 
the effect of the size of social network on job attainment in a theoretical context. 
Using a job-matching model in which workers find jobs through social contacts, they 
show that having more social direct contacts increases the probability to find a job, 
where as having more indirect (or twoMiinks-away) contacts is detrimental in getting 
job information through social networks. Indirect contacts represent competitors and 
may get some of job information that otherwise one may get. So the overall effect of 
network size on job information and employment status is determined according to 
the relative effect of direct versus indirect contacts. 
Wahba and Zenou (2005) presents empirical evidence for Calv6-Armengol and 
Zenou's ideas. They show that for employed individuals, the probability to find a 
better job through social networks is higher than other search methods, and this 
probability has a concave relationship with the size of the network. If each worker has 
more friends, and each of his/her friends has also more friends, this would create 
congestion in information transmission. For very dense networks, this congestion can 
be so important that it outweighs the benefits of large networks and the probability to 
find a job decreases. Also, the probability to find a job through social networks 
decreases with local unemployment rate (which is used as a measure of network 
quality). Because of a lack of data, Wahba and Zenou (2005) used the population 
density as a proxy for the size of social network. Therefore, their results should be 
taken with caution since the population density, itself, may be explained by available 
employment chances. 
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4.11 Social Networks and Workplace Segregation 
There is very little literature on how using social networks for job search may affect 
workplace segregation. Tassier (2005) developed a Markov model to study the 
effects of using referral hiring on inequality between social groups and worl<place 
segregation. According to this model, the population is divided into two groups (for 
example, men and women, or Blacks and Whites). There are a finite set of states, 
and the distribution of the two types of workers in a firm (for example, the percentage 
of female workers) determines its state. The transition probabilities that define the 
probability that a firm's state changes to another state are determined by the 
distribution of worl<er groups in the unemployed population and the current state of 
the firm. 
According to Tassier's model, the level of workplace segregation increases with the 
increase of referral hiring. In the special case when all workers find their jobs by 
referral hiring, complete segregation in the workplace occurs. On the other hand, the 
model shows that referral hiring does not produce a group-level inequality, even in 
the case of complete segregation where the rate of unemployment will be the same 
for different groups. 
In another study, Tassier (2007) used the previous model to study the potential of 
referral hiring to produce gender segregation. He validated the model against 
empirical data on staffing at US colleges and universities, and found that it generates 
a level of segregation close to the observed. 
Although Tassier's research is relevant to the current thesis, it differs in that it only 
considers the relation between referral hiring and workplace segregation in the steady 
state, and pays no attention to the causal mechanisms or the many possible paths 
that may lead to this state. Besides, because of computational complexity, he only 
considers the case when all firms are of equal size. 
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4.12 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented a brief introduction to social networks and social segregation. 
The chapters started with a definition of a social network, its classification into ego-
centric, socio-centric, and open-system networks, and the dimensions of social ties. 
The principles of network-based research are discussed followed by a brief historical 
background on the evolution of social network analysis starting from Gestalt 
psychology in 1930s, reviewing the most popular network models: random model, 
small-world model, and scale-free model. 
The chapter also discussed some popular theories of network formation including 
theories of self-interest, theories of social exchange or dependency, theories of 
mutual or collective interest, cognitive theories, and theories of homophily. Then it 
discussed the origins of social relations, the contribution of each origin to the 
construction of social networks, and how the relative importance of these origins 
changes during life course. 
Social impact theory and how social networks affect individuals' behaviour were 
briefly introduced. Finally, the concept of social segregation was introduced, and the 
effects of using social networks as a job search method on workplace segregation 
were discussed. 
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5 AGENT-BASED SOCIAL SIMULATION 
5.1 Aims of This Chapter 
This chapter aims to introduce agent-based modelling (ABM) as a research method. 
Firstly, social simulation is defined in Section 5.2, and typical objectives of simulation 
research are discussed in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 simulation is discussed as a 
research method, and it is compared with mathematical and statistical modelling in 
Section 5.5. The epistemologies of social simulation are discussed in Section 5.6, 
and the complexity of social systems is discussed in Section 5.7. In Section 5.8, ABM 
is discussed as a specific approach within social simulation in general, while Section 
5.9 provides justification for using ABM as a research method for the current thesis. 
Finally, in Section 5.1 0, Shelling's model of segregation is introduced as a relevant 
example of social simulation. 
5.2 What Is "Social Simulation"? 
Simulation can be defined in many ways. According to the New Oxford English 
Dictionary (2001 ), simulation is: 
11the technique of imitating the behaviour of some situation or 
process (whether economic, military, mechanical, etc.) by 
means of a suitably analogous situation or apparatus, esp. for 
the purpose of study or personnel training". 
Social simulation, then, is an imitation of some social process or social phenomenon. 
According to this definition, simulation is a method of modelling (imitation mean 
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modelling in some sense) real systems and processes to create a model analogous 
(that is similar) to the real system (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005:1 ). The very general 
purpose of this modelling activity is to understand a real world or a "target" system 
through simplification. 
ﾷｾ＠ model is a simplification - smaller, less detailed, less 
complex, or all of these together - of some other structure or 
system. A model aeroplane is recognizably an aeroplane, even 
if it is much smaller than the real aeroplane and has none of its 
complex control system" (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005:2) 
The model should be Jess complex than the real system, and should improve our 
understanding of how the real system functions or might function. By formalizing 
concepts and theories, the model is (or should be) more precise than the textual 
description of the system and its processes, therefore simulation can be used as a 
method of theory development {Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005:3). 
5.3 Objectives of Simulation 
Simulation can be used for diverse purposes (Axelrod 1997b). It can be used for 
prediction (e.g., weather forecasting), performance (e.g., diagnosis, speech 
recognition, and function optimization), training (e.g., flight simulators for pilots), 
entertainment (e.g., flight simulators and computer games), education (e.g., 
simulations of medical interventions), proof for certain theory or hypothesis, discovery 
of new laws and relationships. 
Epstein (2008) argues that social scientists are building models all the time, when 
making projections or describing social dynamics (for example, epidemic, war, or 
migration). The question then is not whether to build models; but, whether to build 
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'explicif ones (Epstein 2008:2). Epstein also argues that the ,ability to predict' is not a 
necessary characteristic of good models. Most complex systems1 (including most 
social systems) are not predictable. The main objective of the good model then is to 
explain the phenomenon and its dynamics rather than to predict it. Waldrop (1993) 
supports Epstein about the importance of explanation, and comments: 
,predictions are nice, if you can make them. But the essence of 
science lies in explanations, laying bare the fundamental 
mechanisms of nature ... Was Darwin ,unscientific' because he 
couldn't predict what species will evolve in the next million 
years? Are geologists unscientific because they can't predict 
precisely where the next earthquake will come, or where the 
next mountain range will rise? Are astronomers unscientific 
because they can't predict precisely where the next star will be 
borne?" (Waldrop 1993:39) 
In addition to prediction (if possible), Epstein (2008:2-3) gives sixteen reasons to build 
a model; these include: 
• Explain a phenomenon and how/why it happens. 
• Help identifying core dynamics. 
• Guide data collection. A model makes it clearer what parameters we should 
focus on, and what data should be collected. 
• Discover new research questions. 
• Suggest dynamical analogies among a wide range of models that may seem 
unrelated. For example, Samuelson (1972) showed that we can connect the 
structural relations of monopolistic firms with those that prevail for an entropy-
1 Complex systems will be introduced in more detail in Section 5.7. 
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maximizing thermodynamic system, where the relationship between absolute 
temperature and entropy is the same as the relation that the wage rate has to 
labour, or the land rent has to acres of land (Samuelson 1972, cited in 
Epstein 2008). 
5.4 Simulation as a Method 
In social research, models can be broadly classified into: statistical (or mathematical) 
models and simulation models (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). Both kinds of models 
involve some level of abstraction for a social process or a target system. The model 
is usually a set of mathematical equations, in case of mathematical models, or a 
computer program, in case of simulation. And both are validated by comparing the 
predicted/simulated data with observed or collected data. 
The methodological process of modelling is very similar for simulation models and 
statistical models, and can be broken down into the following steps (as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1). 
Model 
Abstraction 
Target 
Parameter estimation 
Data gathering 
Simulated Data/ 
Predicted Data 
Similarity 
Figure 5.1 : The logic of simulation as a method 
(Based on Gilbert & Troitzsch (2005:16"17)) 
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• Firstly, the ｾｴ｡ｲｧ･ｴＧ＠ for modelling is specified and defined. This target could be 
a social process or some phenomenon of interest; for example, dynamics of 
residential segregation (Schelling 1971 ). 
• Some data may be gathered at this stage to get a better understanding of the 
target. 
• Since the target system in most social systems is a complex one, some 
ｾ｡｢ｳｴｲ｡｣ｴｩｯｮＧ＠ is needed of the target to a conceptual model. This model could 
be a set of mathematical equations, in case of statistical modelling, or a 
computer program in case of simulation. 
• Once the (statistical or computational) model has been developed, data will 
be needed again to estimate model's parameters during parameter 
estimation phase. 
• Then, in case of statistical models, the model can be used to generate some 
predicted data; while in the case of simulation, the model is left to run to 
generate some simulated data. 
• Finally, the model has to be validated. This is measured by the similarity 
between the model's output (that is, simulated or predicted data) with the 
collected data. 
5.5 Simulation versus Mathematical Modelling 
The main advantage of modelling social phenomena using a mathematical approach 
is that social entities are represented very precisely, and will be in a form to which 
mathematical or deduction techniques can more easily be applied. However, there 
are some difficulties usually associated with mathematical models of social 
phenomena. Firstly, they require a high level of ability in mathematics (which may be 
not available for many social researchers) to manipulate the equations. Secondly, 
these equations are often found not to be possible to solve (the issue of mathematical 
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intractability). Thirdly, as a result of intractability, limiting assumptions or 
simplifications when expressing relationships may be required in order to keep the 
problem amenable to mathematical modelling. For example, the mathematical 
treatment often necessitates that some quantities must be considered to be uniform 
and homogenous, which means that the method is really only suitable for the class of 
problems where entities can be represented as such (which is not the case for most 
social phenomena). 
On the other hand, simulation models could be a better alternative in the following 
situations. Firstly, when the priority is to understand the underlying causal 
mechanisms, and to develop and test theories about the target system, rather than to 
make predictions based on the correlation among variables: 
"We would expect a simulation model to include explicit 
representations of the processes which are thought to be at 
work in the social world. In contrast, a statistical model will 
reproduce the pattern of correlations among measured 
variables, but rarely will it be modelling the mechanisms which 
underlie these relationships." (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005: 18) 
This distinction between statistical modelling and simulation modelling turns, then, on 
the concept of mechanism. Because computational simulation affords the possibility 
of layered models, where each layer corresponds to a layer of reality, simulation 
offers the possibility of modelling such mechanisms. 
Secondly, when the phenomenon under study is a dynamic and complex one. In 
these cases simulation modelling has the following advantages over mathematical 
modelling {Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005:5-6): 
• Computer program code is more expressive than systems of equations. 
• Programs are better suited to modelling parallel processes. 
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• Programs are (or can be) designed modularly and hence are easily modified. 
• Programs are more flexible to model the heterogeneity amongst social 
actors. 
When the main objective of the research is to predict the level of a phenomenon, and 
the phenomenon under study is less complex, mathematical modelling may be a 
good choice. For example, accurate forecasts for numbers of students joining the 
university can be made by examining some time series of previous years and 
applying some mathematical equations to extend it to the future, with no 
understanding, or interest in understanding, the preferences of individuals regarding 
higher education or how they make decisions about it. On the other hand for complex 
phenomena, and when the research aims at understanding the mechanisms that 
govern the phenomenon, then simulation is the better choice. 
5.6 The Epistemologies of Social Simulation 
There has been a long debate between rationalists and empiricists on how scientific 
knowledge could be gained. 
For rationalists, scientific knowledge should be gained through reasoning using 
deduction. We should start with a set of axiomatic-terminological conditions, 
concerning the final knowledge foundation, and then use deductive reasoning to 
extend our l<nowledge and develop theories. Deduction is considered a 'top-down' 
approach that works from theory to data. We start with a theory about some 
phenomenon of interest. Then, we refine it into more specific hypotheses, collect 
some data, and test these hypotheses. The conclusion then may be the 
confirmation/disconfirmation of the initial theory. A good example of the deductive 
approach is the use of rational-choice axioms to discover the equilibrium results in 
game theories (Axelrod 1997a). 
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Empiricists, on the other hand, claim that knowledge can only be gained using direct 
experience and observations (depending mainly on the senses), that is, using an 
inductive approach. Induction moves from specific observations to broader 
generalizations and theories, that is, it is a "bottom-up" approach. We begin with 
some observations and data and try to explore it to detect patterns and regularities, 
formulate some hypotheses, use the available data to test them, and finally develop 
some general conclusion or theory. The analysis of opinion surveys and 
macroeconomic data are examples where Induction is widely used. 
5.6. 1 Simulation as a Third Way of Doing Science 
In addition to induction and deduction, simulation provides a third way of doing 
science that reconciles the rationalists' and empiricists' views (Axelrod 1997b:24). 
With simulation, and like deduction, one starts with a set of explicit assumptions 
(usually about the micro-level behaviour of agents); but, unlike deduction, these 
assumption are not used to prove theorems (because this would be very difficult for 
complex systems), rather, these assumptions are used to build a computational 
model to generate data that can be analysed inductively (Axelrod 1997b:24) (The 
methodology for validating simulation models is discussed in Section 9.3). 
5.6.2 Aims of Scientific Knowledge: Natural sciences versus Historian 
sciences 
The differences between the natural and historian sciences are mainly about the 
epistemological aims and interests of both kinds of science. Wilhelm Windelband 
(1848-1915) and Heinrich Ricert (1848-1915) used the notions "nomothetic" (law-
making and law-finding), to refer to natural science, and "idiographic" (individualistic 
and descriptive) for historical sciences. According to Windelband: 
119 
'Tnatural science] abstracts from the unique and qualitatively 
distinctive properties of real phenomena in order to disclose the 
laws on which they depend. This is the sense in which natural 
science is nomothetic. It has no intrinsic interest in the 
individual events of concrete reality [ ... ] the ultimate theoretical 
purpose of natural science [ ... ] is to produce a system of 
maximally abstract and general laws, nomological regularities 
that govern all events. The interest of historical science, on the 
other hand, is idiographic. Here the purpose of knowledge is to 
comprehend the distinctive properties of the unique event 
itself. 'T (Oakes 1987:437ff) cited in (Gilbert & Ahrweiler 2007)] 
All scientific research can be placed somewhere in the nomothetic-idiographic 
continuum, where theoretical mathematics is placed at the extreme nomothetic side 
and narrative hermeneutical history on the other, idiographic, side. 
According to Max Weber (1864-1920), social science encompasses both nomothetic 
and idiographic features. Idiographic features of social science are emphasized when 
the main objective is to investigate historical and single cases in order to explain why 
and how social phenomena happen. 
"Social science is an empirical science of experienced reality. 
The aim is to understand social reality that surrounds us in its 
peculiar character - on the one hand the contemporary 
framework and cultural meanings of all the single phenomena 
we observe now, and on the other hand, the reasons for their 
historical path that led to their special characteristics." [(Weber 
1988: 170f) cited in (Gilbert & Ahrweiler 2007:5)] 
Nomothetic features of social science can be achieved through exact notions and 
rigorous process of concept formation using what Weber called "ideal types". An ideal 
type represents a conceptual extreme that is constructed from empirical reality and 
gives it a logical consistency. As Weber explains: 
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''The ideal type is constructed by partially emphasising one or 
more characteristics and by combining many diffuse and 
discrete, more or Jess - sometimes not at all- present individual 
phenomena - a procedure which allows one to build a unified 
thought concept from these partially emphasised 
characteristics. In its conceptual purity the ideal type does not 
exist in empirical reality, it is a utopia. For historical work the 
task remains to state for each single case how close or how 
distant reality comes to this thought concept" [(Weber 
1988:191) cited in (Gilbert & Ahrweiler 2007:6)]. 
One can think of perfect competition of classical economic theory as an example of 
ideal types. The conditions and assumptions of the perfect competition model can not 
be found in reality; yet, it provides a valuable framework for many economic 
researchers to generate universally-valid results and conclusions. 
5.6.3 Types of Simulation Models 
Using this nomothetic-idiographic terminology, social simulation models can vary 
widely according to their epistemic aims (as illustrated in Figure 5.2). On the upper-
left-side in Figure 5.2, we find nomothetically-oriented models of abstract social 
processes which seek to discover general "social laws" governing social phenomena. 
Examples of these models include models of abstract social processes such as 
innovation diffusion {Gilbert et al. 2001, Huang et al. 2005), segregation {Schelling 
1971 ), behaviour dynamics {Axelrod 1981, Benvenuto 2000, Nemeth & Takacs 
2007), and opinion dynamics (Deffuant 2006, Gargiulo & Mazzoni, Hegselmann & 
Krause 2002, Salzarulo 2006, Stauffer et al. 2004). 
On the other hand, idiographically-oriented models aim to understand and explain a 
special case, the history of an individual event. An example is the Axtell et al. {2002)'s 
model of the Kayenta Anasazi population in Long House Valley state where they try 
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Empirically-grounded models 
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History 
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Figure 5.2: Simulation models on the Nomothetic"ldiographic space 
(based on Gilbert & Ahrweiler 2007:1 0) 
to reproduce spatial and demographic features of the Anasazi from about A.D. 800 to 
1300. 
It is clear that the simulation models developed within this thesis belong to the 
empirically-grounded models category. Here, the emphasis is to test and develop 
theories of segregation of workplaces and social networks based on evidence from 
empirical data (and in-line with existing theories). 
5. 7 Social Systems as Complex systems 
The complexity approach to studying social systems encompasses a collection of 
theoretical assumptions and system features. According to Waldrop (1993), a system 
is complex when many autonomous agents are interacting with each other in many 
ways: 
"Think of the quadrillions of chemically reacting proteins, lipids, 
and nucleic acids that make up a living cell, or the billions of 
interconnected neurons that make up the brain, or the millions 
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of mutually interdependent individuals who make up a human 
society." (Waldrop 1993:11) 
The human brain, as an example of a complex system, is a network of more than 100 
billion agents (neurons). The interaction among these neurons leads to the 
emergence of various functions of the brain including perception, storing information, 
learning, and innovation (that is, to come up with new methods of solving problems). 
According to Waldrop's definition, the characteristics of complex systems include 
(1993:11 ): 
1. Complex systems consist of a large number of interacting agents, billions in 
the case of a brain, where each agent influences and is influenced by quite 
few number of other agents. 
2. These interactions are non-linear; this is a necessary condition for a system 
to be complex. 
3. These systems undergo spontaneous self-organization through the 
interactions of agents. For example, to satisfy their material needs, people 
unconsciously organize themselves into an economy through their buying 
and selling. In other words, there is no central authority or processor 
organizing the system, such as in a conventional computer. 
4. These systems are adaptive, agents constantly learn from experience and 
history. For example, species evolve for better survival in a changing 
environment. 
5. Complex systems possess a kind of dynamism, that is agents constantly 
change; acquiring knowledge for example. This makes them different from 
static objects such as computer chips or snowflakes. 
123 
Most social systems and social phenomena satisfy these characteristics, that is, they 
are complex systems. These characteristics of complex systems introduce some 
consequences about the system behaviour: 
• Unpredictability of the behaviour. Complex systems are very sensitive to 
initial conditions, and small perturbations could make drastic change to the 
system behaviour, so they are unpredictable in general (or at least they 
cannot be accurately predicted). 
• Lack of decomposability. A complex system, by definition, is the outcome of 
interacting components. So, disconnecting these components, or studying 
them separately (in a reductionist approach) is not possible. 
5.8 Agent-Based Modelling 
Agent-Based Modelling {ABM) is distinguished from other kinds of simulation 
research by its focus on the concept of agents as the core component units that 
compose the model. In this sense, agents can be thought of as intelligent, 
autonomous programs that interact with other components of the system and their 
environment in order to affect a certain set of programmed goals (Gilbert & Troitzsch 
2005). This sociability or social embeddedness nature gives ABM an additional 
advantage, over other types of simulation modelling, when modelling social systems 
where individuals (agents) are continuously interacting with each other and with the 
environment (Edmonds 1998). 
Edmonds defines this social embeddedness as follows: 
ｾｾｮ＠ agent is socially embedded in a collection of other agents 
to the extent that it its more appropriate to model that agent as 
part of the total system of agents and their interactions as 
opposed to modelling it as a single agent that is interacting with 
an essentially unitary environment." (Edmonds 1998:2) 
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According to this definition, an agent's behaviour and cognition can be understood 
only in the context of interactions with other agents. In this framework, multi-agent 
systems usually incorporate some specifications of social interaction such as 
imitation, communication, persuasion, trading, bargaining, and so on, as an integral 
part of the model design. This implies that these processes will themselves be a 
central object of study. 
5.8. 1 Historical Origins of ABM 
Social simulation is a young but rapidly growing method in social sciences (an 
overview of the origins and history of social simulation is found in Gilbert and 
Troitzsch (2005)). Agent-based modelling originated within the field of Distributed 
Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a branch of computer science 
concerned with simulating human intelligence and intelligent behaviour (Gilbert & 
Troitzsch 2005). 
The classical approach of AI focused on individual cognition and does not involve 
"social" aspects of intelligence. In contrast, DAI (which has gained increasing 
research interest since the 1980s) is concerned with complex systems that consist of 
many interacting components (or agents) which have some level of autonomy and 
are both able to interact among themselves and interact with their environment to 
achieve certain goals. In these kinds of systems, social interaction is the mechanism 
of coordinating these various interacting components and their activities and 
achieving a useful outcome on the macro (or system) level. 
DAI is characterised by a 'bottom-up' approach to system design, in which micro-level 
rules of interaction are specified (based on some assumptions or theories), and then 
macro-level patterns "emerge". In this 'bottom-up' approach there is no central control 
or blackboard system, rather control of the system is intended to emerge from the 
specification of interaction processes amongst the agents. The designer of this type 
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of system would exploit this property of complex systems to establish control and 
coordination rather than to program it directly. As a result of the influence of these 
interaction mechanisms, individual components will tend to behave in a regulated 
way. This will result in the system exhibiting structured behaviour at an aggregate 
level. 
5.8.2 Emergence 
Emergence is the l<ey concept that places the DAI approach within the domain of 
complexity research (Waldrop 1993). Emergence implies that macro behaviours are 
generated by micro rules of interaction. As Gilbert and Troitzsch explain: 
''Emergence occurs when interactions among objects at one 
level give rise to different types of objects at another level.. . a 
phenomenon is emergent if it requires new categories to 
describe it which are not required to describe the behaviour of 
the underlying components". (2005:11) 
For example, an economy, as emergent phenomenon, can be described by some 
categories, for example growth rate, recession, and inflation, which are not applicable 
to describe individuals. Similarly, behavioural norms in human societies (such as 
fashion trends) and group behaviour of animals (flocking and herding) are emergent 
phenomena. Emergence is an important feature of most social systems where 
interactions between individuals at the micro level give rise to some patterns at the 
macro level such as social structures and organizations. 
When applying complexity theory to social phenomena it should be taken into 
account that humans have the ability to recognize and interact with macro-level 
entities (institutions for example) which they have created themselves through their 
interactions. Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005:12) called this reflexive action 'second-order 
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emergence', and argue that it is one of the characteristics distinguishing human 
societies from animal societies. 
5.9 Justification for Using ABM in the Current Thesis 
ABM is a suitable method for the current research for the following reasons: 
• The main focus of the current research is a complex and emerging 
phenomenon, that is, the co-emergence of social and workplace segregation. 
• And the main objective of the research is to understand the underlying causal 
mechanisms of segregation, and how the interactions and preferences of 
individuals at the micro level produce the observed macro level of 
segregation, with no direct interest in predicting the level of workplace and 
social segregation based on religion in Egypt (if it is predictable in the first 
place). 
These reasons suggest and support the choice of ABM as an investigation tool for the 
current thesis. 
5.10 Schelling Model of Residential Segregation 
Schelling's (1971) seminal model of residential segregation is presented here as a 
good example of social simulation that describes an emerging phenomenon based 
upon simple local social interaction. In addition, it is relevant to the main topic of the 
current thesis, that is, segregation. Schelling was interested in the phenomenon of 
racial residential segregation in American cities, and he aimed to explain how 
segregation could happen, and how these segregationist residential structures, such 
as ghettos, may occur spontaneously, even if people are relatively tolerant towards 
others of different ethnic groups, and even when they are happy with being a minority 
in their neighbourhoods. 
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To build his simulation model, Schelling used the squares on a checkerboard to 
represent dwellings and differently coloured coins to represent people (agents). He 
started with a fully integrated society by randomly distributing the coins over the 
board. To define the model's dynamics, Schelling supposed that people have a 
'threshold of tolerance' of other ethnic groups. That means that people (or coins) are 
content to stay at their Moore neighbourhood (which consists of the eight cells to the 
north, north-east, east, south-east, south, south-west, west and north-west) as long 
as the proportion of their neighbours of the same ethnic group as themselves is not 
less than this threshold. For example, with 50 percent threshold of tolerance, people 
would be happy to stay as long as at least four out of eight of their neighbours are 
from the same ethnic group; otherwise, they try to move to another neighbourhood 
satisfying this proportion. 
Schelling ran a series of simulation experiments that were organized around different 
assumptions, with different levels of threshold. In one experiment, for example, he 
supposed that a person would move to an open square if just one current neighbour 
were from a different race (1 00 percent threshold). The result, as would be easily 
predicted, was light and dark coins segregated quickly. 
A second experiment was subtler, where Schelling supposed that a person would not 
want to be part of an extreme racial minority. In this simulation, coins move only when 
they found themselves alone among unlike coins. In short order, sharp divides among 
neighbourhoods began to emerge. The effect was so pronounced and persistent that 
Schelling concluded that even if all traces of racism could somehow be obliterated, 
segregation could still happen. 
Although Schelling's computational tools (the checkerboard and coins) were not so 
advanced, his model can be easily developed into a computerized model. A Cellular 
Automata, CA, version of the model is included in the model library of Netlogo 
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Random start Final configuration (37 5% threshold) 
Final configuration (50% threshold) Final configuration (75% threshold) 
Figure 5.3: The result of the simulation of Schelling model. 
software (Wilensky 1997). In this model, a cell (or dwelling) can be in any of three 
colours: white, black, or grey when it is occupied by a white agent, occupied by a 
black agent, or is empty respectively. For each simulated time step, each agent is 
examined to see whether it is content, that is, whether the number of neighbours of 
the same colour is at least equal to its tolerance threshold. If an agent is content, it 
would stay at its position for the next time step, otherwise, it searches for a nearby 
unoccupied cell which has the desired proportion of similar neighbours, and if this cell 
is found, the agent moves to it, otherwise stays at its cell. The simulation continues 
until all agents are content, or a certain number of time steps has passed. 
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Figure 5.3 shows the result of the simulation with 2000 agents. The upper-left panel 
of the figure shows the starting random allocation of black and white agents over the 
grid, and then other three panels show the final configurations after running the 
simulation with tolerance thresholds of 37.5 percent (at least three of an agent's eight 
neighbours must be of the same colour for the agent to be content), 50 percent (four 
out of eight), and 75 percent (six out of eight). Clustering emerges even when agents 
are happy to be a minority in their neighbourhood (with 37.5 percent threshold), and 
the sizes of these emergent clusters increase with increasing levels of tolerance 
threshold. 
5.11 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, social simulation has been discussed as a research method. The 
chapter started with defining social simulation, discussing the typical objective of 
simulation research which is the understanding of the underlying dynamics of 
complex systems. Then it discussed using simulation as a modelling method and the 
analogy between simulation and mathematical and statistical modelling emphasising 
the advantages of each modelling method. 
The epistemologies of social simulation were briefly discussed, and simulation was 
identified as a third way of doing science, in addition to induction and deduction. Also 
complex systems (the broad category of most social systems) were defined and their 
characteristics are discussed. Then, the chapter focussed specifically on ABSS. It 
discussed the historical origins and the evolution of ABSS within DAI, and the main 
concept associated with it; which is emergence. A justification is provided for using 
ABM as a research tool for the current thesis due to the complexity of the topic and 
the research objectives. Finally, the Shelling's model of segregation has been 
introduced as a good and relevant example of social simulation. 
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6 METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Aims of This Chapter 
As stated in earlier chapters, this thesis aims to develop an agent-based simulation 
model that describes the co-emergence of social and workplace segregation. In the 
previous chapter, agent-based social simulation has been introduced as a research 
method, and a justification has been provided for its suitability for the current 
research. This chapter discusses data requirements to build such a model and how 
these data were obtained. 
Section 6.2 identifies the three data sources used in the current thesis, and then each 
of these sources is discussed in a separate section: the Social Contract Survey in 
Section 6.3, the Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey in Section 6.4, and 
the primary data (including interviews with a sample of workers and employers) in 
Section 6.5. The questionnaires, employer questionnaire and worker questionnaire 
used to collect the primary data, are presented in Section 6.6. Finally, the 
programming language used to build the simulation model is presented in Section 
6.7. 
6.2 Data Sources 
Three data sources have been used in an integrated way to provide the information 
about social networks and workplaces within the Egyptian context. Two of these 
sources are secondary data from nationwide surveys: the Social Contract Survey 
(SCS) and Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES), while the third 
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source involves structured interviews with a sample of workers and employers. In the 
following, a brief description of these sources is presented. 
6.3 Social Contract Survey (SCS) 
SCS was carried out by the Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC), of the 
Egyptian Cabinet in 2005. This survey provides an assessment of the satisfaction of 
Egyptians about many public services such as social insurance, health services, 
education, electricity, water, transportation, etc. The survey also includes measures 
about political participation, trust in the economic performance of the country, and 
how far Egyptians feel safe and secure. 
6.3. 1 SCS Sample 
As presented in Table 6.1, the SCS covered 17 of 26 Egyptian governorates, and it 
involved structured interviews with 6006 households. 
SCS is one of the few surveys in Egypt that include data about the religion of 
individuals. The identification sheet of the SCS survey included the variable "hhrel" 
which is the religion of the head of the household. All household members were 
assumed to follow the same religion as the head. 
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Table 6.1 : Distribution of SCS sample. 
Governorate Number of Percent Percentage of Copts Households 
Urban Governorates 
(1.) Cairo 700 11.7 6.3 
(2) Alexandria 399 6.6 2.0 
(4) Suez 100 1.7 6.0 
Lower Egypt 
(11) Damitta 295 4.9 0.0 
(13) Sharkia 292 4.9 2.7 
(14) Qualubia 150 2.5 8.7 
(15) Kafr EI-Sheikh 292 4.9 0.7 
(17) Menoufia 292 4.9 3.1 
(18) Behira 294 4.9 0.3 
(19) lsmailia 292 4.9 3.1 
Upper Egypt 
(21) Giza 150 2.5 2.0 
(22) Beni Suif 292 4.9 1.0 
(23) Fayoum 291 4.8 9.3 
(25) Assuit 541 9.0 12.2 
(26) Sohag 793 13.2 4.8 
(27) Qena 541 9.0 15.9 
(28) Aswan 292 4.9 6.5 
Total 6006 100.0 5.7 
ｾｯｵｲ｣･Ｚ＠ based on data in (SCS 2005). 
Governorate code (the variable gov) in the SCS data file 
6.3.2 Estimates from SCS 
SCS data were used to estimate the overall proportion of Copts and unemployment 
rates. The overall proportion of Copts in Egypt has been controversial. Estimates 
range between 6 percent (according to formal published statistics) and 18 percent 
(according to estimates from the Church records) (Ibrahim 1996). The SCS data were 
used to estimate the overall proportion of Copts in Egypt and it was found to be very 
close to the official published statistics (around 6 percent). 
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Table 6.2: Unemployment rates for SCS and SCS using SCS data. 
Muslims Copts Total 
Male 
Working 86.9 92.1 87.1 
Not working 13.1 7.9 12.9 
Female 
Working 15.8 19.2 15.9 
Not working 84.2 80.8 84.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: based on data in (SCS 2005). 
*Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
Also, Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of Copts is not even among Egyptian 
governorates. Copts are concentrated in Upper Egypt more than in Lower Egypt and 
urban governorates. Also there is large variation among governorates in the same 
region. For example, although Beni Suif and Qena are both Upper-Egypt 
governorates, the percentage of Copts in them varies between one percent and 
around 16 percent respectively. 
As presented in Table 6.2, SCS data were also used to estimate unemployment 
rates. The current thesis focuses only on male workers (no female workers were 
interviewed) because of the high level of unemployment among Egyptian females 
(around 84 percent) which mal<es the importance of workplaces as sources for social 
relations less important than males. As shown in the table, the overall unemployment 
rate for males is 12.9 percent, the unemployment rate for Muslims is 13.1 percent, 
and the unemployment rate for Copts is 7.9 percent. All the rates were calculated for 
individuals aged between 25 and 55 inclusive. 
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6.3.3 Sample Weights for SCS 
Governorates are not proportionally presented in the SCS sample, so sample weights 
were needed to obtain correct overall estimates for the country. Table 6.3 shows the 
sample weights for each governorate in the SCS. For each governorate, its weight is 
defined to be its proportion in the population divided by its proportion in the sample. 
All estimates (proportion of Copts and unemployment rates) calculated from the SCS 
are based on weighted data. 
Table 6.3: Sample weights for SCS Data. 
Total Population Sample Size (n,) Sample Weight 
Governorate (M) (Number of Individuals) [(MIN) I (nln)J 
Cairo 6758581 2790 1.3445 
Alexandria 4123869 1735 1.3192 
Suez 512135 456 0.6234 
Damitta 1097339 1139 0.5347 
Sharkkia 5354041 1370 2.1691 
Qualubia 4251672 677 3.4857 
Kafr EI-Sheikh 2620208 1323 1.0992 
Menoufia 3270431 1242 1.4615 
Behira 4747283 1536 1.7154 
lsmailia 953006 1364 0.3878 
Giza 3143486 624 2.7960 
Beni Suif 2291618 1546 0.8227 
Fayoum 2511027 1552 0.8980 
Assuit 3444967 2878 0.6644 
So hag 3747289 4859 0.4280 
Qena 3001681 2520 0.6611 
As wan 1186482 1814 0.3630 
Total (N) 53015115 (n) 29425 
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6.4 Workers' Status In Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES) 
WSIES was carried out in June 2005 to assess the status of workers in industrial 
enterprises. An industrial establishment was defined to be any economic unit with the 
industrial activity representing 50 percent or more of its overall activity .The main 
objectives of the survey included the assessment of work conditions (for example, 
safety, availability of social insurance, transportation, nurseries and other non-
pecuniary advantages) and the assessment of gender discrimination. The survey was 
collaboration between the Ministry of Investment, the Social Research Centre (SRC) 
in the American University in Cairo, and the World Bank. 
6.4. 1 WSIES Sample 
As presented in Table 6.4, the WSIES sample included structured questionnaires 
with 324 owners/managers of industrial enterprises in six governorates. The WSIES 
Table 6.4: Distribution of WSIES sample. 
Enterprises Male Workers Female Workers 
Governorate Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Cairo 101 31.2 803 31.0 207 32.0 
Alexandria 48 14.8 344 13.3 136 21.1 
Sharkkia 59 18.2 505 19.5 85 13.2 
Qualubia 43 13.3 354 13.6 76 11.8 
Gharbia 32 9.9 236 9.1 84 13.0 
Giza 41 12.7 352 13.6 58 9.0 
Total 324 100 2594 100.0 646 100.0 
Source: based on data in WSIES (2005). 
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sample was selected as a subsample of the Investment Climate Survey (ICS) carried 
out by SRC and the World Bank during the period from October to December 2004 
(the ICS sample included 1036 industrial enterprises from 16 governorates). The 
WSIES sample was selected as a representative sample for greater Cairo and Lower 
Egypt where most firms concentrate. The WSIES sample also included individual 
structured interviews with 2594 male workers and 646 female workers. 
6.4.2 Estimates from WSIES 
WSIES data were used to estimate the level of workplace segregation based on 
religion. Also, the data served as a frame to select employers and workers for further 
in-depth interviews (this will be explained later in the following section). 
Although the raw data of the WSIES do not contain any information about workers' 
religion, it was possible to infer it from their names. The interviewed manager of each 
sampled enterprises was asked to give a list of 10 to 15 complete names of workers 
for individual interview, and workers' religions could be inferred from their names (or 
the names of their household members if the worker was selected for individual 
interview) in this list. 
Most Egyptians have names that reflect their religious identity. For example, most 
Muslims have the name of prophet Mohamed (or one of his nicknames such as 
Ahmed, Mahmoud, Mostafa, and Taha) (47 percent of workers' names), or one of his 
companions (for example Omar, Ali, and Osman) (23 percent of workers' names) 
somewhere in their names: first, second, and/or third name. Also, many "Muslims-
only" names include the word "Abdul" (for example, Abdul Rahman, Abdul Fattah, 
and Abdul Kareem) (29 percent of workers' names). On the other hand, the most 
popular Coptic names include names such as Hannah, Balis, Girgis, and Shenouda. 
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Table 6.5: Workplace segregation indices for WSIES sample. 
Firm size 
{Number of workers} Gini Index (G) ｄｩｳｳｩｭｩｬ｡ｲｩｴｾ＠ Index {D} Number of Firms 
10-50 0.932 0.824 165 
51-100 0.886 0.740 46 
More than 1 00 0.831 0.711 113 
Total 0.839 0.714 324 
Source: based on data in WSIES {2005). 
This procedure, of predicting a person's religion his/her name, proved to be reliable 
within the Egyptian context. Workers' religion recorded from the actual face-to-face 
interviews with the employers (Question 106 in the employer questionnaire in 
Appendix B) matched the predicted religion based on names in all cases. 
Although the list given by firm's manager does not include all workers in that firm, it 
was assumed to be a representative sample of workers within the firm, and hence 
reflects the distribution of workers by religion inside it. Table 6.5 presents the 
workplace segregation indices Gini and Dissimilarity Index for the WSIES data for 
various firm sizes. 
6.5 The Primary Data 
As presented in Table 6.6, the primary data involved structured face-to-face 
interviews with 39 employers (27 Muslim and 12 Coptic employers) and 122 workers 
(81 Muslim and 41 Coptic workers) in four Egyptian governorates during August and 
September 2007. Firms and workers have been selected as a subsample from the 
WSIES sample as explained in the following subsection. 
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Table 6.6: Distribution of firms and workers In the primary data. 
Workers 
Firms Muslims ｃｯｾｴｳ＠ Total 
Governorate N % N % N % N % 
Cairo 26 66.7 54 66.7 28 68.3 82 67.2 
Alexandria 2 5.1 4 4.9 2 4.9 6 4.9 
Sharkkia 2 5.1 5 6.2 2 4.9 7 5.7 
Qualubia 9 23.1 18 22.2 9 22.0 27 22.1 
Total 39 100.0 81 100.0 41 100.0 122 100.0 
6.5. 1 Selection of Firms 
To select the sample of firms for the current research 165 small1 firms with number of 
workers between 10 and 50 inclusive (from a total of 324 firms) were considered in 
the frame. There are two reasons for the current research to focus on this set of small 
firms rather than larger firms. Firstly, it would be hard for a firm with more than 50 
workers to be thought as a single workplace where each worker interacts with all 
other workmates. Such firms are, most probably, divided into departments or sections 
where each could be considered as a workplace on its own. Secondly, it would be 
difficult to identify the employer or the person responsible for hiring decisions in firms 
1 According to the EU definition of micro, small, and medium enterprises; a small 
enterprise should include 10-49 employees. However, two enterprises with high 
Coptic percentage contained 50 employees, and it was thought to be useful to include 
them in the sample because of the low number of available firms with a high 
percentage of Copts. 
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with a very large number of workers; such firms usually have a separate department 
for human resources and follow rigorous hiring processes. Thus, it would be difficult 
to investigate some aspects of the demand side of labour (for example, hiring 
discrimination and statistical discrimination). 
These 165 small firms are categorised according to the percentage of Coptic workers 
into three categories. The first category includes 133 firms with no Coptic worl<ers 
(Predominantly Muslim firms). Half of remaining 32 firms with Coptic workers include 
less than 20 percent Copts (the second category: 16 Integrated firms) while the other 
half include 20 percent or more Copts (the third category: 16 Predominantly Coptic 
firms). 
All firms from the second and the third categories were included in the sample for the 
current research (total 32 firms, 16 of each category) . Besides, 16 firms were 
selected from the firms of the first category (Predominantly Muslim firms), with priority 
of selection given to firms in the nearest geographic area and with the closest number 
of workers to those firms selected from the other categories. The selection of firms in 
this way minimizes the effects of residential segregation by religion and firm size, and 
reduces the cost of travelling between distant sampling areas. 
Table 6.7 summarizes the allocation of selected firms and the actual numbers 
interviewed in each category. Only 39 employers, out of 48, were interviewed. The 
remaining 9 were not interviewed for different reasons: five firms were closed, and 
four refused the interview without providing a reason. 
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Table 6.7: Planned and interviewed numbers of firms and workers. 
Workers 
Firms Muslims ｃｯｾｴｳ＠ Total 
p p p p 
Firm Category 
Predominantly Muslim 16 16 32 32 0 0 32 32 
Integrated 16 12 32 22 16 7 48 29 
Predominantly Coptic 16 11 32 27 32 34 64 61 
Total 48 39 96 81 48 41 144 122 
P: Planned number 
1: Interviewed number 
6.5.2 Selection of Workers 
122 most recently employed male workers were selected within the 39 interviewed 
firms. Only most recently hired workers were selected for interviews because the 
current research involves questions about work history that require recalling past 
experiences. For example, the respondents were asked how he got his current job, 
and how he had used his social network to facilitate the process of job search. It is 
also important to have some information about the experience of previous job(s). 
Interviewing recent workers would minimize the burden of recalling the past. 
Only male workers were interviewed for two reasons. The first is that, according to 
the limited resources available for the research, the sample was not large enough to 
make separate analyses for male and female workers. The second reason is the 
sensitivity of interviewing female workers (especially at their homes), even by a 
female interviewer. 
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The sample of workers was planned as follows: two Muslim workers to be selected 
from predominantly Muslim firms (no Coptic workers in these firms), two Muslim 
workers and two Coptic workers to be selected from predominantly Coptic firms, and 
two Muslim workers and one Coptic worker to be selected from integrated firms. 
However, some variations happened to this selection plan according to the availability 
of workers for interview or the cost of the interview (for workers living far from the firm 
and who were not available to be interviewed inside the firm). Also the religious 
composition of some firms had changed since the WSIES survey and it was not 
possible in some cases to find the required number of Coptic or Muslim workers for 
interview. More Coptic workers were interviewed, when possible, to compensate for 
their small number in the sample. 
The sample size was chosen to provide an acceptable level of precision in the results 
with the limited resources available to the research. Table 6.7 summarizes the 
distribution of the planned and interviewed workers for different categories of firms. 
6.5.3 Sample Weights for the Primary Data 
Firm categories and workers of various religions are not proportionally represented in 
the sample of workers and employers. Copts and firms with a high Coptic proportion 
were oversampled. Hence, weights were used for estimates based on the sample at 
both worker level and firm level (although any generalization based on this small 
sample should be treated with caution). Table 6.8 shows how the sample weights 
were calculated for worl<ers and firms. The weights were calculated using the 
formula: proportion in the population/proportion in the sample for each firm (for 
weights on the firm level), or for each combination of firm category and worker's 
religion (for weights on the worker level). 
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Table 6.8: Sample weights for the primary data. 
(A} Workers 
coets Muslims 
Total Sample Weight Total Sample Weight 
Firm Category 
Predominantly Muslim 0.000 3229 39 2.419 
Integrated 47 14 0.196 496 24 0.547 
Predominantly Coptic 208 27 0.178 451 18 0.395 
Total 254 41 4176 81 
(B) Firms 
Total Sample Weight 
Firm Category 
Predominantly Muslim 133 16 1.965 
Integrated 16 12 0.315 
Predominantly Coptic 16 11 0.344 
Total 165 39 
6.6 Questionnaires 
Two types of questionnaires were used to collect the data for the current research: an 
employer questionnaire and a worker questionnaire; both are presented in detail in 
the following subsections. The questionnaires were translated from English into 
Arabic language, and all interviews were carried out in using the Arabic language. 
6.6. 1 Employer Questionnaire 
The employer questionnaire (Appendix A) was used to gather data from 
owners/managers (who are responsible for recruiting decisions for new workers) of 
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the sampled firms about the religious composition of the firm, recruitment attitudes 
and practices, in addition to information about hiring and statistical discrimination. It 
was also essential in identifying potential workers for the workers' interviews. The 
questionnaire includes three sections in addition to the cover page and the consent 
and identification page. The questionnaire was designed to be as short as possible, 
and it took 13 minutes on average to complete. Some details of the employer 
questionnaire are presented below. 
Cover Page 
The cover page contains the name and the date of the survey, and a clear statement 
that all data will be kept confidential and will be used for scientific research only. 
Consent Form 
"Informed consent" is a legal and moral right of the potential informant. It was defined 
by the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1974 as follows: 
"Informed consent means the knowing consent of an individual 
or his legally authorized representative, so situated as to be 
able to exercise free power of choice without undue inducement 
or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or any other form 
of constraint or coercion." (Singer 1993:361-362) 
The consent form used in the current thesis was designed to comply with the 
definition and regulations developed by US Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. These regulations specify some elements of information necessary for 
informed consent (Singer 1993:362): 
• A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed and their purposes. 
The following statements in the introductory passage of the consent satisfy 
this requirement: "We are conducting this survey about employment, social 
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networks and religion... I would like to ask you about your experience and 
practices as an employer regarding recruiting new workers for your firm. 
• A description of discomforts and risks. The only possible discomfort for 
the employer is to give some of his time to complete the survey: "The survey 
usually takes about 15 minutes to complete". 
• A description of benefits. There is no direct personal benefit for the 
employer to complete the survey; however, it was clear that his participation 
is on a voluntary base. 
• An offer to answer any question: "At this time, do you want to ask me 
anything about the survey?" 
• A statement that the person is free to withdraw at any time without 
prejudice: "Participation in the survey is voluntary and you can choose not to 
answer any of the questions or withdraw from participation at any time." 
Identification Sheet 
The Identification Sheet provides data about the name and position of the respondent 
within the firm, the firm's name and address (including Governorate, Kism, and 
Shiakha2), date and time of interview, and interviewer's name. It also informed the 
interviewer about the required number of Coptic and Muslim workers to be 
interviewed in the firm according to the sample allocation plan. 
2 Governorate, kism and shiakha are administrative divisions in Egypt comparable to 
county, town and area, respectively, in UK. 
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Section 1: Workers' Turnover 
This section is the core part of the employer questionnaire. It provides information 
about the turnover of workers of different religion, and is used to identify worl<ers for 
in-depth interviews. It includes data about some of the male workers that were 
working in the firm two years before the interview (at the time of WSIES interviews). 
The identification number (Q1 00) and names of workers (Q1 01) were pre-filled from 
WSIES data. For each worker in this list, the employer was asked to give information 
about the worker's religion, whether he is still working in the firm or not. If the worker 
had left the firm, we ask why and when that happened. We also asked how long the 
worl<er has been (or "had been" in case he had left the firm) working in the firm. This 
information gave an overall picture of change of religious composition of firms, and 
exit patterns of workers of different religions. 
Section 2: Selection of Workers for Interviews 
This section provides brief background information about the religious composition of 
the firm in two different points in time: when the employer started his activity in the 
firm and at the time of interview. It also provides information about the most recent 
hired workers (and their religious affiliation) which helped in identifying workers for the 
workers interviews. 
Section 3: Recruitment Attitudes and Practices 
This section provides information about the recruitment methods usually used by the 
employer (0301 ). Also, it provides some measures for statistical discrimination 
through a six-item question (0302). Section 3 provides information about hiring 
discrimination through questions 303-306, and the perception of hiring discrimination 
exercised by Copts or Muslims against each other (questions 307-308), in addition to 
the respondent's perception of any discrimination against Copts as a minority group 
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(questions 309 and 31 0). Finally, this section provides basic demographic information 
about the employer (for example, age, education level, and religion). 
The questionnaire ends with recording time (to use along with start time to calculate 
average interview time) and degree of cooperation of respondent (how receptive was 
he/she to participating in the survey), thanking the respondent for participation, and 
recording any further notes or comments by interviewer. 
6.6.2 Worker Questionnaire 
The worker questionnaire (Appendix B) was designed to provide information about 
how people use their social networks to find jobs, and how the ethnic/religious 
composition of social networks affects/changes with workplace segregation. The 
questionnaire provides information about the religious composition and the structure 
of worker's social network, job history, sources and the flow of information about job 
vacancies, in addition to information about the religious tolerance of respondents. The 
worker questionnaire includes four sections in addition to a cover page and consent 
and identification page. 
The cover page and the consent/identification page are similar to those of the 
employer questionnaire with few modifications. Details of the other parts of the worker 
questionnaire are presented below. 
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Section 1: Background and Household Composition 
This section provides basic background information on the respondent and his 
household 3 members. This includes: name, relationship to respondent, sex, age, 
education, marital status, work status, and whether the household member works in 
the same line of work as the respondent or not. The household composition provided 
valuable information about an important part of respondent's social network, that is, 
the adults living in the same household with him (Grossetti 2005). 
Section 2: Respondent's Social Network 
The definition of the size of social network, "the number all alters that ego has 
relations with" (Marsden 1987:232), is too wide to use for empirical surveys. Most 
people have relations (of different kinds and strength) with hundreds of other people 
(Hill & Dunbar 2003). According to Wellman (1990), most people have about 400 
actual ties. So, the definition of social networl< has to be operationalzed according to 
the research objectives (McCallister & Fischer 1983). The current research focuses 
on this part of respondents' social networks that most influence their attitudes, 
behaviour, and well-being. McCallister and Fischer call this part the "core" networl<, 
and they defined it as: 
" ... the set of people who are most likely to be sources of a 
variety of rewarding interactions, such as discussing a personal 
problem, borrowing money, or social recreation" (McCallister & 
Fischer 1983:78). 
3 Household is defined as a group of people who usually live, eat, and sleep together 
in the same housing unit even if they are not relatives. 
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This section provides information about the composition and structure of respondent's 
"core" social network. The meth9d used to obtain information about respondent's 
social network relies on the same strategy of name generators as used by McCallister 
and Fischer (1983) in their Northern California Community Study (NCCS) of the 
personal consequences of residential environment. This strategy involves asking the 
respondents to name people with whom they were likely to have valued interactions. 
The questions from 201 to 206 and 208 include the name generators that have been 
suggested by McCallister and Fischer (1983), and include: 
0201, discuss important matters: "From time to time, most people discuss important 
matters with other people. Who are the people with whom you discuss matters 
important to you?" 
0202, help with major household tasks: "Who from outside your household has 
recently helped you with tasks around the home, such as painting, moving furniture, 
cooking, cleaning or major or minor repairs?" 
0203, borrow minor things: "Suppose you need to borrow some small thing such as a 
tool or a cup of sugar, from whom outside your household would you ask to borrow 
it?" 
0204, borrow large sum of money: "If you need to borrow a large sum of money, say 
LE1000, whom would you ask for help?" 
0205, socializing and entertainment: "Who are the people you really enjoy socializing 
with? For example, people with whom you may have lunch or dinner together, you 
may exchange home visits, or you may meet outside the home for recreation (e.g. 
restaurant, coffee shop, park, club, etc.)." 
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0206, talk about work matters: "With whom would you talk about your work? For 
example, decisions you have to make, professional problems you have to solve and 
ways to improve how you work?" 
0208, any unmentioned important persons: "Are there any other persons that are 
close to you that have not been mentioned in one of the previous questions?" 
These name generators cover wide sources of relationships: intimate and close 
friends, neighbours, relatives, etc. For the objectives of current research, an 
additional name generator was used in the worker questionnaire, which is question 
207: "If you are going to search for a new job, whom would you ask for information or 
help?" This question provides information about the flow of job information through 
social networl<s. 
The second step, after having a list of the respondent's core network alters (questions 
209 and 21 0), was to ask detailed questions about these people. The questions from 
211 to 221 provide details about sex, origin of relation, religion, marital status, etc. 
Question 221 provides information about respondent's network density - the mean 
strength of connection among alters, or the proportion of links present relative to 
those possible (Marsden 1990). Unlike most studies, such as McCallister & Fischer 
(1983) and Marsden (1987), that ask about the relation among a subsample of alters 
(since it is not usually possible to get this information for all pairs of alters), I asked 
here about a sample of relation among all alters. In question 221, the respondent was 
asked to evaluate the relationship between each person in the table with the 
preceding person (the first person is matched with the last one). This technique helps 
reducing the questionnaire space since it does not require a separate section to ask 
about networl< density. It reduces the interviewer's burden since he will not need to 
select a subsample of alters to ask about their relationship. 
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Section 3: Work History 
This section provides information about how people use their social networks to find 
information about jobs, and the level of segregation of the workplaces they had 
worl<ed in. The Work History section includes information about the respondent's last 
three jobs (including the current one). For each job we asl< about: job title and 
category, date of start working in this job and date of leaving it (if applicable), how far 
is/was the job from respondent's house. 
A number of questions are included about the source of job information and the 
contact person: his relationship to respondent, religion, how did he know about the 
job, and whether he has worked with the respondent before. The section also 
includes some questions about job satisfaction and the relationship between 
respondent and his employer and workmates, the religious affiliation of workers, and 
finally why the respondent had left the job. 
Section 4: Attitudes towards Others of Different Religion 
This section provides information about the respondent's attitudes towards working 
with employers and other workmates of different religion, his perception of any 
discrimination against the Coptic minority, and whether Coptic or Muslim employers 
discriminate against workers of different religion to their own. 
For example, questions 401 and 403 describe the respondent's attitude towards 
working with an employer or workmates of a different religion. The questions 405-411 
are similar to the questions in the employer questionnaire, and they provide 
measures for statistical discrimination and stereotyping perceived by the worl<er, 
information about hiring discrimination in the firm, and the perception of hiring 
discrimination exercised by Copts or Muslims against each other, in addition to the 
respondent's perception of any discrimination against Copts as a minority group. 
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Like the Employer questionnaire, the worker questionnaire ends with recording time, 
thanking the respondent, and recording any notes or comments by the interviewer 
6.6.3 Fieldwork 
Due to the number of interviews and time limitation on the fieldwork, two professional 
interviewers were recruited and trained to help in the data collection process. 
Employers were called (whenever their phone numbers are available in the database; 
otherwise, the researcher visited them directly), informed about the study and asked 
to participate in it. All employers' interviews took place in their firms. With employers' 
permissions, workers were offered to have their interviews in their homes or in the 
firms, and most workers' interviews were in the firms (112 of 122 interviews). 
6.6.4 Office Work 
All questionnaires were reviewed for completeness and consistency. Then, a 
codebook was developed to post-code open-ended questions and questions that 
included "Other" answers. 
A data entry program was developed using Microsoft Access, and data were entered 
into the computer. Regular verification checks were performed, and then data were 
converted to SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) files for statistical 
analysis. 
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6. 7 Programming 
The simulation model was developed using NetLogo4 (version 4.0.3). NetLogo is a 
multi-agent programmable modelling environment. It was developed by Uri Wilensky 
in 1999 at the Centre for Connected Learning (CCL) at Northwestern University, USA. 
NetLogo inherits some aspects of the Logo programming language; for example, the 
main agents are "turtles" moving around "patches" (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). 
NetLogo was selected as a programming tool for many reasons. It is a simple and 
easy to use yet powerful programming language; with a single line of code, one can 
ask NetLogo to perform many complicated tasks. NetLogo is an object-oriented 
programming language, perfectly suited for agent-based models. Another reason for 
choosing NetLogo is that it can be easily used for creating models involving social 
networks using its predefined Link agent set that (as apparent from the name) can 
link two agents together. 
6.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented the three data sources that have been used to provide the 
information needed to build and validate the model of social and workplace 
segregation. Two of these sources are secondary data from the Social Contract 
Survey (SCS) and Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES}, while 
the third source is primary data involving structured interviews with a sample of 
workers (122) and employers (39). 
4 NetLogo is available for download for free at: http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo 
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The chapter also introduced two types of questionnaires that have been used to 
collect the primary data: the employer questionnaire and the worker questionnaire, 
and discussed some issues regarding the office work and the preparation of the data 
for statistical analysis, for example, coding and data entry, in addition to introducing 
the programming language used to implement the simulation model. 
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7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY DATA 
7.1 Aims of This Chapter 
In this chapter, the main findings of the empirical primary data are presented and 
discussed. In the Section 7.2, an overview of the main findings is introduced. The 
results of the analysis of the Employers Questionnaires are presented in Section 7.3, 
these include: firms' background, worl<ers' turnover, hiring practices, stereotyping and 
statistical Discrimination, and hiring discrimination, and employers' background 
characteristics. 
The results from the Workers Questionnaires are discussed in Section 7.4, these 
include: workers' background characteristics, workers' social networks, job search 
and job contacts, workers' turnover, work preferences, and workers' perception of 
hiring discrimination and stereotyping. 
7.2 Introduction 
The main findings from the employers' and workers' data shed some light on social 
networl<s and social integration between Muslims and Copts in the Egyptian society. 
The results focus on the processes of workers' recruitment and job search methods 
within the Egyptian labour market for both Muslim and Coptic workers and employers, 
and how these affect workplace segregation based on religion. 
The statistical analysis of the employers' interviews shows that most employers rely 
on informal methods for recruiting workers, and the recruitment through insider 
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referrals is very common. There was no direct evidence for hiring or statistical 
discrimination based on employers' responses. However, there is a strong 
relationship between an employer's religion and the religious affiliation of his workers. 
The workers' data show that Muslims and Copts have social networks of similar 
structure and size. However, social networks for both Muslims and Copts tend be 
religiously homophilous. Consequently, Muslims and Copts usually have job 
information from people of the same religion. The data also show that Copts tend, 
more than Muslims, to work in segregated workplaces based on religion. Moreover, 
the duration that a Coptic worker stays in employment at a workplace was found to be 
correlated to the percentage of Copts in this workplace. 
The following provides more detail about these results. 
7.3 Analysis of Employers Data 
The Employer questionnaire took on average 13 minutes to complete with the owner 
or manager of the firm. Most employers (33 of 39) were receptive to participation in 
the survey. Some (6 employers), however, were not comfortable with discussing 
these sensitive issues about Copts-Muslims relations at work. A summary of the 
results from the employer questionnaire is given in the following. 
7.3. 1 Firms' Background 
Table 7.1 presents the distribution of the sampled firms according to some 
background characteristics for each firm category. As defined in Chapter 6, 
predominately Muslim firms are those firms with no Copts at all, integrated firms have 
some Copts but less than 20 percent, while predominately Coptic firms are those with 
more than 20 percent Copts. 
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The firm categories used throughout this chapter are based on data from the 
Employer's Questionnaire: question 204; number of current workers in the firm, and 
question 205; number of current Coptic workers in the firm, rather than estimated 
ones based on data from WSIES (see Selection of Firms in Chapter 6 for more 
details). The proportion of Copts in the same firm may have changed from the time of 
WSIES (2005) to the time of the interview due to workers' movement in and out the 
firms. 
Table 7.1: Firms' background characteristics. 
Firm ｣｡ｴ･ｧｯｲｾ＠
Predominately Predominately 
Muslim Integrated Co12tic Total 
Governorate 
Cairo 12 6 8 26 
Alexandria 0 2 
Sharkkia 0 2 
Qualubia 4 4 9 
Firm's age 
Less than 1 0 years 3 3 3 9 
10-19 6 5 0 11 
20-29 6 3 10 
30-39 0 3 4 
40 and more years 0 4 5 
Mean age 18.8 17.4 30.0 21.5 
Number of workers 
10-19 8 5 6 19 
20-29 3 2 3 8 
30-39 2 0 3 
40-50 3 5 9 
Mean size 24 29 21 25 
Total number 16 12 11 39 
Source: employer data. 
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As shown in Table 7.1, the sampled firms were selected from four governorates: 
Cairo, Alexandria, Sharkkia, and Qualubia (the majority were from Cairo; 26 firms, 
and Alexandria; 9 firms). The mean age of the firm was 22 years. The firms vary 
widely, in terms of age, from 2 to 67 years old. Table 7.1 shows that the number of 
workers in these firms varies between 1 0 and 50, with a mean of 25 workers, and 
around half of the firms employ less than 20 workers. 
7.3.2 Workers' Turnover 
As explained earlier in Chapter 3, the exit patterns of workers may affect workplace 
segregation (S0rensen 2004). Firms may recruit their workers using formal methods 
based on equal opportunity practices, and may start with all social groups 
proportionately represented in the firm, yet segregation may happen due to the exit 
patterns of workers and their responses to changes of the religious, ethnic, or racial 
composition of their workplaces. This may happen when workers tend to stay longer 
in workplaces where their own social group is overrepresented compared with other 
workplaces. 
Table 7.2: Mean job duration (in months) for Muslim and Coptic workers. 
Mean job duration {months} 
Muslim Workers ｃｯｾｴｩ｣＠ Workers Total 
Firm category 
Predominately Muslim 103.5 103.5 
Integrated 107.5 132.3 112.0 
Predominately Coptic 130.9 145.2 137.7 
Total 105.2 141.2 107.4 
Number of workers 323 76 399 
Source: employer data. 
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As presented in Table 7.2, the overall mean job duration for all worl<ers was around 9 
years (1 07.4 months) Oob duration is calculated from question 103 and 105 of the 
employer questionnaire). The mean job duration for Muslim workers was about 105 
months, and there is no significant difference in this mean according to percentage of 
Copts in the worl<place. For Coptic workers, the mean job duration was higher (about 
141 months); however, the difference in job duration between Copts and Muslims is 
not statistically significant, and there is also no significant difference in this mean by 
percentage of Copts in the workplace. 
There is no clear evidence, based on the data presented in Table 7.2, that Copts or 
Muslims prefer to stay longer where they are overrepresented. However, this 
hypothesis will be tested again later in this chapter using data from the worker 
questionnaire where job duration is reported by the workers themselves which makes 
it more likely to be accurate, and the test will be based on a larger sample. 
Table 7.3: Reasons for workers to leave their workplaces. 
Muslim Workers ｃｯｾｴｩ｣＠ Workers Total 
Reasons (Q104) 
Found another job 50.6 43.8 49.5 
Was not happy with salary 5.7 12.5 6.8 
Was not good at job 4.6 0.0 3.9 
His behaviour was not good 1.1 6.3 1.9 
No longer needed 5.7 0.0 4.9 
Went to the army 11.5 6.3 10.7 
Dead/Sick 8.0 25.0 10.7 
Other 12.8 6.1 11.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of workers 67 16 103 
Source: employer data. 
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7.3.3 Main Reasons for Workers to Leave Their Workplaces 
For those workers who had left their workplaces between the time of WSIES and the 
interview, employers were asked about the reasons for them leaving (question 104). 
Table 7.3 summarizes the results. Half the workers left because they had found 
another job, and some were not happy with the salary (around 7 percent), or joined 
the army. No significant differences found between Copts and Muslims regarding the 
reason to leave. 
7.3.4 Employers' Background 
The employer questionnaire included two background questions about employers' 
age (based on Q311) and education (0312). As shown in Table 7.4, the mean age of 
employers was around 52 years, and around four fifth of them have a university or 
higher degree of education. 
Table 7.4: Percent distribution of employers by background characteristics. 
Muslim Coptic 
ｅｭ･ｬｯｾ･ｲｳ＠ ｅｭ･ｬｯｾ･ｲｳ＠ Total 
Age (Q311) 
30-39 14.8 25.0 17.9 
40-49 29.6 8.3 23.1 
50-59 33.3 41.7 35.9 
60-69 11.1 16.7 12.8 
70+ 11.1 8.3 10.3 
Mean age 51.2 52.4 51.6 
Educational level (Q312) 
Primary 7.4 8.3 7.7 
Secondary 14.8 8.3 12.8 
University/Higher 77.8 83.3 79.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of ･ｭｾｬｯｾ･ｲｳ＠ 27 12 39 
Source: employer data. 
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7.3.5 Hiring Practices 
The employer questionnaire includes information about how frequently employers use 
each of the recruiting methods (Question 301 ): 
• Formal methods, through advertisement and/or employment agency 
• Through current workers, that is, using insider referrals 
• Through employer's social network, that is, employer's friends and relatives 
• Old workers, or someone eligible known to the employer 
• Any other recruiting methods, for example, Labour Office or a worker may 
pass and ask for a job. 
Table 7.5 presents the number and percentage of employers who reported that they 
frequently or sometimes use each of these recruiting methods. Using informal 
methods to hire new workers is a very common practice in the sampled firms. For 
example, about 81 percent of employers hire new workers through referrals from the 
current workers in their firms (and this may have a large effect on the level of 
Table 7.5: Hiring methods reported by employers 
Hiring Method (Q301) 
Formal channels (Advertisement/Employment agency) 
Through current workers 
Through employer's friends/relatives 
Old workers or someone known to the employer 
Other methods 
Number of employers 
Source: employer data. 
Employers 
Number 
20 
31 
19 
22 
5 
39 
Percentage 
51.0 
80.5 
47.5 
55.6 
13.9 
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workplace segregation). On the other hand, formal recruiting channels, through 
advertisements and employment agencies are used by around half of the employers. 
No significant differences were found by religion of the employers or by proportion of 
the Copts in the firm (not presented in the table). 
7.3.6 Stereotyping and Statistical Discrimination 
The employers were asked a set of questions (Q302) in the form: Which workers, 
Copts or Muslims, do you think work harder, are more honest, are more cooperative 
with managers/supervisors, etc. As presented in Table 7.6, there is an indication that 
only Muslim employers practice stereotyping and statistical discrimination. All Coptic 
employers reported that Muslim and Coptic workers are "the same" in all questions. 
However, more than one fifth of the Muslim employers believe that Muslim workers 
are more honest, more cooperative with other workmates, and more cooperative with 
their managers and supervisors, while around 17 percent of them believe that Coptic 
workers are more respectful to work rules. 
These results from the employer's interviews should be treated as a general 
indication rather than solid evidence of stereotyping and statistical discrimination. 
Firstly, the sample size does not allow for solid generalizations, especially with Coptic 
employers (only 12 interviews). Secondly, there is a possibility that the results may be 
biased because people from minority groups generally tend to give more socially 
desirable answers than majority group people. 
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Table 7.6: Stereotyping and statistical discrimination of employers 
Muslim 
Employers 
Coptic 
Employers Total 
Q302:Which workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think are better than the other in each of the 
following: 
Work harder 
Muslims 13.9 0.0 12.8 
Copts 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The same 86.1 100.0 87.2 
More honest 
Muslims 22.2 0.0 20.5 
Copts 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The same 77.8 100.0 79.5 
More cooperative with managers/supervisors 
Muslims 22.2 0.0 20.5 
Copts 2.8 0.0 2.6 
The same 75.0 100.0 76.9 
More cooperative with other workmates 
Muslims 22.2 0.0 20.5 
Copts 2.8 0.0 2.6 
The same 75.0 100.0 76.9 
Respect work rules 
Muslims 8.3 0.0 7.7 
Copts 16.7 0.0 15.4 
The same 75.0 100.0 76.9 
Accept lower salary 
Muslims 5.7 0.0 5.3 
Copts 5.7 0.0 5.3 
The same 88.6 100.0 89.5 
Number of Employers 27 12 39 
Source: employer data. 
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7.3. 7 Hiring Discrimination 
The employers were asked a set of questions to assess their hiring discrimination 
(question 303M310). Table 7.7 summarizes the employers' responses to these 
questions. 
None of Coptic employers reported that it is important to hire workers of the same 
religion as theirs (0303), while around 17 percent of Muslim employers reported it is 
important. The three main reasons given by the Muslim employers for their 
preference to have Muslim workers only were (not shown in the table): 
• 
1
'TO practice religious activities (e.g., to pray, fast, celebrate feasts) together" 
• 
1
'TO have the same morals and attitudes" 
• 
1100 not like to deal with people from other religion" 
To assess the perception of the employers regarding any potential problems, or 
benefits, of having Copts and Muslims working in the same workplace, employers 
were asked: ｾｾｈｯｷ＠ good or bad thing, you think, is it to have workers with different 
religions in the same workplace?" (0305). The majority of employers were neutral, 
that is, they reported that it is neither good nor bad to have workers of different 
religions together at the same workplace; one fifth of Muslim and half Coptic 
employers reported it is good, and about 14 percent of Muslim employers said it is 
bad. Benefits reported for having Copts and Muslims together in the same workplace 
include (0306): 
• "Would spread love and friendship among people" 
• "Decreases the sensitivity between Copts and Muslims" 
• "Help exchanging ideas and experiences" 
• "Create environment with good competition" 
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• 
11They [Copts and Muslims] have different vacations in feasts, so, there will be 
workers to run the business all the time" 
• llHelp stopping discrimination against Copts and Muslims in the work" 
• 
1
'Help presenting a good picture of the Egyptian society with no discrimination" 
Table 7.7: Employers' responses to questions about hiring discrimination. 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
0303: Is it important or not important to have workers of the same religion as yours? 
Important 
Not important 
16.7 
83.3 
0.0 
100 
15.4 
85.0 
0305: Is it good or bad to have workers with different religions In the same workplace? 
Good 19.4 
Bad 13.9 
Neutral 66.7 
50.0 
0.0 
50.0 
22.5 
12.5 
65.0 
0307: Do you agree or disagree that Muslims tend to employ each others more than 
employing Copts? 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
25.0 
72.2 
2.8 
33.3 
33.3 
33.3 
25.6 
69.2 
5.1 
0308: Do you agree or disagree that Copts tend to employ each others more than 
employing Muslims? 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
55.6 
36.1 
8.3 
33.3 
33.3 
33.3 
53.8 
35.9 
10.3 
0309: Do you agree or disagree that there is discrimination against Copts In Egypt? 
Agree 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Disagree 77.8 66.7 76.9 
Neutral 22.2 33.3 23.1 
Number of ｅｭｾｬｯｹ｟･ｲｳ＠ 27 12 39 
Source: employer data. 
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On the other hand, reasons given by employers against integrated workplaces 
include (Q306): 
• "They have different habits, and this may create problems at the work" 
• "/ prefer not to recruit people from other religion at all" 
To assess the perception of employers about the level of hiring discrimination in the 
Egyptian labour market, employers were asked: "How strongly do you agree or 
disagree that Copts/Muslims tend to employ each others more than employing 
Muslims/Copts?" (Q307 and 0308). 
As presented in Table 7.7, more than half of Muslims employers believe that Coptic 
employers discriminate against Muslim worl<:ers, while only quarter of them reported 
that Muslim employers discriminate against Copts. For Coptic employers, one third of 
them think that there is a mutual discrimination between Muslims and Copts 
regarding employment. 
Finally, none of the employers, Muslims or Copts, reported that they believe there is 
any discrimination against Copts in general in Egypt. 
7.4 Analysis of Workers Data 
The worker questionnaire took on average 22 minutes to complete. Most of the 
workers were happy to participate in the survey and complete the questionnaires. 
Like employers, however, there are 7 workers (5 Muslims and 2 Copts), representing 
around 6 percent of the sample, who did not show good level of cooperation and 
refused to answer some of the questions. In the following, a summary of the results 
from the worker questionnaire is presented. 
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7.4. 1 Workers' Background 
Table 7.8 presents the distribution of the interviewed workers by age (Q104) and 
educational level (Q1 05). Worker's age varied widely between 18 and 60 years, with 
a mean of about 37 years. 
The majority of the workers, Copts and Muslims, have an educational level between 
primary and secondary, with around 10 percent who have never attended school at 
all, and 10 percent with a university degree. The mean number of years of education 
was 9.3 years for Coptic workers and 8.3 years for Muslims. 
Some of the household characteristics are presented in Table 7.8. The mean 
household size (number of members) for Muslim workers (4.6) is slightly larger than 
for Copts (4.1 ). Around one quarter of household members are employed (in addition 
to the interviewed worker), and a small percentage (around 5 percent) of those are 
working in the same line of work as the respondent worker, that is, in the same 
workplace or in a similar job in another workplace. 
7.4.2 Workers' Social Networks 
As explained in detail in Chapter 5, the worker questionnaire included questions 
about the composition and structure of the worker's social network. A set of name 
generators (questions from 201 to 208) was used to elicit the names of alters, then, a 
number of detailed questions (questions 211 to 221 ), were asked about these alters. 
The worker's social network is defined to include all adults in his household in 
addition to the elicited ones. In the following, a summary of the results regarding the 
workers' network size and composition is presented. 
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Table 7.8: Percent distribution of workers by background characteristics. 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
Age (Q104) 
Less than 30 22.8 28.6 23.1 
30-39 39.5 28.6 38.8 
40-49 30.7 14.3 29.8 
50+ 7.0 28.6 8.3 
Mean age 36.7 39.2 36.9 
Educational level (Q1 06) 
No education at all 11.4 14.3 11.6 
Primary 29.8 14.3 28.9 
Preparatory 14.9 14.3 14.9 
Secondary 33.3 42.9 33.9 
University/Higher 10.5 14.3 10.7 
Mean years of education 8.3 9.3 8.3 
Mean number of household 
members 4.6 4.1 4.6 
Work status for household 
members (Q1 08) 
Working 24.0 26.7 24.2 
Not worl<ing 76.0 73.3 75.8 
Type of work (0109) 
The same as worker's 5.0 0.0 4.6 
Different from worker's 95.0 100.0 95.4 
Total percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of workers 81 41 122 
Source: worker data. 
7.4.2.1 Network Size and Composition 
Table 7.9 summarizes the main findings of networl< size and composition for Coptic 
and Muslim worl<ers. The average network size was 7.1 alters per worker, with a 
minimum of 2 and a maximum of 20. Mean network size for Copts (6.8) was slightly 
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Table 7.9: Size, average closeness of alters, religious affiliation of alters, and context of 
relation construction by worker's religion. 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
Network size 
Average 7.1 6.8 7.1 
Minimum 2 2 2 
Maximum 20 15 20 
Strength of relation 
Intimate/Strong 96.9 96.1 96.9 
Moderate 2.9 3.9 3.0 
Weak 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Religion of alters 
Muslims 98.2 17.6 93.4 
Copts 1.8 82.4 6.6 
Strength of relation among alters 
Intimate/Strong 65.4 66.7 65.4 
Moderate 5.0 6.3 5.1 
Weak 1.8 2.1 1.8 
No Relation 27.9 25.0 27.7 
Average closeness among alters 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Source of relation 
Relatives 55.0 51.0 54.7 
School/University 4.0 2.0 3.9 
Work 26.3 27.5 26.4 
Neighbours 10.6 11.8 10.7 
Through other friends/relatives 3.3 5.9 3.5 
Other sources 0.7 2.0 0.8 
Number of alters 593 286 879 
pource: worker data. 
Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
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lower than that of Muslims (7.1) though the difference was not statistically significant. 
Most of the reported relations (around 97 percent) represent strong ties, and the 
respondent evaluated them as intimate or strong relationships. 
Table 7.9 shows a strong evidence for segregation in social networks of Muslim and 
Coptic workers based on religion. On average, Copts represent only 1.8 percent of 
Muslims' social network (while their overall proportion in the society was estimated to 
be around 6 percent). Similarly, only 17.6 percent of alters in the social network of 
Coptic workers were Muslims. 
To measure network density, the workers were asked to evaluate the strength of the 
relationship between each pair of successive alters with a scale from 1 (representing 
an intimate relation) to 5 (no relation at all). All household members are assumed to 
have intimate relationships among themselves. Nearly one third of alters have a weak 
or no relation at all, the remaining percentage, around 70 percent, have moderate-to-
intimate relationship. The average closeness among alters was 2.4, and no significant 
difference was found by worker's religion. 
As Table 7.9 shows, more than half the social relations were with relatives. 
Workplace proved to be an important context for relationship construction. More than 
a quarter of alters were known through work. Moreover, the workplace contributed 
around 58 percent of non-familial relationships. Other sources of social relationships 
include: school/university (4 percent), neighbourhood (11 percent), through other 
friend/relative (4 percent), and around one percent through other sources (for 
example, mosque/church). 
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7.4.3 Job Search and Job Contacts 
Section 3 of the worker questionnaire provides information about respondent's work 
history. The results about this work history are summarized in the following. 
As shown in Table 7.10, informal search for jobs using friends and relatives is very 
common, and was used to secure about 58 percent of jobs for workers. Around 73 
percent of Copts were found to rely on informal search compared with 57 percent of 
Muslim workers (although the difference was not statistically significant). 
Table 7.10 shows strong evidence for segregation in job contacts by religion. Most of 
Muslims (97 percent) and all Copts have received job information or help from people 
of the same religion as their own. This result was expected due the high level of 
segregation in social networks based on religion shown previously in Table 7.9. 
The results in Table 7.10 also show that about half the job information comes from 
relatives of the worker, and two fifths from friends and neighbours (8 percent), in 
addition to direct contact with the employer (about 5 percent) . 
Table 7.10 also shows that more than half the job information gained through informal 
search was received from previous worl<mates. About 35 percent of jobs were 
discovered through persons working in the firm where these jobs were; this 
emphasizes the importance of insider referral for job search and hiring. 
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Table 7.10: Job search method and characteristics of job contact person by worker's 
religion. 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
Job search method (Q309) 
Informal 57.1 72.7 57.9 
Formal/None 42.9 27.3 42.1 
Religion of job contact (0308) 
. 
Muslims 97.1 0.0 91.1 
Copts 2.9 100.0 8.9 
Relationship to job contact (Q307) 
Relative 46.7 66.7 47.7 
Friend 39.0 33.3 38.7 
Neighbour 8.6 0.0 8.1 
Employer 5.7 0.0 5.4 
Ever worked with contact person in 
the same workplace (031 0) 
Yes 54.3 50.0 54.0 
No 45.7 50.0 46.0 
Source of information for contact 
person (Q309) 
Works in same firm 34.6 42.9 35.1 
Employer 16.3 28.6 17.1 
From other friends 46.2 28.6 45.0 
Unknown 1.0 0.0 0.9 
Other 1.9 0.0 1.8 
Number of jobs 136 67 203 
$ource: worker data. 
Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
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7.4.4 Workers' Turnover 
As explained earlier, the exit patterns of workers could have a large effect on 
workplace segregation. Section 3 of the worker questionnaire provides information 
about start date (0303) and end date (0304) of the last three jobs (including the 
current one) which enables the calculation of the duration in months for these jobs. 
Table 7.11 shows that the mean job duration for a worker in the same workplace is 
high amongst the sampled workers. The mean duration for a Muslim worker is about 
10 years, and there is no significant difference in this mean by percentage of Copts in 
the workplace (firm category). On the other hand, the mean job duration for a Coptic 
worker is higher (about 11 years) although the difference is not statistically significant. 
An important result is that there is a statistically significant difference in the mean job 
duration for Coptic workers for workplaces with different percentages of Copts. On 
Table 7.11: Mean job duration for Muslims and Copts by percentage of Copts in the 
workplace. 
Mean job duration (months) 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
Firm category 
Predominately Muslim 102.6 
Integrated 131.0 79.5. 110.4 
Predominately Coptic 152.4 164.9 160.3 
Total 119.9 131.3 123.7 
Number of jobs 130 66 196 
Source: worker data. 
·Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
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average, Coptic workers tend to stay more than twice as long in workplaces with 
higher percentages of Copts than in other workplaces (165 versus 80 months 
respectively). 
Moreover, as Figure 7.1 shows, there is a significant difference in the mean job 
duration between Muslims and Copts in integrated workplaces. Copts tend to leave 
this kind of integrated workplace much faster than Muslims (about 80 versus 131 
months respectively). 
This pattern may indicate that Copts' preferences and flow among workplaces may 
have a greater impact on workplace segregation than those of Muslims. Coptic 
workers tend to leave integrated workplaces faster and stay in Coptic segregated 
workplaces for longer. However, there is no significant difference in mean job 
duration for Muslims in workplaces with varying percentages of Copts. 
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Figure 7.1: Mean Job Duration for Muslim and Coptic Workers 
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7.4.5 Change of Workplace Segregation by Religion 
Changes in the level of workplace segregation depend on the flow of workers from 
different religions among workplaces. For example, when a Coptic worker moves 
from a workplace with a high percentage of Copts to one with a lower percentage this 
would decrease the overall segregation level and vice-versa. This change is a slow 
process and may take very long time to happen. This makes it hard to measure since 
it needs data from distant points in time, which may not be available. 
The worker questionnaire contains questions regarding the religious composition of 
the current and previous workplaces (up to two when available) that the worker had 
worked in during his work history (0314 and 0315). Table 7.12 summarizes the 
change in percentage of Coptic workers between the old and recent workplaces. For 
example, for Muslim workers who had worked in workplaces with no Copts, in 60 
percent of the cases the new workplaces also had no Copts, while around 27 percent 
moved to integrated workplaces, and the rest moved to workplaces with a high 
proportion of Copts. In return, around 7 4 percent of Muslim workers who were 
working in integrated workplaces moved to segregated ones with no Coptic worl<ers. 
Similarly, around 89 percent of Muslims who were working in workplaces where 
Copts are overrepresented had moved to no-Copt workplaces. 
Thus the overall pattern of turnover for Muslim workers would increase workplace 
segregation as the net effect is on the side of moving towards no-Copt workplaces. 
This pattern can be summarized using the mean difference of the percentages of 
Coptic workers between old and recent workplaces, which was -3.3 percent for 
Muslim workers, that is, on average Muslim workers move to workplaces where the 
proportion of Coptic workers is 3.3 percent less than in their previous work. 
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Table 7.12: Change in percentage of Coptic workers in workplaces for Muslim and 
Coptic workers. 
Percentage of Copts in the old 
workplace 
None 1-20 >20 Total 
Muslim workers 
Percentage of Copts in the new 
workplace 
None 60.0 73.9 88.9 69.4 
1-20 26.7 21.7 11.1 22.6 
>20 13.3 4.3 0.0 8.1 
Mean difference in percentage of Coptic workers -3.3 
Coptic workers 
Percentage of Copts in the new 
workplace 
None (Predominately Muslim) 
1-20 (Integrated) 
>20 (Predominately Coptic) 
50.0 
50.0 
33.3 
66.7 
40.0 
60.0 
Mean difference in percentage of Coptic workers -1.9 
Number of jobs 28 26 19 73 
Source: worker data. 
On the other hand, the Coptic workers who had been working in highly-Coptic 
segregated workplaces are more likely to move to similar workplaces (67 percent) 
than to move to more integrated workplaces (33 percent). And half of Copts working 
in integrated workplaces moved to highly-Coptic segregated ones. 
Although mean difference in percentage of Coptic workers is negative, which 
indicates that they were moving to more integrated or Muslim-dominated workplaces, 
it was not statistically different from zero. 
176 
7.4.6 Work Preferences and Perception of Discrimination 
Workers were asked how important it is to work with employers and other workmates 
with the same religion as their own, and were asked also about their beliefs that 
employers, in general, tend to hire people from their religion, and whether there is any 
kind of discrimination against Copts in Egypt. Table 7.13 summarizes workers' 
responses to these questions. 
In general, around one quarter of Muslim workers reported that it is important for 
them to work with Muslim employers. Some of the reasons reported for this 
preference include (0402) 1 : 
• "To get a better treatment, and to avoid problems" 
• 'To perform religious activities together and to have rest in prayer times" 
• "I just feel more comfortable when work with a Muslim employer" 
• "Do not like to deal with or to be headed by a Copt" 
• "To have the same morals and religious rules" 
Similarly, around 8 percent of Muslims preferred to work with other Muslim 
worl<mates for one or more of the following reasons (0404): 
• "Feel more comfortable to work with Muslims" 
• "To avoid problems and clashes" 
• "The relations would be better inside the workplace" 
• "Do not like to deal with Copts" 
1 Answers to open questions were translated from Arabic to English. This translation 
made some different answers in Arabic seem similar when translated into English. 
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Table 7.13: Workers' responses to questions about hiring discrimination. 
Muslim Workers Coptic Workers Total 
0401: Is it important or not important to work with employers of the same religion as 
yours? 
Important 
Not important 
25.4. 
74.6 
0.0 
100.0 
24.0 
76.0 
0403: Is it important or not important to work with workmates of the same religion as 
yours? 
Important 
Not important 
7.9 
92.1 
0.0 
100.0 
7.4 
92.6 
0406: Is it good or bad to have workers with different religions In the same workplace? 
Good 
Bad 
Neutral 
25.4. 
5.3 
69.3 
57.1 
0.0 
42.9 
27.3 
5.0 
67.8 
0408: Do you agree or disagree that Muslims tend to employ each others more than 
employing Copts? 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
17.5. 
71.9 
10.5 
42.9 
42.9 
14.3 
19.0 
70.2 
10.7 
0409: Do you agree or disagree that Copts tend to employ each others more than 
employing Muslims? 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
59.6. 
36.0 
4.4 
42.9 
42.9 
14.3 
58.7 
36.4 
5.0 
0410: Do you agree or disagree that there Is discrimination against Copts in Egypt? 
Agree 3.5 25.0 4.9 
Disagree 84.2 50.0 82.0 
Neutral 12.3 25.0 13.1 
Number of workers 80 42 122 
ｾｯｵｲ｣･Ｚ＠ worker data. 
Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
On the other hand, it was not important for Coptic workers to work with a Coptic 
employer or other Coptic workmates. 
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Table 7.13 also shows that about around 57 percent of Coptic worl<ers reported that it 
is a good thing for workers from different religions to work together within the same 
workplace compared to 25 percent of Muslim workers, and only 5 percent of Muslim 
workers think that is bad. The main reasons reported are (Q407): 
• "This would spread love and friendship among people" 
• (IWould decrease sensitivity between Copts and Muslims". 
• "Would help exchanging ideas and experiences" 
• "Creates good competition" 
• "This would bring sense of humour at the workplace" 
• "To stop discrimination against Copts and Muslims in work" 
Perception of workers of hiring discrimination that employers may practice against 
Muslim and Coptic worl<ers was assessed by asking workers: "Do you think that 
Muslims/Copts tend to employ each other than employing Copts/Muslims?" The 
results in Table 7.13 show that both Copts and Muslims believe that each party 
practices hiring discrimination against the other. More than two fifths of Coptic 
workers believe that Muslim employers practice hiring discrimination against Copts. 
On the other hand about three fifths of Muslim workers believe the opposite, that 
Coptic employers practice hiring discrimination against Muslim workers. 
One of the alarming results was that one quarter of Coptic workers (compared to only 
4 percent of Muslim workers) reported they believe that there is discrimination against 
Copts in Egypt. The main reported manifestations of discrimination were (Q411 ): 
• //Muslims are preferred in some jobs; for example army and police and 
sensitive positions" 
• (/Muslims do not treat Copts with the due respect". 
• "Difficulties in building and maintenance of churches 
• '1-ack of media channels and programs for Copts" 
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7.4. 7 Evidence for Hiring Discrimination 
Evidence for hiring discrimination based on religion, practiced by both Muslim and 
Coptic employers, is presented in Table 7.14. The table shows significant differences 
in the percentages of Coptic workers in the firm with the employer's religion, and this 
indicates a great tendency for the employers to hire workers of the same religion as 
their own. For example, around 89 percent of Muslim employers run firms with no 
Coptic workers at all. Similarly, three quarters of the Coptic employers have Copts 
overrepresented inside their workplaces. 
To measure the strength of the relationship between employer' religion and the 
percentage of Coptic workers in the firm, the Eta2 coefficient was calculated to be 
0.957 which indicates a high correlation. 
Table 7.14: Percent distribution of firms by employer's religion and percent of Coptic 
workers in the firm. 
Muslim 
Employers 
Percentage of Coptic workers 
. 
None (Predominately Muslim) 88.6 
1-20 (Integrated) 8.6 
>20 (Predominately Coptic) 2.9 
Total 100.0 
Number of firms 27 
Source: worker data. 
·Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
Eta coefficient= 0.957 
Coptic 
Employers 
0.0 
25.0 
75.0 
100.0 
12 
2 Eta coefficient is a nominal by interval measure of association. 
Total 
79.5 
10.3 
10.3 
100.0 
39 
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7.4.8 Stereotyping 
To measure the level of stereotyping that Muslims and Coptic workers might practice 
towards the others, workers were asked a set of questions (0405) in the form: Which 
workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think work harder, are more honest, more 
cooperative, etc. 
As presented in Table 7.15, more than a quarter of Muslim workers believe that 
Muslim workers in general are more honest, more cooperative with managers and 
supervisors, more cooperative with other workmates, and accept lower salaries than 
Coptic workers. Surprisingly, 18 percent of Muslim workers believe that Copts are 
more respectful to work rules in contrast to 16 percent who reported that Muslim 
workers are more respectful. This may be, in part, due to the image the majority may 
have that minority people have less power to break rules in general, that may also be 
evident from the relatively high percentage (14 percent) of Muslims who reported that 
Coptic workers are more cooperative with managers and supervisors. 
On the other hand, Coptic workers showed a lesser level of stereotyping against 
Muslim workers, and they reported that there is no difference between Coptic and 
Muslim workers for most questions. 
Table 7.16 shows the effect of workplace segregation on stereotyping. As shown in 
the table, there is a general increasing trend in the answer "Copts and Muslims are 
the same" with the increase of the percentage of Coptic workers in the firm (although 
there is a significant difference only in the second question, "more honest'). This 
implies that more contact between Muslim and Coptic workers decreases 
stereotyping. 
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Table 7.15: Workers' responses to questions about stereotyping. 
Muslim Coptic 
Workers Workers Total 
0405: Which workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think are better than the other in each of the 
following: 
1- Work harder 
Muslims 16 0 11 
Copts 5 10 7 
The same 79 90 83 
2· More honest 
Muslims 26 0 17 
Copts 8 10 8 
The same 66 90 74 
3- More cooperative with 
managers/supervisors 
Muslims 24 2 17 
Copts 14 5 11 
The same 63 93 73 
4- More cooperative with other 
workmates 
Muslims 31 5 22 
Copts 8 10 8 
The same 61 85 69 
5- Respect work rules 
Muslims 16 0 11 
Copts 18 17 17 
The same 66 83 72 
6- Accept lower salary 
Muslims 26 0 17 
Copts 10 10 10 
The same 64 90 73 
Number of Workers 80 42 122 
ｾｯｵｲ｣･Ｚ＠ worker data. 
Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
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Table 7.16: Workers' responses to some questions about stereotyping by percentage of 
Coptic workers. 
Percentage of Coptic Workers 
None >20 Total 
0405: Which workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think are better than the other in each of the 
following: 
1· Work harder 
Muslims 15.4 10.5 6.8 10.7 
Copts 2.6 15.8 2.3 6.6 
The same 82.1 73.7 90.9 82.6 
2- More honest 
Muslims 25.6 18.4 9.1 17.4 
Copts 7.7 15.8 2.3 8.3 
The same 66.7 65.8 88.6 74.4 
3· More cooperative with 
managers/supervisors 
Muslims 25.6 15.8 9.1 16.5 
Copts 7.7 13.2 11.4 10.7 
The same 66.7 71 .1 79.5 72.7 
4· More cooperative with other 
workmates 
Muslims 30.8 28.9 9.1 22.3 
Copts 0.0 10.5 13.6 8.3 
The same 69.2 60.5 77.3 69.4 
5· Respect work rules 
Muslims 12.8 15.8 4.5 10.7 
Copts 15.4 15.8 20.5 17.4 
The same 71.8 68.4 75.0 71.9 
6- Accept lower salary 
Muslims 25.6 18.4 9.1 17.4 
Copts 5.1 10.5 13.6 9.9 
The same 69.2 71.1 77.3 72.7 
Number of workers 39 38 45 122 
§iource: worker data. 
Significant differences exist at 0.05 significance level. 
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7.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented the results of the interviews with workers and employers. The 
main findings include: 
• Both workers and employers rely on friends and relatives for job search and 
hiring; 58 percent of jobs were secured using this informal methods. 
• Job contacts are segregated based on religion, Copts and Muslims are more 
likely to pass job information to others of the same religion. 
• A high correlation was found between employers' religion and the proportion 
of Copts in the workplace indicating hiring discrimination. 
• There is a high level of perception of discrimination: half of worl<ers, Muslims 
and Copts, believe that employers tend to hire workers of the same religion 
as their own. 
• There is a high level of social segregation. Social networks for both Muslims 
and Copts tend be religiously homophilous; however, they have similar 
structures and sizes. 
• Exit patterns play an important role in workplace segregation. For example, 
on average, Coptic workers tend to stay more than twice as long in 
workplaces with a high percentage of Copts than in other workplaces. 
The results of the statistical analysis give a snapshot to the current levels of 
segregation and homophily and the correlation between some variables of interest. 
However, this analysis does not explain how these levels were obtained, that is, how 
social and workplace segregation co-emerge and develop over time. Other analytical 
tools are needed to address this question of emergence. In the next chapter a 
simulation model is suggested to help in this regard. 
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8 AGENT-BASED MODEL FOR SOCIAL AND 
WORKPLACE SEGREGATION 
8.1 Aims of This Chapter 
The intent of this chapter is to present a simulation model for the relationship between 
workplace segregation (based on race, ethnicity and/or religion) and the segregation 
of the social networks of individuals. The model creates an artificial society where 
agents (people) use their social networks to search for jobs. As simulation time 
passes, agents change their social networks by creating new social links (ties) with 
other agents while some other links dissolve. Also, the composition of workplaces 
may change through the processes of workers' firing and hiring. 
The model describes this process of continuous change in the composition of 
workplaces and social networks of agents, and how this change affects levels of 
workplace segregation, segregation of the social networks of agents and the 
unemployment levels of minority and majority groups. The simulated behaviour of 
agents (in creating and dissolving social links) and firms (in firing and hiring workers) 
and the model's parameters will be set in the light of the results of statistical analysis 
of the empirical data presented earlier in Chapter 7. 
After this introduction, a general framework for the relationship between social 
segregation and workplace segregation is presented in Section 8.2, then, a detailed 
description of the proposed agent-based simulation model is presented in Section 
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8.3. Finally in Section 8.4, some basic experiments with the model are presented to 
test its validity. 
8.2 General Framework for the Relationship between Social and Workplace 
Segregation 
The proposed framework describes the dynamic relationships between social 
segregation, workplace segregation, mean homophily level, and referral hiring (as 
summarized in Figure 8.1 ). 
Social segregation may directly affect workplace segregation (each arrow in Figure 
8.1 indicates a causal relationship between the variables at its two ends). When firms 
tend to hire new workers through referrals, especially referrals from other existing 
workers (insider referrals), and when social networks of people (which represent the 
pool of candidate workers) tend to be segregated and homophilous, this would 
promote workplaces segregation. On the other hand when workplaces become more 
segregated this would reduce the chance of intergroup contact, that is, the chance for 
Social Segregation 
Using referral hiring, 
Increases 
Workplace Segregation 
Figure 8.1 : A framework to study social and workplace segregation 
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people from different social groups to meet and create social relations at work, and 
this would increase social segregation. 
An individual's homophily level works is a bias towards creating social ties with similar 
others (McPherson et al. 2001) . So, high levels of homophily lead to the creation of 
homophilous social networks, which in turn increase social segregation. On the other 
hand, when social networks of people become less segregated, this means that 
people have a higher chance to have contacts with others of different social groups, 
and this would hinder their homophilous attitudes and vice-versa. 
The relationship between homophily levels and workplace segregation can be 
described as follows. High levels of homophily among individuals may affect 
workplace segregation through its effects on the exit patterns of workers. As 
presented in the previous chapter (and shown in Table 7.11) and supported by other 
empirical studies (for example, S0rensen 2004), workers with high levels of 
homophily tend to stay longer in segregated workplaces where their groups are over-
represented than other workplaces. Also, high homophily levels among employers 
would promote hiring discrimination (employers' preferences to hire workers of the 
same social group as their own (Becker 1971)), and this would increase workplace 
segregation. In return, workplace segregation may the affect homophily levels of 
individuals. Segregated workplaces reduce the chance for inter-group contact to 
happen, which promotes homophilous attitudes and vice versa. 
8.3 Model Description 
In the following, an agent-based simulation model for social and workplace 
segregation (based on the general framework presented in the previous section) is 
presented. Firstly, the model's specifications are introduced in the following 
subsection. 
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8.3.1 Agents 
The model creates an artificial society of N ･ｱｵ｡ｬｬｹｾｱｵ｡ｬｩｦｩ･､＠ agents (persons). Each 
agent can belong to one of two social groups: A or B (these groups can be Copts and 
Muslims, Blacks and Whites, or simply Red and Green). Assume that A is a minority 
group, and its proportion in the society is P (where 0<P<0.5). Thus, there are PN 
agents belong to the minority group, and ＨＱｾｐＩｎ＠ agents are ｭ｡ｪｯｲｩｴｹｾｧｲｯｵｰ＠ members. 
8.3.2 Social Networks 
As discussed in earlier Section 6.6.2, a social network Ｈ･ｧｯｾ｣･ｮｴｲｩ｣＠ social network) is 
operationally defined as a " ... set of people who are most likely to be sources of a 
variety of rewarding interactions, such as discussing a personal problem, borrowing 
money, or social recreation" (McCallister & Fischer 1983:78), that is what is called 
"core network". Creation and dissolving of what are called "social links" will depend on 
this definition. For example, this definition imposes restrictions on the size of the 
social network (as explained below). Social links need some time to develop (and 
dissolve). 
8.3.2.1 Network Size 
Each agent has a social network (an ･ｧｯｾ｣･ｮｴｲｩ｣＠ social network), and the maximum 
possible size of this network (maximum number of alters at one time) is S;, i=1, 2, ... , 
N. Network size can be differ among individuals and is assumed to have a normal 
distribution with mean and variance to be estimated from empirical data (some 
simplified examples that will follow assume a constant value for network size). Since 
people need to invest some resources (especially time) in maintaining their social 
relationships, they can not keep relationships (especially the 'core relationships' as 
explained earlier) with an unlimited number of people. Thus, the assumption that 
each agent has a maximum limit to its social network's size seems plausible. 
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8.3.2.2 Homophilv Levels 
Agents create social links with each other based on their homophily levels, h;. An 
agent's homophily level expresses its tendency (or bias) to create social links with 
other agents of the same colour (group) as its own. For example, a Red agent would 
create a social link to another Red agent with the following probability1 : 
{
p + h(l- p) if p > 0 
Prob (Red to Red) = 
0 Otherwise 
and it creates a link to a Green agent with the complement probability. 
(8-1) 
In the previous equation, (small) p refers to the proportion of Red agents available 
within the context of link creation. For example, when a Red agent joins a workplace, 
and it is about to create a social link to one of the existing co-workers, p would refer 
to the proportion of other Red workers (who are not already linked with the agent) in 
that workplace. 
Based on the equation (8-1), with h=O, all links are created at random, and all agents 
will have the same probability p to create links with Red agents and probability 1- p to 
create links with Green agents. On the other hand, with the maximum homophily, 
h=1, a Red (Green) agent would create links to other Red (Green) agents (if such 
agents are available) with probability one, otherwise with Green (Red) agents. 
1 All formulas applied to Red agents can be applied to Green agents by replacing p 
With (1-p). For example, Prob (Green to Green)= . . {(1 -p) + hp if p < 1 
0 otherwise 
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It should be stressed here that a Red {Green) agent with a homophily of 1 can still 
create social links with other Green {Red) agents if it faces a situation where there 
are no other Red {Green) agents. In other words, an agent acts according to the 
following sequence when creating a social link. Firstly, it decides {with some 
probability) whether or not to create a link. Secondly, it decides {with another 
probability) with whom it would like to create this link. Defining homophily in this way, 
as biasness towards similar people, differentiates it from xenophobia which indicates 
hatred and hostility towards dissimilar people. 
Updating Agents' Homophi/y Levels 
Agents are initialized with a zero homophily level H. However, an agent's homophily 
level changes over time, and it is assumed to depend - in addition to its current level 
- on five factors: {1) composition of its social network, (2) average homophily level of 
alters in its social network, (3) composition of its worl<place, (4) average homophily 
level of its workmates, and (5) overall average homophily of all agents in society. 
Thus, for a Red agent, its homophily level at time f+ 1, h1+1• can be written as a 
weighted average of its homophily level h1 and the effects of these five factors: 
hr+1 = [h1 + aJ(p11 -P)I(l-P) + a2(mean homophily of alters)+ aJ(pw-P)/(1-P) + a4 (8-2) 
(mean homophily ofworkmates) +as (overall mean homophily of all agents)] I 
(1 + a1+ a2+ a3+ a4 +as) 
where h1 is agent's homophily level at time t, Pn is the proportion of alters of Red 
colour in agent's social network, Pw proportion of workmates of Red colour, and a1, 
8.3.2.3 Directed versus Undirected Links 
In forming their social networks agents create directed (asymmetric), rather than 
undirected (symmetric), social links with each other. There are two reasons behind 
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this assumption. The first reason is the potential asymmetry in the evaluation of social 
links, and the asymmetry in job knowledge and access. Asymmetry in the evaluation 
of social links implies that two persons X and Y may evaluate the importance or the 
strength of their relationship differently. X may consider Y as one of his/her best 
friends (or one of his core network) while Y may think that this relationship to X is not 
intimate at all. On the other hand, asymmetry in job knowledge and access implies 
that job information and/or referral may flow from person X to person Y but not in the 
opposite direction. For example, " ... a bank president probably can recommend a 
bank teller for a position but a bank teller probably cannot recommend a bank 
president." (Tassier & Menczer 2005:1 0). 
The second reason for choosing directed links is a pragmatic one. When building 
models involving social networks, it is generally easier and more flexible to deal with 
directed links more than undirected ones. For instance, it is not always possible (or 
at least, not easy) to create an artificial society with agents that have a specific 
distribution of number of undirected links, while it is always possible to create that 
distribution of directed links. For example, it is not possible to create a network of five 
agents (nodes) each having three undirected links. 
8.3.2.4 Origins of Social Relations 
Fischer (1982) stated that "most adults encounter people through their families, at 
work, in the neighbourhood, in organizations, or through introduction by friends or 
relatives; ... ; only rarely do chance meetings, in a bar, at an auction, or such become 
anything other than brief encounters." (Fischer 1982:4). In line with Fischer, agents 
are assumed to create their social links through three sources: workplaces, other 
friends/relatives (other links) and/or random acquaintances. 
At each time step of a simulation run, each working agent has a probability Lw to 
create a social link to one of the existing ｣ｯｾｷｯｲｫ･ｲｳＮ＠ If a working agent decides to 
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create a link through its workplace it would select (based on its homophily level) one 
of the existing co-workers to create this link to. Also, at each time step, each agent 
has a probability LN to create a new link with another agent through its existing social 
network (in other words, with another agent who is already linked with one of agent's 
social network). Finally, at each time step, each agent has a probability LR to create a 
new link with another random agent. 
The values for the probabilities Lw, LN and LR were inspired by the results of the 
empirical study. These results show that about 30 percent of social links originated 
within workplaces, more than 65 percent come from/through relatives, other friends 
and neighbours, and the remaining proportion of links is created through random 
encounters. Similar results were also found in other empirical literature (for example 
Grossetti 2005). So, the numerical values for Lw, LN and LR were chosen to get 
similar distribution of social links according to their origin at the end of simulation 
(although social networks are initialized as random networks). 
Finally, any extra links exceeding an agent's maximum network size are deleted 
randomly. Although the reduction of the number of links to a "maximum limit" seems 
artificial, it is a useful simplification. People normally do not entirely drop their 
relationships; rather, they change their evaluation to their social relationships. Using 
our definition of the core social network, any social links with low evaluation will be 
considered deleted as they will fall outside the definition's boundaries. Other 
alternatives to deleting social links randomly include deleting them with some 
probability (for example, probability proportional to the current number of links or link 
age). Since it is not believed that these complications will greatly affect the results, 
the simplified assumption of random deletion will be applied. 
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8.3.3 Workplaces and Jobs 
The artificial labour market includes a number of firms, F, each of which has a 
number of jobs (fh) which remains constant throughout a single simulation run. It is 
assumed that all the jobs are identical, and need the same level of skills and 
qualifications (so, any agent can do any job with the same efficiency). ). Each firm 
has a "colour" which indicates the group identity of its owner/manager (employer). 
Suppose that proportion of Red firms is P. Hiring discrimination for a firm fat any time 
step, o, = (hiring-discrimination-constant) * (mean homophily level of workers), where 
hiring-discrimination-constant is a constant that indicates to what extent the 
homophily attitudes of employers are translated to hiring discrimination. For example, 
when there are some anti-discrimination laws for hiring workers, this constant should 
take a low value. 
Each firm, f, has a total of t, agents (workers) consisting of r1 Red agents and g, Green 
agents, such that t,= r1 + g1• Let p1 = r1 It, be the proportion of the minority (Red) group 
inside this firm. Let U, U" and Ug denote the overall unemployment, minority 
unemployment and majority unemployment levels respectively. Finally, let 
T = L:t 1 denote total number of currently working agents. f 
8.3.3.1 Hiring Process 
At each time step, each firm will hire a number of workers to fill its vacant jobs. Firms 
can hire new workers (agents) either through formal channels or through referrals 
from current workers. Let R denote the prevalence of referral hiring in the artificial 
labour market. When hiring a new worker, a firm uses referrals from current worl<ers 
with probability R, and uses formal methods of hiring (for example advertising 
vacancies) with probability 1-R. 
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If a firm decided to hire a worker through formal methods it would simply pick one of 
the unemployed worl<ers at random. In case of hiring through referrals from current 
workers, firms may practice hiring discrimination against the candidate workers. Let G 
represent the group of candidate workers, i.e., unemployed workers who have social 
links with at least one of the current workers in the firm (If no such workers exist, firms 
hire through formal channels). For example, a Red firm would hire a Red agent 
through referral with the probability: 
{
p + D 1 (1- p) if p > 0 
Prob (Red fnm to hire Red worker through refetTal) = . 
0 Otherw1se 
(8-3) 
and it hires a Green agent with the complement probability, where p refers to the 
proportion of Red agents in the group G. 
8.3.3.2 Firing Process 
The results of the empirical study, presented earlier in Chapter 7, show that workers 
tend to stay longer in workplaces where they are overrepresented than in other 
workplaces. Based on these empirical results, it is assumed that at each time step of 
the simulation run, each working agent will be fired from (or will exit) its workplace 
with some probability. This probability should depend on the agent's homophily level, 
h, and how far the proportion of its group inside the workplace, p, is from the overall 
group proportion in the society, P. The probability of a Red agent to be fired from (or 
to exit) its workplace at any time step is given by: 
(8-4) 
194 
where 13 is a constant regulating the speed of workers' turnover in the simulated 
labour markee. 
Based on equation (8-4), for an agent with zero-homophily, its probability to be fired 
would be constant and equals 13 regardless of the proportion, p, of its group in the 
workplace (which is intuitive). On the other hand, an agent with a non-zero 
homophily, h, would have an increasing probability to be fired as its group's 
proportion p decreases, and vice versa. 
Introducing homophily level as a decisive factor (in addition to the group proportion p) 
in determining exit levels of workers seems plausible. There should be no reason for 
some worker to have an increasing probability (with decreasing level of p) to leave its 
job when he/she is absolutely egalitarian. On the other hand, if a worker has a high 
level of homophily it would plausible to assume that he/she will be happier when 
working in a workplace with more similar co-worl<ers. 
8.3.4 Statistics and Indices 
In the current model, the main objective is measuring the level of segregation of the 
global social network and the level of workplace segregation, in addition to 
unemployment rates for minority and majority groups. The segregation index 
(presented in detail in Chapter 4), S, developed by Freeman (1978) will be used to 
measure the level of segregation in the global social network of agents. S measures 
the deviation of the distribution of links between two agents from different groups from 
the distribution expected when links are created at random (Freeman 1978:416). 
2 Analogously, for a Green agent its probability to be fired is EG = 13 (1 + h (p - P) ) 
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Two indices (presented earlier in Chapter 2) will be used to measure workplace 
segregation: the Gini index, G, and the modified Gini index G. The Gini index, G was 
developed by Jahn, Schmid, and Schrag (1947), and it measures the deviation of the 
distribution of agents of different colours in firms from the case of evenness (all firms 
have the same proportion of Red agents equal to their overall proportion P). On the 
other hand, the modified Gini index, G, measures the deviation of the segregation 
curve from the curve of randomness (which represent the case in which workers are 
randomly allocated to firms). Thus, G is more appropriate when the main concern is 
the actual level of segregation among firms (even if this segregation is due to just 
chance or random effects), whereas G is used to measure the systematic or net 
segregation, that is, the segregation level due to the behaviour of agents and firms 
not due to random effects. 
8.3.5 Model Dynamics 
Figure 8.2 shows the logic of the dynamics of the simulation model (see Appendix C 
for a complete list of the model implemented in NetLogo 4.0.3). The simulation starts 
by creating an artificial society of a number of agents from two different groups and a 
random social network for each agent. A number of firms F are created, each with a 
specified number of jobs e,, and then agents are assigned to these firms randomly. 
The final step of the initialization process is to calculate and plot statistics for the 
initial stage, which include indices of segregation for workplaces and social networks 
and levels of unemployment for minority and majority groups. Then at each time step: 
1. Each agent will be fired with the proper probability (as described earlier) 
2. Each firm will hire a number of agents, either randomly (through formal 
channels) or through referrals from current workers, depending on the 
probability R. 
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3. Agents update their homophily levels based on formula ＨＸｾＲＩ＠
4. Agents update their social networks. Each agent creates a link through the 
workplace (if the agent is currently employed), through other links and/or 
randomly with the proper probabilities (Lw, LN or LR respectively). 
5. Statistics are calculated and plotted. 
Create an artificial society of N agents 
Assign agents to groups A and B 
Create a random social network (a number of links) for each agent 
Create a labour market ofF firms each with 8t jobs 
Assign agents to firms randomly 
Measure and plot statistics 
For each time step 
For each agent 
Fire the agent with the proper probabilities ER and EG 
End for 
For each firm 
Hire workers to fill the vacant jobs through formal channels or referrals 
If firm fails to hire through referral it would use formal methods of hiring 
End for 
For each agent 
Update homophily level 
Create a new link with probability LN through existing links 
Create a new link with probability LR to a random agent 
If agent is working 
Create a new link with probability Lw to one of other ｣ｯｾｷｯｲｫ･ｲｳ＠
End if 
End for 
Measure and plot statistics 
End for 
Figure 8.2: Psuedo code of the Dynamics of the Simulation Model 
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8.4 Simulation Results 
In the following, the results of the simulation model for workplace segregation, social 
segregation and unemployment levels of minority and majority groups are 
summarized. The results are based on the parameter values shown in Table 8.1 . 
Table 8.1 : Parameters values and description for the basic experiments. 
Parameter Description Value 
General 
Sim-run Number of simulation runs 30 
Sim-time Number of time steps for each simulation 500 
run 
Gt, a2, as, a4 and G5 Constants regulating the change in 0.4 homophily levels. 
B A constant regulating the probability of an 0.1 agent to be fired. 
Agents 
N Total number of agents 1000 
p Proportion of the minority (Red) group 0.2 
Social Networks 
S; Size of social networks of agents 10 
Lw Probability of creating a new link with other 0.3 
co-workers 
LN Probability of creating a new link through 0.5 
current links 
LR Probability of creating a new link randomly 0.01 
Workplaces 
hiring-discrimination-constant Constant regulating the effect of hiring 1.0 discrimination 
F Number of firms 40 
e Number of jobs in each firm 20 
8.4. 1 Referral Hiring, Workplace Segregation and Social Segregation 
The results summarized in Figure 8.3 show the co-emergence of workplace 
segregation and social segregation with different levels of referral hiring. Both 
workplace segregation and social segregation increase with increasing level of 
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referral hiring. An interesting result is that significant levels of workplace segregation 
and social segregation may evolve even when hiring of workers occurs mainly 
through formal channels and the society is initially integrated. The random allocation 
of workers to firms may introduce some level of workplace segregation which triggers 
an increasing (but still low) level of homophily and social segregation which, in turn, 
promotes workplace segregation (through the exit patterns of workers), and so on. 
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Figure 8.3: Emergence of workplace segregation and social segregation for different 
levels of referral hiring. 
8.4.2 Homophily Levels 
The results of the simulation show that even when the model starts with a zero-level 
of homophily, agents of majority groups, generally, end with higher homophily levels 
than those of minority groups (as shown in Figure 8.4). The main reason is minority 
people have a higher chance to have outgroup links (through social networks or 
workplaces) than majority group members. 
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Figure 8.4: Final mean homophily levels for minority and majority groups for different 
levels of referral hiring. 
8.4.3 Employment Inequality 
An interesting result of the simulation model is that increasing levels of referral hiring 
would be beneficial for minority groups when the population is highly segregated and 
harmful otherwise. Figure 8.5 shows that minority unemployment generally decreases 
with increasing level of referral hiring until it reaches its minimum level (with R=O.B in 
our experiment) , then increases after that. When referral hiring is low (hence, lower 
levels of workplace and social segregation), all unemployed agents will have the 
same chance to join any workplace with vacant jobs, and will have the same 
probability to exit their workplaces, hence all social groups will have similar 
unemployment levels (around 20 percent in our experiment). This is clearly illustrated 
in Figure 8.6 with the case of R=O. But with higher levels of referral hiring (the cases 
R=O.B and R=1), minority unemployment tends to be higher than majority 
unemployment at the early stage of simulation run, which is characterized by (still) 
lower levels of workplace and social segregation. However, as time passes and 
segregation increases, referral hiring benefits the minority's employment. For 
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Figure 8.5: Unemployment levels of minority group for different levels of referral 
hiring, R. 
example, when R=O.B, minority unemployment attains a stationary level of 0.16. 
When the level of referral hiring is close to one, a complete segregation of workplaces 
(and social networks) is reached and the firms are distributed proportionally between 
minority and majority groups, hence all groups will have the same unemployment 
level (0.2) . 
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This result regarding the relationship between referral hiring and minority employment 
is consistent with the result of Tassier and Menczer' model (2005) where they 
showed that: 
"More random social networks [majority groups] yield higher 
employment rates than less random social networks [minority 
groups] if the population is integrated [in early stage of our 
simulation] or information flows about job vacancies are random 
[low level of referral hiring]. However if the population is highly 
segregated and information flows about job vacancies are non-
random [with high level of referral hiring in later stages of 
simulation run] then Jess random social networks have higher 
employment rates than more random social networks. This 
second finding holds because non-random social networks 
allow a group to better contain job information inside the group 
when a population is segregated." (Tassier & Menczer 2005:1). 
8.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter a general framework is introduced which describes the dynamic 
relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, 
and referral hiring. An agent-based simulation model was developed and the results 
of the model support the proposed framework. The results of the simulation model 
indicated that the labour market may experience significant levels of workplace 
segregation and social segregation even when hiring of workers occurs mainly 
through formal channels. The results also show that majority groups tend to be more 
homophilous than minority groups, and referral hiring may be beneficial for minority 
groups especially when the population is highly segregated. 
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9 MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
9.1 Aims of This Chapter 
In this chapter, verification and validation are discussed for the model developed 
earlier in the previous chapter. In Section 9.2, definitions of model validation and 
verification are presented, then the methodology adopted for validation and 
verification of the proposed model is presented in Section 9.3. The conceptual model 
validation which validates the most important assumptions of the model is discussed 
in Section 9.4, and the computerized model verification is discussed in Section 9.5. 
Finally, the operational validation of the model is tested in Section 9.6 through 
comparison of the simulated results against empirical data from the Egyptian labour 
market and social networks. 
9.2 Definitions 
Many definitions of model validation exist in the literature (for example Balci 1994, 
Schlesinger 1979, and US Department of Defense 2003). Most of these definitions 
agree on the main aspects of the validation process. According to US Department of 
Defense, validation is: 
"the [process] of determining the degree to which a model is an 
[accurate representation] of the real-world from the 
perspective of the [intended uses] of the model" (US 
Department of Defense 2003:13). 
Similarly, Schlesinger defined validation as: 
203 
ｾｾ＠ substantiation that a computerised model within its domain of 
applicability possesses a {satisfactory range of accuracy] 
consistent with the [intended application] of the model" 
(Schlesinger 1979:103). 
Based on these definitions, the main aspects of model validation (described with bold 
words and phrases in the previous definitions) can be summarized as: 
• Validation is a process. There can be no one test with which the model 
validity can be judged. There are many tests and techniques to validate 
simulation models {Balci 1994) from which the researcher has to select the 
appropriate ones (based on model's objectives and/or available data). 
Generally, as a model passes various tests, confidence in the model is 
enhanced. 
• No model can be absolutely valid. Since the model created is an 
approximation of the actual system, some errors are unavoidable. So, 
rejecting a model because it fails to reproduce an exact replica of the real 
system is not acceptable (Martis 2006). 
• A model should be valid for the purpose for which it is constructed, and it 
should be judged for its usefulness rather than its absolute validity. For 
example, many of simulation models in social sciences are built to explain the 
dynamics or the emergence of some social phenomenon rather than to 
predict it {a simple example is Schelling's model of segregation (1971) 
resented in Section 5.1 0). These models should be judged for their 
usefulness in explanation rather than their power of prediction or replication 
of existing social systems. 
204 
, 
, 
, 
I 
; 
; 
, 
,.., 
,,' 
Problem Entity 
(Real System) 
....... 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' ｾ＠
Operational Conceptual 
Model 
Validation 
Validation 
I 
I 
' 
' 
' I 
I 
1 
1 
' ; 
Data 
Experim/ntation Validity ｾｮ｡ｬｹｳｩｳ＠
and 
/, Modelling 
\ 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' I ; 
Computerized ...._ Computer Programming and Conceptual 
Model Model 
Implementation 
' , ' , 
' ,' ....... , 
... ... ... Computerized , , ,. " 
....... Model .. , 
Verification 
Figure 9.1: Validation in the Modelling Process 
(based on Sargent 2005) 
9.3 Methodology for Validation 
The methodology adopted here for validating the simulation model is based on the 
simplified version of the modelling process illustrated in Figure 9.1 (adapted from 
Sargent (2005)). One starts by identifying the problem entity of a research. The 
'problem entity' is the target (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005) system to be modelled 
(Sargent 2005). For example, the dynamics and emergence of social and workplace 
segregation would be considered the problem entity of this thesis. 
The conceptual model is "the mathematical/logical/verbal representation (mimic) of 
the problem entity developed for a particular study' (Sargent 2005:132). A conceptual 
model is developed through an analysis and modelling phase, and it is (or should be) 
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based on some existing theories and assumptions around the problem entity. 
Conceptual model validation is defined as: 
'Tthe process of] determining that the theories and assumptions 
underlying the conceptual model are correct and that the model 
representation of the problem entity is "reasonable" for the 
intended purpose of the model." (Sargent 2005:132) 
In most social simulation models, the assumptions and theories used to build the 
conceptual models determine the micro behaviour of agents. A simple example is 
Schelling's model of segregation (1971) which assumes that an agent would move to 
a new neighbourhood if it is not happy with the proportion of neighbours of different 
colours. For a model to be valid, it should show similarity to the target system in both 
the micro-level behaviour of agents and the macro level behaviour of the system 
output. Gilbert (2002) stresses the importance of this two-level validation of models: 
"One has to validate a model at both the individual/eve/ and at 
the macro level before one can suggest that the simulation is a 
good representation of the social processes it is aiming to 
model." (Gilbert 2002:9) 
For the current thesis, the conceptual model is illustrated by Figure 9.21• The most 
important assumption (among others discussed in following sections) behind the 
relationships in this conceptual model is that: inter-ethnic group contact among 
people would increase their tolerance (reduce homophily), and mal<e them more 
receptive to other people of different ethnic, racial, and/or religious background (Amir 
1969). 
1 This figure is a copy from Figure 8.1, and was copied here for the convenience of 
the reader. 
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Increases 
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Figure 9.2: A framework to study social and workplace segregation 
Once a conceptual model is obtained, one can turn to its translation into a 
computerized model through a computer programming and implementation phase 
(Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). So, the computerized model, in Figure 9.1, "is the 
conceptual model implemented on a computer" (Sargent 2005:132). The complete 
computer code of the computerized simulation model for social and workplace 
segregation is presented in Appendix C. 
One has to make sure that this process of translating a conceptual model into a 
computerized model is accurate through computerized model verification (or simply 
"verification"). Verification can be defined as: 
uthe process of determining that a model implementation and its 
associated data accurately represent the developer's 
conceptual description and specifications" (US Department of 
Defense 2003: 13) 
As Balci (1994) explains, "model validation deals with building the right model ... 
[while] model verification deals with building the model right"(Balci 1994:121-123). 
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The computerized model is used to generate simulated data. These simulated data 
can then be compared, through the operational validation process, with {real) 
collected data to check whether the model generates outcomes similar to those 
produced by the actual processes operating in the social world {Gilbert & Troitzsch 
2005). Operational validation can be defined as: 
udetermining that the model's output behaviour has sufficient 
accuracy for the model's intended purpose over the domain of 
the model's intended applicability" (Sargent 2005:132). 
Finally, the data used to develop the model (during analysis and conceptual model 
developing), estimate model's parameters, and test the model (during the operational 
validation) should be valid in the first place (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). Data validity is 
defined as: 
uensuring that the data necessary for model building, model 
evaluation and testing, and conducting the model experiments 
to solve the problem are adequate and correct" (Sargent 
2005:132). 
As Figure 9.1 illustrates, after the model has been conceptually validated, verified and 
operationally validated, it can be used for theory development about the problem 
entity. Inferences about the problem entity are obtained by conducting computer 
experiments on the computerized model in the experimentation phase (Sargent 
2005). 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, conceptual model validation, computerized 
model verification, operational validation, and data validation are presented and 
discussed for the proposed simulation model of the current thesis. 
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9.4 Conceptual Model Validation 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, during conceptual model validation one needs to 
ensure that all theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct 
and that the model under investigation represents the problem entity in a reasonable 
way (Sargent 2005). To validate the proposed conceptual model of social and 
workplace segregation, presented in Figure 9.2, the following underlying assumptions 
and relationships among the model's components need to be tested: 
1 . The Contact Hypothesis 
2. The mutual relationship between social segregation and homophily levels 
3. The mutual relationship between workplace segregation and homophily 
levels 
4. The mutual relationship between social and workplace segregation 
These four assumptions have been validated empirically (against available empirical 
data and other empirical studies), and theoretically (against other existing theories). 
9.4. 1 The Contact Hypothesis 
The central premise of many of the relationships in the conceptual model (Figure 9.2) 
is that more intergroup contact between different social (ethnic, racial and/or 
religious) groups would reduce prejudice and hostility and promote tolerance, which is 
classically known as the Contact Hypothesis (Allport 1954). 
The Contact Hypothesis has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, and it has been 
shown that significant attitude changes due to intergroup contact have been reported 
in many earlier empirical studies across different contexts (Ellison & Powers 1994, 
Emerson et al. 2002, Robinson 1980, Sigelman & Welch 1993, Williams 1964, 
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Yancey 1999). It has been shown also that four key conditions should be satisfied 
before the desired effects of contact could be expected (Allport 1954): 
1. Contact should occur between equal-status groups 
2. Contact should be acquaintance potential (frequent, direct, intimate, etc.) 
3. Contacting groups should pursue common objectives 
4. There should be social and institutional support for the contact 
According to the proposed conceptual model, contact among people (agents) takes 
place mainly through workplaces (with other worl<mates) and social networks (with 
friends). With a huge literature confirming the impact of social networks on attitude 
and behaviour change (for example, Duncan et al. 1968, Latane 1981, 1996), it 
seems reasonable to assume that having social ties with outgroup members would 
decrease prejudice and homophily. 
The proposed virtual worl<place satisfies, to a reasonable extent, Allport's conditions. 
The contact occurs among equal-status co-workers. Contact among people at the 
same workplace usually occurs frequently (every day), for long periods, mostly face-
to-face. The success of the enterprise is beneficial to all workers, regardless of group 
identity, and this represents a common objective. Finally, in most cases, authority in 
workplace (for example, the employer) would support established norms of 
acceptance and cooperation for the benefit of the enterprise (Pettigrew 1998). 
The empirical data gathered by the researcher is consistent with previous theoretical 
and empirical research on the effect of contact, especially within workplaces, on 
reducing prejudice and homophily. Table 9.1 shows that a significant (although not 
strong, since Cramer's V is around 0.3) relationship exists between percentage of 
alters' of the same religion and the percentage of Coptic workers in firms for Muslim 
and Coptic workers. For Muslim workers, percentage of Coptic alters (friends) in their 
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social networks significantly increases as the percentage of Coptic workers in their 
workplace increases (from only 1.6 percent for firms with no Copts to 21.9 percent in 
firms with 20 percent or more Coptic workers). A similar relationship exists for Coptic 
workers where the percentage of Muslim alters in their social networks doubles from 
29.7 percent in firms with 20 percent or more Copts to 63.8 percent with firms with 1-
20 percent Copts. This implies that increasing the contact between Muslims and 
Copts within workplaces would increase the chance for intergroup social ties to 
develop and hence lower levels of homophily would prevail. 
Once the Contact Hypothesis is granted to be a reasonable assumption in our 
conceptual model, it could be used to explain the most of the remaining proposed 
relationships in the model, as follows. 
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Table 9.1 : Percent distribution of alters' religious identity by percentage of Coptic 
workers in firms for Muslim and Coptic workers. 
Percentage of Coptic Workers in the Firm 
None 1-20 More than 20% Nof cases 
Muslim Workers 
Alters' Religious Identity 
Muslims 
Copts 
Nof cases 
Coptic Workers 
Alters' Religious Identity 
Muslims 
Copts 
Nof cases 
Notes: 
98.4 
1.6 
122 
90.9 
9.1 
88 
63.8 
36.2 
47 
78.1 
21.9 
64 
29.7 
70.3 
91 
250 
24 
274 
57 
81 
138 
1- Chi-square test shows a significant relationship between percentage of alters' religion and 
percentage of Coptic workers in firms for both Muslim and Coptic workers. 
2- For Muslim workers: Cramer's V 2=0.280 (significant). 
3- For Coptic workers: Cramer's V=0.312 (significant). 
4- Calculations are based on non-relative alters to exclude the biasness towards creating ties 
with household members and relatives. 
2 Cramer's V is the most popular of the chi-square-based measures of nominal 
association, and it ranges between 0 and 1 regardless of table size. V is the square 
root of chi-square divided by sample size, n, times m, which is the smaller of (number 
of rows- 1) or (number of columns- 1): V = SQRT(Jt!!nm). 
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9.4.2 The Mutual Relationship between Social Segregation and Homophlly 
Levels 
A direct result of the Contact Hypothesis is the positive mutual relationship between 
social segregation and individuals' homophilous attitudes (expressed in Figure 9.2). A 
segregated social network would decrease the chance of intergroup contact, which 
increases homophily levels, and vice versa. On the other side, people with high 
homophily levels would be biased towards creating social relations with ingroup 
members and avoid outgroup members, even when contact occurs, and this would 
create homophilous social networks and increasing social segregation. 
9.4.3 The Mutual Relationship between Workplace Segregation and 
Homophily Levels 
In a similar way, segregated workplaces decrease the opportunity for intergroup 
contact which increases homophilous attitudes, and vice versa (Table 9.1 clearly 
supports this claim). On the other hand, individuals' homophily may affect workplace 
segregation through its effects on the exit patterns of workers and hiring 
discrimination. 
ｓｾｮ･ｮｳ･ｮ＠ (2004) shows that the exit rates of workers are inversely related to the level 
of same-race representation at the time of organizational entry and increase when 
workers experience declines in same-race representation. Also, our empirical study 
shows similar results. As presented earlier in Table 7.11 in Chapter 7, Coptic workers 
tend to stay more than twice as long in workplaces with a higher percentage of Copts 
than in other workplaces (mean duration is 79.5 and 164.9 months respectively). 
However, as the number of Muslim friends increases in Copts' social networks 
(accompanied by a decreasing level of homophily), this difference in mean duration 
decreases and becomes insignificant. The mean duration of Muslim workers shows a 
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similar pattern (decreasing with increasing percentage of Coptic workers) though the 
differences in mean duration were not statistically significant. 
Also, higher homophily levels among employers would promote hiring discrimination 
(Becker 1971 ), and this would increase workplace segregation. As presented earlier 
in Chapter 3 (Table 3.3), empirical data of WSIES survey (2005) confirms hiring 
discrimination in the Egyptian labour market. There is a strong tendencl for Muslim 
and Coptic employers to hire workers of the same religion as their own. 
9.4.4 The Mutual Relationship between Social and Workplace Segregation 
Most of the research on workplace segregation emphasises one way of the 
relationship between social segregation and workplace segregation mediated by 
referral hiring (Elliott 2001, Tassier 2005, Tassier & Menczer 2005). 
The conceptual model, in Figure 9.2, proposes that the relation between social 
segregation and workplace segregation can also go in the other direction. People 
spend a large fraction of their time at work, and that a large fraction of social 
interactions takes place at workplaces (Grossetti 2005). When workplaces become 
segregated this reduces the chance for intergroup contact to occur, and this could 
affect social segregation directly (by reducing the chance for intergroup ties to 
develop) and indirectly (by increasing homophily levels which create biased against 
intergroup social relationships). Table 9.1 provides an empirical evidence for the 
positive correlation between social segregation and workplace segregation (without 
assuming any of the variables to be dependent or independent). 
3 Eta correlation coefficient between Employers religious identity and percentage of 
Coptic workers in the firms was 0.718, which shows a high level of correlation. 
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9.5 Computerized Model Verification 
Ensuring that the computer programming and implementation of the conceptual 
model are correct is not an easy task. It is very common to make programming errors, 
and sometimes these errors are not discovered until the model shows an unexpected 
behaviour (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005). There are some general guidelines to reduce 
programming errors (which have been followed as far as possible during building the 
computerized model). For example, using a special-purpose simulation language 
(such as NetLogo which was used here) generally results in fewer errors than if a 
lower level programming language such as FORTRAN, C, or C++ is used. Similarly, 
using a structured and clear programming style (for example, informative variable 
names, proper indentation, and good documentation) reduces the probability of 
errors. 
One of the most popular tests for model verification is the Extreme Condition Test 
(Sargent 2005), where the model is tested using a set of test cases, usually of 
extreme values for the parameters, where the outcomes are easily predictable 
(Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005) . In the following, the Extreme Condition Test is applied to 
the computerized model. All model parameters are based on the values in Table 8.1 
in Chapter 8 with modifications for each test case. 
9.5. 1 Extreme Condition 1: No Referral Hiring, No hiring Discrimination 
In this extreme case, all hiring occurs randomly (referral-hiring = 0), and there is no 
hiring discrimination (hiring-discrimination-constant = 0). Figure 9.3 presents the 
results of the simulation model for these settings. In this case, as expected, levels of 
workplace and social segregation remain at very low levels. Random allocation of 
workers creates some segregation in workplaces and this would cause an equivalent 
level of social segregation to evolve. However, G", the measure of systematic 
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Figure 9.3: Emergence of workplace and social segregation for Extreme Cond•tion 1 
(no referral hiring and no hiring discrimination). 
workplace segregation, is very close to zero, indicating a very low level of systematic 
(or intended) segregation. Also, under these settings (and in all the other test cases) 
both minority and majority groups have similar levels of unemployment (0.2 in the 
current example). 
9.5.2 Extreme Condition 2: Complete Referral Hiring, No hiring Discrimination 
In this second test case, all hiring occurs through insider referrals (referral-hiring = 1), 
and there is no hiring discrimination (hiring-discrimination-constant = 0). Figure 9.4 
presents the results of the simulation model for these settings. Again, as expected in 
this case, significant levels of workplace and social segregation coevolve (average 
G=0.51, average G"=0.25, and average 8=0.54). As in Extreme Condition 1, random 
allocation of workers to workplaces creates some level of workplace segregation and 
this promotes an equivalent level of social segregation. However, in this case and 
due to referral hiring, social segregation and workplace segregation start to reinforce 
each other pushing their levels higher than their values in case 1 . 
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Figure 9.4: Emergence of workplace and social segregation for Extreme Condition 2 
(complete referral hiring and no hiring discrimination). 
9.5.3 Extreme Condition 3: All Social Links are Created at Random, Complete 
Referral hiring, hiring-discrimination-constant=1 
As presented in Figure 9.5, because all links are created at random , there is almost 
no social segregation (S=0.004) . The referral hiring and hiring discrimination promote 
a significant level of workplace segregation (G=0.44 and G11=0.19) . 
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Condition 3 
(complete referral hiring, hiring-discrimination-constant=1, and links are created at random). 
9.6 Operational Validation 
During operational validation, the model's behaviour is tested against the observed 
empirical data derived from the Egyptian labour market and social networks. The 
observed levels of workplace segregation, social segregation, mean homophily levels 
of individuals, and unemployment levels of minority and majority groups are 
compared with simulated data. Three sources of data will be used to estimate 
model 's parameters and measures: Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey 
(WSIES), Social Contract Survey (SCS) , and the Empirical Data (ED) gathered by the 
researcher. 
9.6. 1 Estimating Model's Parameter for the Egyptian Case 
Table 9.2 presents the estimated values for the model 's parameters calculated from 
the three different sources of data. 
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Table 9.2: Estimated values for model's parameters based on the empirical data. 
Parameter Name Parameter Value 
Minority proportion (P): 0.06 
Overall unemployment rate 0.13 
Number of workers 4800 
Number of firms 165 
Total number of jobs 4176 
Number of jobs in each firm Same distribution as WSIES data 
Number of Coptic employers 14 
Number of Muslim employers 151 
Level of referral hiring 0.65 
Probability of creating new 
links through work, social 0.3, 0.5, 0.01 (respectively) 
network, and randomly. 
Maximum network size Normal (8,4) 
9.6.2 Comparing Observed and Simulated Results 
Source 
scs 
scs 
Calculated 4 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
ED 
ED 
ED 
Table 9.3 shows that there a great level of similarity between the observed values of 
the variables and the simulated values. All of the confidence intervals (CI's) of the 
difference between of the observed and simulated values contain the zero point, 
indicating that the values are not statistically different. 
4 Calculated based on number of jobs and unemployment rate. 
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Table 9.3: Comparing observed and simulated values of the simulation model. 
Observed Simulatio 95% Confidence Variable Name Value Source n Value Std. Error Interval for Difference 
Social Segregation 0.802 ED 0.796 0.004 (-0.013, 0.001) 
Worl<place Segregation 0.932 WSIES 0.925 0.003 (-0.0136, 0.0002) 
- Gini 
Muslims 0.133 scs 0.1334 0.0002 (·0.0008, 0.0009) 
unemployment 
Copts unemployment 0.079 scs 0.074 0.003 (·0.011' 0.002) 
9. 7 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter the processes of model validation and verification were discussed. The 
methodology used for validation and verification of the proposed model of 
segregation that has been developed in the previous chapter was discussed. 
Various relations in the conceptual model were validated based on empirical data, 
including the Contact Hypothesis, the mutual relationship between social segregation 
and homophily levels, the mutual relationship between workplace segregation and 
homophily levels, and the mutual relationship between social and workplace 
segregation. 
The computerised model was validated based on three extreme condition tests: 
1 . No Referral Hiring, No hiring Discrimination 
2. Complete Referral Hiring, No hiring Discrimination 
3. All Social Links are Created at Random, Complete Referral hiring, hiring-
discri m i nation-constant=1 
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Finally, for operational validation, the model's behaviour was tested against the 
observed empirical data driven from the Egyptian labour market and social networks. 
There was a great similarity between the observed values of the variables and the 
simulated values. 
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10 EXPERIMENTING WITH THE MODEL 
10.1 Aims of This Chapter 
In this chapter, the model that has been developed and validated in earlier chapters 
will be used in some experiments. The objective is to study the effects of the following 
factors on social and workplace segregation: 
• Unemployment level {Section 1 0.2) 
• Size of social networks of agents (Section 1 0.3) 
• Hiring discrimination {Section 1 0.4) 
• Size of minority group {Section 1 0.5) 
• Firms' sizes {Section 1 0.6) 
10.2 The Relationship between Unemployment Level and Segregation 
In this section, the effect of the overall unemployment level on social and workplace 
segregation is examined. Most of the literature on the relationship between 
segregation and unemployment focuses on the effects of workplace and occupational 
segregation on employment and wage inequality {For example, Carrington & Trosl<e 
1998, Glass 1990, Tassier & Menczer 2005). There is almost no research on the 
effect of overall unemployment levels on social and workplace segregation. This is 
because there is little suitable empirical data. Unemployment levels usually change 
very slowly and within narrow margins, so it is very difficult to have longitudinal data 
about social and workplace segregation and levels of unemployment for one society. 
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Here, experimenting using simulation models seems to be a good (and may be the 
only) choice. Firstly, the design of the simulation experiment is introduced and then 
the simulation results. 
10.2.1 Experiment Design 
In this experiment, the model parameters were estimated using the three empirical 
studies (as described earlier in the Chapter 6): Workers' Status in Industrial 
Enterprises Survey (WSIES), Social Contract Survey (SCS), and the Empirical Data 
{ED) gathered by the researcher. Table 10.1 1 presents the values of these 
parameters. 
The model was run2 for some experimental levels of unemployment rate (0, 0.2, 0.4, 
0.6 and 0.8), and for each level the number of workers is calculated by dividing the 
number of jobs (4176) by (1-unemployment rate). 
1 Table 10.1 was copied from Table 9.2 in the previous chapter for the convenience of 
the reader. 
2 All experiments in this chapter are based on 30 runs for 500 time steps each. 
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Table 10.1 : Estimated values for model's parameters based on the empirical data. 
Parameter Name Parameter Value 
Minority proportion (P): 0.06 
Overall unemployment rate 0.13 
Number of workers 4800 
Number of firms 165 
Total number of jobs 4176 
Number of jobs in each firm Same distribution as WSIES data 
Number of Coptic employers 14 
Number of Muslim employers 151 
Level of referral hiring 0.65 
Probability of creating new 
links through work, social 0.3, 0.5, 0.01 (respectively) 
network, and randomly. 
Maximum network size Normal (8,4) 
10.2.2 Experiment Results 
Source 
scs 
scs 
Calculated 3 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
WSIES 
ED 
ED 
ED 
As presented in Figure 1 0.1, both social segregation and workplace segregation tend 
to increase with increasing level of unemployment until it reaches some level (0.2 in 
Figure 10.1 ), after which increasing unemployment level has no effect on social and 
workplace segregation. 
With lower levels of unemployment, employers might not have enough referrals from 
current incumbents {since most alters in their social networks would have jobs 
already). In this case, according to the suggested model, employers might hire 
3 Calculated based on number of jobs and unemployment rate. 
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Figure 10.1: The effect of unemployment level on workplace and social segregation. 
workers formally (that is, randomly), which would decrease workplace segregation 
and consequently decrease social segregation. However, this positive effect of 
unemployment on segregation levels vanishes at some point (0.2 in the current 
experiment) when most of the working agents are linked to at least one unemployed 
agent for whom they can give referrals. 
Referring to Egypt's case (with unemployment rate 0.13), the results of this 
experiment suggest that the Egyptian society could be less segregated if the 
unemployment level decreases (of course in addition to other positive social and 
economical effects) . 
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1 0.3 Size of Social Networks 
In this experiment, the hypothesis being tested is that increasing the average size of 
individuals' social networks would decrease social and worl(place segregation. 
10.3. 1 Experiment Design 
The simulation model was run using the parameters in Table 10.1 except that the 
mean size of social networks was varied between 5 and 30 (as presented in Figure 
10.2). It was difficult to extend the experiment to mean network sizes greater than 30 
because of limitations on the computational resources available, since the 
computational time was found to increase exponentially with increasing mean 
network size. 
1 0.3.2 Experiment Results 
The results presented in Figure 10.2 show that there is a negative relationship 
between the mean size of individuals' social networks and social and workplace 
segregation. With increasing network size the probability for individuals to have social 
links to others from different social group increases, hence social and workplace 
segregation would decrease (according to the Contact Hypothesis discussed earlier 
in Section 2.3.1 ). 
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Figure 10.2: The effect of average size of social networks on segregation. 
10.4 Hiring Discrimination 
As described earlier in Chapter 8, hiring discrimination for a firm f, o,, was defined to 
be the product of discrimination-constant by mean homophily level of workers, where 
discrimination-constant indicates to what extent homophily attitudes of employers are 
translated into actual hiring discrimination. Laws or rules, such as affirmative action 
which intends to promote the access of unprivileged groups to employment, might 
restrict an employer's ability to discriminate against some social group(s). In this 
case, the value of the discrimination-constant would be relatively low. In this section, 
the effect of this discrimination-constant on social and workplace segregation level is 
investigated. 
1 0.4. 1 Experiment Design 
As with the previous two experiments, the simulation model was run using the 
parameters in Table 10.1 while varying the level of discrimination-constant between 0 
and 1. 
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1 0.4.2 Experiment Results 
The simulation results presented in Figure 10.3 show that there is a strong positive 
relationship between hiring discrimination (through ､ｩｳ｣ｲｩｭｩｮ｡ｴｩｯｮ Ｍ ｣ｯｮｳｴ｡ｮｾ＠ and social 
and workplace segregation. A complete segregation in workplaces would occur when 
the discrimination-constant is one. 
Reflecting on data about the Egyptian society, the estimated value of discrimination-
constant is relatively high, and this would suggest that there is a great potential in 
reducing social and workplace segregation when adopting suitable anti-discrimination 
laws. 
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Figure 10.3: The effect of hiring discrimination on segregation. 
10.5 Minority Proportion 
In this experiment, the hypothesis being tested is that increasing the proportion of the 
minority group would decrease social and workplace segregation. 
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10.5.1 Experiment Design 
As presented in Table 1 0.2, the simulation model was run using values for the 
minority proportion between 0.1 and 0.5. Using values for the minority proportion 
different than that of Egypt's data {0.06) required a change in the distribution of firms 
and workers as well because the numbers of Coptic and Muslim employers need to 
be consistent with the value of the minority proportion used in the experiment. So, the 
simulation was run using 100 firms each having 25 jobs (the same as the mean 
number of jobs in WSIES). 
Table 10.2: Model's parameters used to study the effect of minority proportion on 
segregation. 
Parameter Name 
Minority proportion (P): 
Overall unemployment rate 
Number of workers 
Number of firms 
Number of jobs in each firm 
Number of Coptic employers 
Number of Muslim employers 
Discrimination-constant 
Level of referral hiring 
Probability of creating new 
Parameter Value 
0.1' 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 
0.13 
2500 
number of jobs 1(1-unemployment rate) 
100 
25 
Minority proportion * Number of firms 
(1-Minority proportion) * Number of firms 
0.7 
0.65 
links through work, social 0.3, 0.5, 0.01 (respectively) 
networl<, and randomly. 
Maximum network size Normal (8,4) 
Source 
Experimental 
Values 
scs 
Calculated 
Arbitrary 
WSIES 
Calculated 
Calculated 
WSIES 
ED 
ED 
ED 
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Figure 10.4: The effect of minority proportion on workplace and social segregation. 
1 0.5.2 Experiment Results 
As Figure 10.4 shows, there is a negative relationship between minority proportion 
and social and workplace segregation. With increasing minority proportion the 
probability for individuals to have social links to others from different social group 
increases, and this decreases social and workplace segregation. The minority 
proportion also affects the level of segregation at the initial stages of the simulation. 
As described earlier in Chapter 3, mere random allocation of workers to jobs, during 
the initial stages of simulation, would create some level of workplace segregation, 
and this level increases as the minority proportion decreases. 
10.6 Firms' Sizes 
Many empirical studies suggest that there is negative relationship between a firm size 
and workplace segregation (for example, Holzer 1998, S0rensen 2004). Most of 
these studies argue that large firms may be less segregated because they are subject 
to more regulations and oversight regarding hiring practices. Smaller firms are less 
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likely to have formal human resources departments than larger firms, so they rely 
heavily on less costly informal recruitment channels. These informal recruitment 
methods create greater disadvantages for minority groups. 
However, the main concern of the current simulation experiment is to study how firm 
size affects social and workplace segregation according to the suggested dynamic 
framework. In other words : would this negative relationship with firm size still exist 
even when all firms follow the same hiring practices? 
10.6. 1 Experiment Design 
The simulation model was run using the parameters in Table 10.2 but with firm size 
(Number of jobs in each firm) ranging from 10 to 90 . For each simulation run, the 
number of firms is calculated as: total number of jobs (2500) divided by firm size. 
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Figure 10.5: The effect of average firm size on segregation. 
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10.6.2 Experiment Results 
As presented in Figure 1 0.5, the simulation results show that there is a strong 
negative relationship between average firm size and social and workplace 
segregation even when all firms are assumed to follow the same hiring practices. This 
negative relationship could be explained by two factors. Firstly, increasing the 
average firm size would decrease levels of segregation at the initial stages of 
simulation {in exactly the same way as minority proportion increases). Secondly, 
increasing the firm size would increase the probability for some firm to have workers 
from different social groups proportionally represented inside this firm, which 
increases the probability for social links to be established among these workers, and 
this would decrease social segregation and workplace segregation. 
10.7 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the simulation model was used in a number of experiments. The 
results of the experiments showed that: 
• There is a positive relationship between the overall unemployment level and 
segregation. Both social and workplace segregation increase with an 
increase of unemployment. 
• A weak negative relationship was found between the average individuals' 
network size and segregation. 
• Hiring discrimination was strongly and positively correlated with both social 
and workplace segregation. 
• The relationship between minority proportion and segregation is a strong 
negative one. 
• Finally, both social and workplace segregation are negatively correlated with 
the average firm size. 
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11 CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
11.1 Introduction 
The main impetus of the current thesis is to understand why the social distance 
between Copts and Muslims has been increasing and why their social networks and 
workplaces are getting more segregated. Segregation is a complex concept that has 
many dimensions and many sources. Segregation could happen in individuals' social 
networks, neighbourhood, and/or in organizations such as schools, universities, 
places of worship (e.g. churches and mosques in the Egyptian case), and 
workplaces. Most previous research on segregation has focused mainly on the 
consequences rather than the determinants of segregating, and studied each of these 
sources separately. For example, some research focused on residential segregation, 
some focused on segregation in schools or universities, and so on. The original aim 
of this thesis was to study the determinants of segregation, how it emerges and how 
these different sources of segregation are interrelated. However, because of limited 
resources, the research focused on two important dimensions of segregations: social 
networks and workplaces (as a proxy for organizations). 
11.2 Objectives 
The general objective of the current research was to develop an agent-based model 
that describes and explain the co-emergence of social and workplace segregation. 
Models are helpful tools to simplify and understand complex social systems and 
phenomena such as social and workplace segregation. 
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The model was used as an investigation tool to study the relationship between 
segregation and: (1) referral hiring, (2) unemployment rate, (3) sizes of social 
networks, (4) hiring discrimination, (5) proportion of the minority group, (6) Firm size 
(number of workers in the firm), and (7) employment inequality between majority and 
minority groups. 
11.3 Methods 
Statistical analysis and agent-based modelling have been used in an integrated way 
to achieve the research objectives. A general framework has been proposed that 
describes the dynamic mutual relationships between social segregation, workplace 
segregation, mean homophily level, and referral hiring. This framework served as a 
conceptual model that helped to identify the data to be collected and guided the 
statistical analysis and development of the agent-based model. 
11.3. 1 Data Sources 
Three data sources, about the labour market and social networks in Egypt, have been 
used to achieve the objectives of the current thesis: 
• The Social Contract Survey (SCS) was used to estimate the overall 
proportion of Copts and unemployment rates for Muslims and Copts. 
• The Workers' Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES) was used to 
estimate the level of workplace segregation. Also, the firms in WSIES served 
as a frame to select employers and workers for the further in-depth 
interviews. 
• Structured face-to-face interviews were carried out with 39 employers (27 
Muslims and 12 Copts) and 122 workers (81 Muslims and 41 Copts) in four 
Egyptian governorates during August and September 2007. These data 
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provided information about social networks for Copts and Muslims and 
enabled the measurement of social segregation. 
11.3.2 The Agent-Based Model 
The agent-based modelling approach has been used as the main research method, 
along with statistical analysis. An agent-based model has been developed (based on 
the results of empirical sources of data) to investigate the co-emergence of social and 
workplace segregation, and to identify the main determinants of these sources of 
segregation. 
The model creates an artificial labour market and society where agents (people) use 
their social networks to search for jobs. Agents change their social networks by 
creating new social relationships (links) with other agents while some other links 
dissolve. The composition of workplaces also may change through the processes of 
workers' firing and hiring. 
The model has been validated at the conceptual level and at the data level, and there 
was a great similarity between the simulated and the observed results. 
11.4 Main Research Findings 
The main contribution of the current thesis is modelling the co-emergence of social 
and workplace segregation. Creating a model for these phenomena enables better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of segregation and its determinants. 
The model can be used as an experimental tool to test further theories and 
hypothesises about segregation. Although the model is validated against data from 
the Egyptian society, it can be used, with proper estimation of model's parameters, to 
capture different societies and social contexts (e.g., less privileged minorities). Some 
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of the main results of the empirical data, and results from simulation experiments are 
discussed in the following. 
11.4. 1 Levels of Segregation 
The analysis of the WSIES data provided evidence for high levels of worl<place 
segregation. The Gini index of worl<place segregation was 0.932. The dissimilarity 
index was also computed, 0=0.825, which means that about 83 percent of the Coptic 
{or Muslim) worl<ers would have to change their workplace in order to attain a 
complete integration at Egyptian workplaces. 
The empirical study showed that there is a high level of segregation based on religion 
in the social networks of Muslims and Copts: the index of social segregation, S, was 
0.802. 
The SCS data confirmed the formal announced proportion of Copts which is around 6 
percent of the Egyptian population, and showed that Copts are not evenly distributed 
among regions and governorates in Egypt. They concentrate in Upper Egypt more 
than Lower Egypt, and tend to be overrepresented in some areas inside the same 
governorate. Another result from the SCS is that Muslims have a higher 
unemployment rate (13.3 percent) than Copts (8.0 percent). 
11.4.2 Labour Market and Discrimination 
The data from the interviews with the employers and workers showed that: 
• Informal search for jobs using friends and relatives is common, and was used 
to secure about 58 percent of jobs for worl<ers. There was also a high level of 
segregation in job contacts, that is, Copts and Muslims are more likely to 
refer or pass job information to others of the same religion as their own. 
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• There is evidence of hiring discrimination from both Coptic and Muslim 
employers. A high correlation was found between employers' religion and the 
proportion of Copts in the workplace. 
• Evidence was also found of discrimination from the workers' side (especially 
Muslim worl<ers) . For example, one quarter of Muslim workers reported that it 
is important for them to work with a Muslim employer, and 8 percent prefer to 
worl< with other Muslim workmates. Half of workers, Muslims and Copts, 
believe that employers tend to hire workers of the same religion as their own. 
• Exit patterns play an important role in segregation. For example, on average, 
Coptic workers tend to stay more than twice as long in workplaces with a high 
percentage of Copts than in other workplaces (165 versus 80 months 
respectively). 
11.4.3 Social Networks 
The interviews with the workers showed that social networks measures are similar for 
Muslims and Copts: 
• The network size (based on the adopted definition of a social networl<) 
ranges from 2 to 20 persons with an average of 7 .1. 
• There is a high level of density and overlap in social relations. Around 72 
percent of alters of an ego have social relationships between each other, and 
65 percent of them have intimate/strong relationships. 
• Families and workplaces are the main source of social relationships. More 
than half the social relations were found to be with relatives, about 26 percent 
with workmates, 10 percent with neighbours, 4 percent with previous 
school/university colleagues, and other sources (mainly through other friends 
and mosques/churches). 
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11.4.4 Results of the Agent-Based Model 
The simulation model has been used in some experiments, and the results of these 
experiments showed that: 
• A labour market may experience significant levels of worl<place segregation 
and social segregation even when the hiring of workers occurs mainly 
through formal channels. 
• Referral hiring may be beneficial for the employment of minority groups 
especially when the population is highly segregated. The relationship 
between referral hiring and minority unemployment is curvilinear with a U-
shape. 
• Majority-group members tend to be more homophilous than minority-group 
members 
• Referral hiring is an important determinant of social and workplace 
segregation 
• Hiring discrimination was strongly, and positively correlated with both social 
and workplace segregation 
• There is a positive relationship between the overall unemployment rate and 
segregation 
• A weak negative relationship was found between the average individuals' 
network size and segregation. 
• The relationship between minority proportion and segregation is a strongly 
negative one. 
• An average firm size is negatively correlated with social and workplace 
segregation. 
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The results the simulation model showed that some level of segregation based on 
religion is inevitable even if Muslims and Copts are completely egalitarian. The main 
source of social relationships is the family which is, in most cases, a segregated 
social entity. Members of the same family are mostly of the same religion. However, 
segregation can be limited by encouraging integration in organizations such as 
workplaces, schools, charity societies, and social clubs. 
As the empirical data and the results of the simulation model showed, hiring 
discrimination was the most influential and controllable variable (unlike network size, 
firm size, and minority proportion which can not be controlled) affecting workplace 
segregation. Thus, encouraging employers to adopt formal hiring and equal-
opportunity recruitment would decrease worl<place segregation and, consequently, 
social segregation. For example, with zero discrimination, the modified Gini index of 
workplace segregation would decrease from its current level of 0.9 to 0.2 and social 
segregation would decrease from 0.8 to 0.5. 
11.5 Directions for Future Research 
The current work can be extended in many ways: 
• A more general model may be needed to incorporate more dimensions and 
sources of segregation in addition to social networks and workplaces. For 
example, an important source of segregation is neighbourhood. A model that 
tal<es into consideration spatial configurations of different social group would 
be useful. 
• The model can be extended by considering different social network 
structures, especially at the initial stage of simulation. Only a random network 
model has been used in the current model. 
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• The model can also be extended to consider multicultural societies with 
more than two social groups, for example, UK and US. 
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PURPOSES ONLY 
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CONSENT FORM 
Hello, My name is ________ _ , We are conducting this survey about employment, social 
networks and religion. I would very much appreciate your participation in the survey. I would like to 
ask you about your experience and practices as an employer regarding recruiting new workers for 
your firm. The survey usually takes about 15 minutes to complete. Whatever information you provide 
will be kept strictly confidential and will not be shown to any other persons. 
Participation in the survey is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any of the questions or 
withdraw from participation at any time. However, I hope that you will participate in the survey since 
your views are important. 
At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey? 
May I begin the interview now? 
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: _______ ___ _ 
RESPONDENT AGREES TO INTERVIEW D 
PROCEED WITH INTERVIEW . . . 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT AGREE D 
RECORD REASON AND STOP 
IDENTIFICATION 
NAME OF RESPONDENT: ... .... .. ... ..................... ........... ........ ......... ..................... .. ... .. 
POSITION IN THE FIRM: .. .......... ... ................ ... . · .. · ..... · .. · ..... · ........ ·............... .......... ... rn 
FIRM: ... ....... ............................. ...... . .... ..... ................. ... .... ...... ...... ...... ..... . ........... ... . 
ADDRESS IN DETAIL: ................... ........... ...................... ....................... .... .. ..... ... .. ... . 
GOVERNORATE:... .... ... .... ......... ..... ............. .. .............. ............. .... ..... .. .............. ....... rn 
KISM : .. .. ............ .. .. .. ... .......... .............. ... ........... ..... ... ... ... ......................................... rn 
SHIAKHA: ..................... ........ .. ........ · .............. · .. · ... · ....... · ....... · · · ................. · ..... . · ....... rn 
INTERVIEWER: ............... .... ·······.... ........................ .......... .......... ....... .. ............ ... ...... D 
DATE OF INTERVIEW: .. ......... ./ .. .... .. ./2007 
TIME OF INTERVIEW: ............................ . 
REQUIRED NUMBER OF WORKERS FOR INTERVIEW.............. .......................................... D 
MUSLIM WORKERS..... .... .... ...... ... .... ... .......... .. ........ ............... ... ........... .... ..... D 
COPTIC WORKERS.................................... ........ ...... .. ... .... ................ ...... ....... D 
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SECTION 1: WORKERS' TURNOVER 
I would like to ask you about some of the workers who were working here when we visited this firm two years ago. 
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 
IF NOT WORKING 
NO NAME Is (NAME) still When had he left Why had he left For how long Is (NAME) Muslim 
working here? the firm? the firm1? has/had (NAME) or Copt? 
been working 
here? 
YES NO (MONTHS) (MONTHS) M c 
01 ............................................................ 2 [I] D 2 
02 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
03 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
04 ............................................................ 2 [I] D 2 
05 
···························································· 
2 rn D 2 
06 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
07 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
08 .............................................................. 2 [I] D 2 
09 ............................................................. 2 [I] D 2 
10 ............................................................. 2 [I] D 2 
11 .............................................................. 2 rn D 2 
12 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
13 
···························································· 
2 rn D 2 
14 ............................................................. 2 [I] D 2 
15 
···························································· 
2 [I] D 2 
1 CODES FOR 0104: 1-He found another job 2- He was not happy with the salary 3-He was not good at his job 
4-His behaviour was not good 5-He was no longer needed 6-0ther reasons (SPECIFY) 
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SECTION 2: SELECTION OF WORKERS FOR INTERVIEWS 
201 In what year have you started working in this firm? YEAR: I I I I I 
202 How many workers did you have then? rn 
203 How many of them were Copts? rn 
204 How many workers do you have now? rn 
205 How many of them are Copts? rn 
We would like to make some interviews with workers in your firm, and this will be in their homes and with their approval. 
Could you please give me names and address of three of the most recent Muslim workers (and three of the most recent Coptic 
workers) for interview? 
206 207 208 209 210 211 212 
NO NAME For how ls(NAME) LINE SELECTED IF SELECTED FOR INTERVIEW: 
long has Muslim or NUMBER FOR 
(NAME) Copt? (0100) INTERVIEW? ADDRESS IN DETAIL 
been 
worldng 
here? 
YES NO 
(MONTHS) M c 
rn 2 rn 2 
2 rn 2 rn 2 
3 rn 2 rn 2 
4 rn 2 rn 2 
5 rn 2 rn 2 
6 rn 2 rn 2 
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SECTION 3: RECRUITMENT ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
When you want to hire a new worker, which of the following 
methods you may use? And how frequently? 
1- Make an advertisement/Ask employment agency ....... ... ... 
2- Ask one of cmTent workers to look for one for you ..... ..... 
3- Ask one of your friends to look for one for you .. .............. 
4- Look for someone you know before .... .................... ......... 
5- Other methods (SPECIFY) .................. .................... .......... 
Generally, which workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think are 
better than the others in each of the following: 
1- Work harder ........... .............. ............... ..................... ... 
2- More honest. .. .. ...... ... .. ...... ... ....... ........................ .... .... 
3- More cooperative with managers/supervisors .. ...... .... 
4- More cooperative with other workmates .................... 
5- Respect work rules (e.g. coming and leaving in time) 
6- Accept lower salary ............. .. .... ....... .. .. ............... ... ... 
How important or not important, you think, is it for you to 
work with workers of the same religion as yours? 
IF IMPORTANTNERY IMPORTANT: 
Why? 
How good or bad thing, you think, is it to have workers with 
different religions in the same workplace? 
306 IF NOT NEUTRAL: 
Why? 
307 How strongly do you agree or disagree that Muslims tend to 
employ each others more than employing Copts? 
FREQUENTLY SOMETIMES RARELY 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
MUSLIMS COPTS THE SAME 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
VERY IMPORTANT .......... .. .. ................. . 
IMPORTANT .............. .... ... ........ .. ... .... .. .. . 
NEUTRAL. ................. .... ..... ........... ........ . 
NOT IMPORTANT ... ... ... .......... ... ........... . 
NEVER 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
DK 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL.. ....... ............ 5 
........ ...... .......................... ........... ..................... .................. co 
::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::co 
.... ... ............ ................................................ ................... CD 
VERY GOOD .. .. ............ .............. .... ....... . 
GOOD ... .. ..................... .. ... .. ...... ..... ... ..... . 
NEUTRAL. .... ............. .... ............... .. .. .. ... . 
2 
3 
BAD.......................... ... .... ........... ..... .. .. .. .. 4 
VERYBAD.............. ....... .. ........ ....... ........ 5 
.................................................... ...................................... co 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::co 
......................................................................................... co 
STRONGLY AGREE ... ....... ............. ...... .. 
AGREE ... .... ........ ............. .. .... ... .... .. ...... .. . 2 
NEUTRAL...... ....... .. .. ....... .... ....... .. ........ .. 3 
DISAGREE..... .. ..... .. ..... ............... .. ... .... .. 4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE...... .. .. ... .......... .. 5 
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308 How strongly do you agree or disagree that Copts tend to 
employ each others more than employing Muslims? 
309 How strongly do you agree or disagree that there is 
discrimination against Copts in Egypt? 
310 IF AGREE/STRONGLY AGREE: 
In what way? 
311 What is your year of birth? 
312 What is the highest level of education you finished? 
313 Are you Muslim or Copt? 
314 RECORD TIME: ................................................................................ . 
STRONGLY AGREE ............................. .. 
AGREE ................................................... . 
NEUTRAL. ............................................. . 
2 
3 
DISAGREE.. ....................... .. .................. 4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE........ ...... ........... 5 
STRONGLY AGREE ............................. .. 
AGREE .... .... ........ .................. ..... .......... .. . 2 
NEUTRAL.. ............................................ . 3 
DISAGREE...................... ............ .......... . 4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE...... ......... .......... 5 
.......................................................................................... o=J 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::o=J 
......................................................................................... o=J 
YEAR: 
NO EDUCATION AT ALL ..................... .. 
PRIMARY............................................... 2 
PREPARATORY.... .... ............. ...... .......... 3 
SECONDARY............... .......... ..... ........ ... 4 
UPPER INTERMIDIATE......................... 5 
UNIVERSITY/HIGHER.......................... .. 6 
MUSLIM ................................................ .. 
COPT............... ........ .. ..... ... ................ ..... 2 
315 THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR PARTICIPATION, REASSURE VERY GOOD.......................................... 1 
CONFIDENTIALITY, AND RECORD DEGREE OF COOPERATION: GOOD....... .......... ....... ............................. 2 
MODERATE... ......... .................... . ........... 3 
BAD........................................ ...... ..... ...... 4 
VERYBAD............. ........ ......................... 5 
RECORD ANY NOTES: 
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Arabic Version 
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Cairo University University of Surrey 
Department of Sociology Faculty of Economics and Political Science 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND EMPLOYMENT SURVEY 
Worker Questionnaire 
August 2007 
ALL DATA WILL BE KEPI' CONFEDENTIAL AND WILL BE USED FOR 
SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES ONLY 
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CONSENT FORM 
Hello, My name is ________ , We are conducting this survey about employment, social 
networks and religion. I would very much appreciate your participation in the survey. I would like to 
ask you about your work experience and your social network. The survey usually takes about 30 
minutes to complete. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will not 
be shown to any other persons. 
Participation in the survey is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any of the questions or 
withdraw from participation at any time. However, I hope that you will participate in the survey since 
your views are important. 
At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey? 
May I begin the interview now? 
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER: __________ _ 
RESPONDENT AGREES TO INTERVIEW D 
PROCEED WITH INTERVIEW ... 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT AGREE D 
RECORD REASON AND STOP 
IDENTIFICATION 
NAME OF RESPONDENT:..... ....... ....... .......................................................... ..... ..... .. I 
RELIGION: MUSLIM ............ 1 COPT ............ 2 
ADDRESS IN DETAIL: ................................ ... ....... ........................... .. . .. ......... .......... .. 
GOVERNORATE: ....... ...... ..... .................... ... ..... ... ......... ... .... ............ ..... .. ........... ...... . 
KISM : ....... .. ...... ................ .. ......... .. ... .. .. ..................... ......................... .............. ...... . 
SHIAKHA: .......... ....... ...... ... ..... .. .. ........... .... ................... ......................... ............. ... .. 
FIRM: .. ....... .. .. ... ... .... ... .. .... . ................................................................................ .. . .. 
INTERVIEWER: ........ ... ............. ... ....... .......... ............................. .. ..... ....... ................ . D 
DATE OF INTERVIEW: .... ....... .! .. ...... ./2007 
TIME OF INTERVIEW: ..................... .... .. .. 
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SECTION 1: RESPONDENT'S BACKGROUND AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
PLEASE LIST ALL YOUR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS STARTING WITH YOURSELF· 
' 
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 
AGES+ AGE 6·25 AGE 16+ 
NO NAME What is your Is (NAME) What is the What is the highest Is (NAME) What is the Is (NAME) NOT 
relationship to male or age of level of education of currently marital status Currently CURRENTLY ATIENDING (NAME)? female? (NAME)? (NAME)? What is attending of (NAME)? working or SCHOOL: 
the highest grade? school/univer not? 
1-RESPONDENT 1-NON -+107 
slty? Is (NAME) in 
2-WIFE 2-PRIMARY the same line 
3-SONIDAUGHTER 3-PREPARATORY of work as 
4- SON/DAUGHTER IN LAW 4-SECONDARY yours? 5-MOTHERIFATHER 5· UPPER 
6-BROTHERISISTER INTERMIDIATE 1-SINGLE 
7-GRANDPARENTS &-UNIVERSITY+ 2-MARRIED 
8· OTHER RELATIVE 3-WIDOWED 
9-0THER M F LEVEL GRADE YES NO 4·DIVORCED YES NO YES NO 
01 QJ 0 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D ······················· 
02 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ······ ······ ···· ····· ·· 
03 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 .. .. ........... ........ 
04 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 .. ... .. ................ 
05 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
06 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ······················· 
07 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 .. ..... .... ....... .. ... 
08 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
09 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
10 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ·· ·· ·· ··· ·· ············ 
11 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ····· ··· ··············· 
12 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ............. .... .. .... 
13 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
14 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ······················· 
15 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 .. .......... ...... .. ... 
16 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
17 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
18 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 .. .. ... .. ... ....... .... 
19 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ······ ··········· ······ 
20 D 1 2 ITJ D D 1 2 D 1 2 1 2 ....................... 
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SECTION 2: RESPONDENT'S SOCIAL NETWORK 
NOW, WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR SOCIAL NETWORK. 
FOR QUESTIONS 201-208: 
Give a new number for each person mentioned by respondent. If respondent mentioned the same person in more than one question, then write 
the same first number given to the person along with his/her name. Start numbering after the last HH member of Section 1. 
201 
202 
203 
204 
From time to time, most people discuss important matters 
with other people. Who are the people with whom you 
discuss matters important to you? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
Who from outside your household has recently helped you 
with tasks around the home, such as painting, moving 
furniture, cooking, cleaning or major or minor repairs? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
Suppose you need to borrow some small thing like a tool or a 
cup of sugar, from whom outside your household would you 
ask to borrow it? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
If you need to borrow a large sum of money, say LElOOO, 
whom would you ask for help? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
rn ...................... ................................................... .. 
rn ................................................ ...........................  
rn ................................................ ..........................  
rn ................. ........................................................ .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn ...........................................................................  
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn ........................................ .................................. .. 
rn ....................................... .............. .................... .. 
rn .... ................... ................................................. .. 
rn .......................................... ............................... .. 
rn ...........................................................................  
rn ................................................................ .......... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................... ......... ... .................... .. 
rn ...................... .. ...................................................  
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn ...........................................................................  
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......... ............................................................... .. 
rn ....................................... .................................. .. 
rn ...... .... ...... ... ... .................................................. .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .................................................................. ....... .. 
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn .... ..................................................................... .. 
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205 
206 
207 
208 
Who are the people you really enjoy socializing with? For 
example: people with whom you may have lunch or dinner 
together, you may exchange home visits, or you may meet 
outside the home for recreation (e.g. restaurant, coffee shop, 
park, club, etc.). 
PROBE: Any body else? 
With whom would you talk about your work? 
For example: decisions you have to make, professional 
problems you have to solve and ways to improve how you 
work? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
If you are going to search for a new job, whom would you 
ask for information or help about that? 
PROBE: Any body else? 
Are there any other persons that are close to you that have not 
been mentioned in one of the previous questions? 
IF YES: Who are they? 
FOR QUESTIONS 209·221: 
rn ...........................................................................  
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
ITJ ........................... ............................................... .. 
ITJ ......................................... ............................... .. .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ ............................................ ...... ......................... . 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
ITJ ................................................................. ......... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ ...... ..................... .. ............................................. .. 
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
rn ........................................................................ .. .. 
ITJ ......................... ............ ... .......... ......................... . 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ ........................ ................................................... . 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
N0 ........................... .. ...................... 1 
YES (GIVE LIST BELOW) ..................... 2 ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
ITJ ........................... ........... .. ................................... . 
ITJ ........................................................................... . 
ITJ .......................................................................... .. 
rn .................. ........................................................  
rn .......................................................................... .. 
rn ...... .................................................................... .. 
rn ...... ..................... ............................................. .. 
Write down all the numbers (0209) and names (021 0) of all non-household members {all persons with numbers greater than total number of 
HH members) that have been mentioned in questions 201-208. Then for each person ask questions 211-221. 
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209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 
\ 
No Name Sex How did you know IF NOT RELATIVE What is the Is (NAME) ls(NAME) What is the highest What is the How often do you What is the 
(Name)? age of Currently in the level of education strength of meet with strength of What is the For how (NAME)? working or same line of(NAME) relation between (NAME)? relation between 
1-RELATIVE religion of many not? of work of you and (NAME)? (NAME) and 
2-SCHOOL (NAME)? years have yours? (PREVIOUS/LAS 
3-WORK you known 1-NON TNAME)? 
4-MOSQUE/CHURCH (Name) 2-PRIMARY 1-DAILY 
5-NEIGHBOUR 3-PREP 2-WEEKLY 1-INTIMATE 
6-THRU CHILDREN 4-SEC 1-INTIMATE 3-MONTHLY 2-STRONG 
7-THRUWIFE 5- UPPER 2-STRONG 2-YEARLY 3-MODERATE 
8-THRU OTHER FRIEND INTERMIDIATE 3-MODERATE 4-WEAK 
M F 9-0THER (specify) M c YES NO YES NO &-UNIVERSITY+ 4-WEAK UNIT TIMES 5-NO RELATION 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................ 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D .......................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................. 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D .......................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ........................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D .............................. 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................ 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................. 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D .......................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ........................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................ 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ........................... 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D D orn D ............................. 
rn 1 2 D 1 2 rn rn 1 2 1 2 D orn .......................... 
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301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
306 
307 
308 
309 
SECTION 3: WORK HISTORY 
WE WOULD LIKE SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR WORK HISTORY. 
Job title 
Job category? 
When did you start working in this job? 
When did you leave this job? 
How far is (was) this job from your 
home? 
Who told you about, or helped you to get 
this job? 
IF THE PERSON WAS LISTED BEFORE (IN 
SECTION 1 OR SECTION 2) WRITE DOWN 
HIS/HER LINE NUMBR AND SKIP TO Q309. 
What is your relationship to this person at 
this time? 
Is this job contact person Muslim or 
Copt? 
IF THE CONTACT PERSON IS NOT THE 
EMPLOYER: 
How did this person know about this job? 
Current Job Previous Job 2nd Previous Job 
SKILLED LABOUR ............ ... 1 SKILLED LABOUR .... .. ... ...... 1 SKILLED LABOUR ............... 1 
UNSKILLED LABOUR ... ........ 2 UNSKILLED LABOUR ... .. .... .. 2 UNSKILLED LABOUR ... ........ 2 
OTHER .... .... . .................... . 3 OTHER .. .. ........ ..... ..... .... . ... 3 OTHER ................ ........ .. .... 3 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
IN KM: IN KM: INKM: 
NAME: ... .... ...... ... .. ... ... ....... .... ... . NAME: .. ..... .... .......................... .. NAME: ............. .... ... ..... .. ..... .. .... . 
LISTED o=J.-.. 309 LISTED o=J.-.. 309 LISTED 
NOT LISTED ........... 77 NOT LISTED ...... .. ... 77 NOT LISTED ........... 77 
NONE/FORMAL NONE/FORMAL NONE/FORMAL 
SEARCH .............. .. . 88 -+ 311 SEARCH ................. 88 -+ 311 SEARCH .... .. ........... 88 -+ 311 
RELATIVE .......... .. ....... 1-+ 309 RELATIVE ................... 1-+ 309 RELATIVE ................... 1-+ 309 
FRIEND .................. .. . 2 FRIEND .... .. .. ....... ...... 2 FRIEND ..................... 2 
NEIGHBOUR ...... ....... 3 NEIGHBOUR ... .. ... ... .. 3 NEIGHBOUR ............ . 3 
EMPLOYER ........ ....... 4 EMPLOYER. ....... ... .... 4 EMPLOYER ............. . .4 
EX-WORKMAT .......... 5 EX-WORKMAT ........ .. 5 EX-WORKMAT .......... 5 
OTHER ....................... 6 OTHER ... ............... ... .. 6 OTHER .......... ............. 6 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
MUSLIM .. ...................... .......... 1 MUSLIM .................................. 1 MUSLIM .................................. 1 
COPT ..... ... ..................... .......... 2 COPT ..................... ............... ... 2 COPT ....................................... 2 
WORKS IN SAME FIRM .......... 1 WORKS IN SAME FIRM .......... 1 WORKS IN SAME FIRM .......... 1 
FROM OTHER FRIENDS ........ 2 FROM OTHER FRIENDS ........ 2 FROM OTHER FRIENDS ........ 2 
FROM THE EMPLOYER. ........ 3 FROM THE EMPLOYER .. .. .. .. . 3 FROM THE EMPLOYER ......... 3 
DK ........................................... .4 DK ................. ... ........................ 4 DK ....... ....... .. ... .................... ..... 4 
OTHER ....... ........... ............... ... 5 OTHER ....... ............................. 5 OTHER .................................... 5 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
310 Had you ever worked with this person in YES .... .. .. .. .................. .. .. .. .... .. .. 1 YES ...................... .................... 1 YES .......................................... 1 
the same workplace before he told you NO ............................................ 2 N0 ............................................ 2 NO ............................................ 2 
about this job? 
311 Generally, how satisfied or unsatisfied are VERY SATISFIED ...... .. ...... .. .... 1 VERY SATISFIED .................... 1 VERY SATISFIED .................... 1 
(were) you with this job? SATISFIED .............................. 2 SATISFIED .............................. 2 SATISFIED .............................. 2 
NEUTRAL. .... ........... .... ... .. ....... 3 NEUTRAL. ..... ... ......... .. .. .... .. ... . 3 NEUTRAL. .... .. ....... ...... ............ 3 
UNSATISFIED ..... .. ................. .4 UNSATISFIED ... ................ ...... 4 UNSATISFIED .... ..................... 4 
VERY UNSATISFIED .............. 5 VERY UNSATISFIED .............. 5 VERY UNSATISFIED .............. 5 
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312a IF SATISFIEDNERY SATISFIED: 
What do (did) you like in this job? 
312b IF UNSATISFIEDNERY UNSATISFIED: 
313 
314 
315 
316 
318 
What do (did) you dislike in this job? 
Was the employer Muslim or Copt? 
How many employees were there? 
How many Coptic employees were there? 
Are there any workmates from this 
workplace that you are (still) in contact 
with or meet outside workplace? 
IF YES: Who? 
Why did you leave this job? 
Current Job Previous Job 2nd Previous Job 
GOOD SALARY ..... .. ... ... ... .. .. .. A GOOD SALARY ...................... A GOOD SALARY ...................... A 
NOT HARD .... .......................... B NOT HARD .................. ........ .... B NOTHARD .............................. B 
SUITABLE SCHEDULE .......... C SUITABLE SCHEDULE .......... C SUITABLE SCHEDULE .......... C 
NEAR HOME ........................... D NEAR HOME ............ .............. . D NEAR HOME ........................... D 
NICE EMPLOYER .. .. .. ............. E NICE EMPLOYER ................... E NICE EMPLOYER ...... ............. E 
NICE WORKMATES ............... F NICE WORKMATES ............... F NICE WORKMATES ............... F 
OTHER .................................... X OTHER ....... ... .... ...................... X OTHER .. ....... .. .. .. .. .... .. ....... ...... X 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
POOR SALARY ...................... A POOR SALARY ...................... A POOR SALARY ...................... A 
HARD .............. ..... ....... ... ..... ... . B HARD ............ ... ...... .... ... ... .... ... B HARD ...................................... B 
UNSUITABLE SCHEDULE ..... C UNSUITABLE SCHEDULE ..... C UNSUITABLE SCHEDULE ..... C 
FAR FROM HOME ....... ....... .... D FAR FROM HOME ........... ..... .. D FAR FROM HOME ..... .... .... .. .. . D 
EMPLOYER NOT NICE .......... E EMPLOYER NOT NICE .. .. ...... E EMPLOYER NOT NICE .. .. ...... E 
WORKMATES NOT NICE ...... F WORKMATES NOT NICE ...... F WORKMATES NOT NICE ...... F 
OTHER ................ ............. .... ... X OTHER ....... ............. ...... ...... .... X OTHER .................................... X 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
MUSLIM .. ..... .... ...... .... ... .. ...... .. 1 MUSLIM .......................... ... ..... 1 
COPT ............................... ........ 2 COPT ............ ........................... 2 
ITJ ITJ 
ITJ ITJ 
N0 ... ... ......... ... ........ .... .... .. ... ..... 1 N0 ... ....... .................................. 1 N0 .... .............. .... .. .... ... ............. 1 
YES (LIST BELOW) ................. 2 YES (LIST BELOW) ............ .... . 2 YES (LIST BELOW) ................. 2 
NAME RELIGION NAME RELIGION NAME RELIGION 
············· ··· ···· ··· · 
M c .... ... ... ........ ...... M c ... .. .. .... ............. M c 
.................. ... ... M c ........................ M c ........................ M c 
.................. .. .. .. M c ... ..... ..... .. .. .. .. ... M c ........................ M c 
....... .. ... .. .......... M c ..... .. .. ......... ..... . M c ..................... ... M c 
POOR SALARY .. ......... ...... ..... A POOR SALARY ..................... . A 
HARD ...... ...... ... .. ... .. .. ............ .. B HARD ............................ .... ...... B 
UNSUITABLE SCHEDULE ..... C UNSUITABLE SCHEDULE ..... C 
FAR FROM HOME .................. D FAR FROM HOME .................. D 
EMPLOYER NOT NICE .......... E EMPLOYER NOT NICE .......... E 
WORKMATES NOT NICE ... ... F WORKMATES NOT NICE ...... F 
OTHER .. .... .... ........ ... .... ... ........ X OTHER .............. ... .. ...... ........... X 
(SPECIFY) (SPECIFY) 
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SECTION 4: ATTITUDES 
NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT SOME ISSUES. 
401 
402 
403 
404 
405 
406 
How important or not important, you think, is it for you 
to work with an employer of the same religion as yours? 
IF IMPORTANT/VERY IMPORTANT: 
Why? 
How important or not important, you think, is it for you 
to work with other workmates of the same religion as 
yours? 
IF IMPORTANT/VERY IMPORTANT: 
Why? 
Generally, which workers, Coptic or Muslim, do you think 
are better than the other in each of the following: 
1- Work harder ................................................................ 
2- More honest. ............................................................... 
3- More cooperative with managers/supervisors ............ 
4- More cooperative with other workmates .................... 
5- Respect work rules (e.g. coming and leaving in time) 
6- Accept lower salary ................................................... 
How good or bad thing, you think, is it to have workers 
with different religions in the same workplace? 
407 IF NOT NEUTRAL: 
Why? 
408 How strongly do you agree or disagree that Muslims tend 
to employ each others more than employing Copts? 
VERY IMPORTANT ............................... . 
IMPORTANT........... .. .............................. 2 
NEUTRAL............................... .. .............. 3 
NOT IMPORTANT........................ ... ....... 4 
NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL..................... 5 
............................................................................................. -co 
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::[I] 
.............................................................................................. [IJ 
VERY IMPORTANT........... ........... .. ........ 1 
IMPORTANT.. .. ..... ..... ...... ....... ................ 2 
NEUTRAL............ .. ................................. 3 
NOT IMPORTANT.. ................................ 4 
NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL....... .............. 5 
.................................... ......................................................... -co 
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::co 
.................................... .......................................................... [I] 
MUSLIMS COPTS THE SAME DK 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
VERY GOOD ........................................ .. 
GOOD............ ...... .... ..... ..... .......... .. ...... ... 2 
NEUTRAL.... ...... ..... ...... ............ .... .. ........ 3 
BAD.................. ....... ............ ............. ....... 4 
VERYBAD.............................. ........... ..... 5 
............................................ .... .................................. ........ -co 
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::co 
.......................................................................................... [I] 
STRONGLY AGREE .................... ......... .. 
AGREE............ ...... ....... ... .... ................ .... 2 
NEUTRAL........ ....... ........................... ..... 3 
DISAGREE..... ........................................ 4 
STRONGLY DISAGREE............. ............ 5 
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409 How strongly do you agree or disagree that Copts tend to 
employ each others more than employing Muslims? 
410 How strongly do you agree or disagree that there is 
discrimination against Copts in Egypt? 
411 IF AGREE/STRONGLY AGREE: 
In what way? 
412 RECORD TIME: .................................................... ...................... . 
413 THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR PARTICIPATION, 
REASSURE CONFIDENTIALITY, AND RECORD DEGREE OF 
COOPERATION: 
RECORD ANY NOTES: 
STRONGLY AGREE ..... .......... ............. . .. 
AGREE.......... ... ......... .. .. .. ... ........ ..... .. ...... 2 
NEUTRAL........... .... ........ .... .. ..... ... ... .... ... 3 
DISAGREE..... ...... ............... .. .. ............... 4 
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Appendix C: Netlogo Code 
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Screen Shot of the Model Implemented in Netlogo 
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List of the NetLogo Code 
;; Agent-Based Simulation Model for Social and Workplace Segregation 
;; For NetLogo 4.03 
;; By Mohamed Abdou 
;;Nov2008 
;; persons are the main agents representing Workers 
breed [persons person] 
;; agents have a colour/group affiliation (primitive; no need to declare), homophily level, 
;; and maximum network size (max number of links they can create) 
persons-own [ homophily-level my-prob-to-frre net-size] 
; ; Define Firms 
breed [Firms Firm] 
;; Each frrm has a number of jobs 
Films-own [n-of-jobs] 
;; The employment link between a worker and a firm 
undirected-link-breed [Firm-Links Firm-Link] 
;; each link has age (job duration) and source of information about this job (source codes: Formal OR Referral) 
Firm-Links-own [age source] 
;; person-to-person links representing social networks 
directed-link-breed [Social-Links Social-Link] 
;; each link has a source of relation (source codes: Workplace, Network, Random) 
Social-Links-own [source] 
;; List of global variables 
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globals [ 
] 
social-seg 
workplace-seg-diss 
workplace-seg-gini 
workplace-seg-gini * 
unemployment-red 
unemployment-green 
p-links-work 
p-links-net 
p-links-random 
DStar 
GStar 
Avg-Homophily-total 
A vg-Homophily-red 
Avg-Homophily-green 
;;; Setup Procedure;;; 
to setup 
clear-all 
create-society 
create-workplaces 
set-DStar 
compute-work-seg 
compute-soc-seg 
compute-unemployment 
compute-links-source 
do-plots 
end 
;; level of segregation in social networks 
;; level of segregation in workplaces, Dissimilarity index, D 
;; level of segregation in workplaces, Gini index, G 
;; level of segregation in workplaces, Modified Gini Index, G* 
;; level of unemployement for the minority (Red) agents 
;; level of unemployement for the majority (Green) agents 
;; percentage of links through workplace 
;; percentage of links through other links 
; ; percentage of random links 
;; Dissimilarity index in case of randomness (Computed from another simulation) 
;; Gini index in case of randomness (Computed from another simulation) 
;; average Homophily of agents 
;; average Homophily for Red agents 
;; average Homophily for Green agents 
;; create a society and social networks 
;; Creat workplaces and firms 
;; Set the value ofD* 
;; compute indices for workplace seg 
;; compute index for social seg 
;; compute unemployment levels 
;; compute proportions of links of various sources 
;; update the plots 
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;;; Main Procedure ;;; 
to go 
while [ticks < 500] 
[ 
] 
end 
compute-Avg-Homophily 
fire-workers 
hire-workers 
update-SocNet 
compute-work -seg 
compute-soc-seg 
compute-unemployment 
compute-links-source 
do-plots 
tick 
to create-society 
set-default-shape persons "Person" 
create-persons n-of-persons [ 
set color green 
set net-size Avg-Net-Size 
;; compute average homophily levels 
;; flre workers with propper probabilities 
;; hire new workers 
;; update social networks of agents: create new links and while dissolving some links 
;; compute indices for workplace seg 
;; compute index for social seg 
;; compute unemployment levels 
;; compute proportions of links of various sources 
;; update the plots 
set homophily-level mean-homophily 
ask n-of (minority-proportion * n-of-persons) persons [ set color red] ;; set the color of minority group to Red 
create-net -random 
end 
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;; set the initial Homophily levels 
to set-Homophily 
ifHomophily-Type ="Uniform" [ ;; uniform homophily 
ask persons [ 
set homophily-level random-float 1] 
if Homophily-Type= "Constant" [ ;; constant homophily 
ask persons [ 
set homophily-level mean-homophily] 
ifHomophily-Type = "Normal 11 
end 
ask persons [ 
] 
set homophily-level random-normal mean-homophily Homophily-StD 
if homophily-level > 1 [set homophily-levell] 
if homophily-level < 0 [set homophily-level 0] 
;; create random social networks 
to create-net-random 
;; normal distribution for the homophily 
ask persons [create-Social-Links-ton-of net-size other persons [set source 11random11 ]] 
end 
;; create links from different sources and dissolve the extra links 
to update-SocNet 
create-links-net ;; create new links through other links 
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create-links-random 
create-links-work 
remove-extra-links 
update-Homophily 
end 
;; create new random links 
;; create new links through workplaces 
;; remove some links to keep the numbe or links below the maximum for each agent 
;; update agents' homophily levels 
;; update Homophily levels of agents 
to update-Homophily 
;; declare some working variables 
let lngroup-Prop-In-SocNet 0 ;; proportion of links to agents of the same-color 
let Ingroup-Prop-In-Workplace 0 ;; proportion of agents of the same color in the workplace 
let Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters 0 ;; mean homophillevel of alters 
let Mean-Homophily-Of-Workmates 0 
let temp 0 
let A vg-Homophily 0 
let Ingroup-Proportion 0 
let temp-Firm nobody 
let tempset nobody 
let tempagent nobody 
let para-suml 1 +Network-Composition-Canst+ Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters-Const +Workplace-Composition-Canst+ Mean-Homophily-Of-Workmates-Const 
+ Overall-Mean-Homophily-Const 
let para-sum2 1 +Network-Composition-Canst+ Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters-Const + Overall-Mean-Homophily-Const 
let Overall-Mean-Homophily mean [homophily-level] of persons 
ask persons [ 
let Network -Composition-Effect 0 
let Workplace-Composition 0 ;; the effect of workplace composition on the homophily level 
let mycolor color 
let my-who who 
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ifelse color= red [set Ingroup-Proportion minority-proportion] ;; Red agent's group proportion is minority-proportion 
[set Ingroup-Proportion (1 -minority-proportion)] ;; Green agent's group proportion is 1-minority-proportion 
set Ingroup-Prop-In-SocNet (count Out-Social-Link-neighbors with [color= mycolor] ) I (count Out-Social-Link-neighbors) 
set Network-Composition-Effect (Ingroup-Prop-In-SocNet- Ingroup-Proportion) I (1 - Ingroup-Proportion) 
if Network-Composition-Effect< 0 [set Network-Composition-Effect 0] 
if Network-Composition-Effect> I [set Network-Composition-Effect I] 
set Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters mean [homophily-level] of Out-Social-Link-neighbors 
;;; workplace effect 
ifelse count Firm-Link-neighbors> 0 ;; if the agent is currently working ... 
[ 
ask Firm-Link-neighbors [ ;; this is the firm where the agent works 
] 
set Ingroup-Prop-In-Workplace count Firm-Link-neighbors with [color= Mycolor] I count Firm-Link-neighbors 
set Mean-Homophily-Of-Workmates mean [homophily-level] of Firm-Link-neighbors with [who !=my-who] 
set Workplace-Composition (Ingroup-Prop-In-Workplace- Ingroup-Proportion)/(1 - Ingroup-Proportion) 
if Workplace-Composition< 0 [set Workplace-Composition 0] 
if Workplace-Composition> 1 [set Workplace-Composition 1] 
set homophily-level (homophily-level +(Network-Composition-Canst* Network-Composition-Effect)+ (Workplace-Composition-Const *Workplace-
Composition) + (Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters-Const * Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters) + (Mean-Homophily-Of-Workmates-Const * Mean-Homophily-Of-
Workmates) + (Overall-Mean-Homophily-Const * Overall-Mean-Homophily)) I para-suml 
] 
I ;; for unemployed agents ... 
set homophily-level (homophily-level + (Network-Composition-Const * Network-Composition-Effect) + (Mean-Homophily-Of-Alters-Const * Mean-
Homophily-Of-Alters) + (Overall-Mean-Homophily-Const * Overall-Mean-Homophily) ) I para-sum2 
] 
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if homophily-level > I [set homophily-levell] 
if homophily-level < 0 [set homophily-level 0] 
] 
end 
;; create new random links 
to create-links-random 
ask persons [ 
if (random-float 1) < new-link-random [ 
create-Social-Link-to one-of other persons with [not in-Social-Link-neighbor? myself] [set source "random"] 
] 
end 
;; create new links through other links 
to create-links-net 
ask persons [ 
let mycolor color 
let ingroup-proportion 0 ;; agent's group proportion 
if (random-float 1) <new-link-net [ 
let my-who who 
let tempagent self 
let tempset nobody 
ask Out-Social-Link-neighbors [set tempset (turtle-set tempset Out-Social-Link-neighbors with [who !=my-who and not in-Social-Link-neighbor? 
tempagent])] 
if tempset != nobody and any? temp set [ 
set ingroup-proportion count tempset with [color= mycolor] I count tempset 
ifelse (ingroup-proportion > 0 and ingroup-proportion < I) 
[ 
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] 
] 
J 
] 
ifelse (random-float 1) < (ingroup-proportion + homophily-level * (I - ingroup-proportion)) 
[create-Social-Link-to one-oftempset with [color= mycolor] [set source "network"]J 
[create-Social-Link-to one-of tempset with [color != mycolor][set source "network"]J 
create-Social-Link-to one-of tempset [set source "network"] 
end 
;; create new links from workplace 
to create-links-work 
let temp-Firm nobody 
let tempset nobody 
let ingroup-proportion 0 
ask persons with [count Firm-Link-neighbors> 0] [ ;; only working agents 
let mycolor color 
if (random-float 1) <new-link-work [ 
let my-who who 
let tempagent self 
;; tempset is the set of workmates with no social link to the agent 
ask Firm-Link-neighbors [set tempset Firm-Link-neighbors with [who !=my-who and not in-Social-Link-neighbor? tempagent}] 
if tempset != nobody and any? tempset [ 
set in group-proportion count tempset with [color = mycolor] I count tempset 
ifelse (ingroup-proportion > 0 and in group-proportion < 1) 
[ 
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] 
] 
ifelse (random-float 1) < ( ingroup-proportion + homophily-level * (1 - ingroup-proportion)) 
[create-Social-Link-to one-of tempset with [color= mycolor] [set source "workplace11 ]] 
[create-Social-Link-to one-oftempset with [color!= mycolor][set source "workplace"]] 
[create-Social-Link-to one-of tempset [set source "workplace"] ] 
end 
;; remove extra links randomly 
to remove-extra-links 
ask persons with [count my-Out-Social-Links> net-size] [ask n-of (count my-Out-Social-Links- net-size) my-Out-Social-Links [die]] 
end 
;; create fmns and jobs 
to create-workplaces 
create-Firms n-of-Firms [set n-of-jobs num-of-jobs set color green] 
ask n-of (minority-proportion * n-of-Firms) Firms [set color red] 
Hire-Workers-Random 
end 
to Hire-Workers-Random 
ask Firms [ 
let n-jobs (n-of-jobs- count my-Firm-Links) ;; number of available jobs= total number of jobs- number of current workers 
if n-jobs > 0 [create-Firm-Links-with n-of n-jobs persons with [count Firm-Link-neighbors= OJ[ set source 11formal"]] 
] 
set-Probability-To-Fire 
end 
;; hire new worker 
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to hire-workers 
let n-tot 0 
let temp 0 
let Firm-color red 
; ; total workers in the Firm 
;; random number 
ask Firms with [count my-Firm-Links< n-of-jobs] [ ; only Firms with number of workers less than number of jobs 
while [count my-Firm-Links< n-of-jobsJ [ 
set n-tot count my-Firm-Links 
set temp random-float 1 
if n-tot = 0 [set temp 1 ] ;; when there are no workers use formal search 
J 
J 
ifelse temp < level-of-referral-hiring 
[Hire-Referral] 
[Hire-Formal] 
set-Probability-To-Fire 
end 
;; hire new worker through referrals 
to Hire-Referral 
let candidates-set nobody 
let Firm-color color 
let P 0 
;; Referral Hiring 
;; Formal Hiring 
let h hiring-discrimination * mean [homophily-levelJ afFirm-Link-neighbors 
ask Firm-Link-neighbors [set candidates-set (turtle-set candidates-set Out-Social-Link-neighbors with [count Firm-Link-neighbors= 0] )] 
ifelse any? candidates-set 
[ 
set P count candidates-set with [color= Firm-color] I count candidates-set 
ifelse (P > 0 and P < 1) 
[ 
ifelse (random-float I)< (P + h * (1 - P)) 
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] 
[create-Firm-Link-with one-of candidates-set with [color= Firm-color] [set source "referral"]] 
[create-Firm-Link-with one-of candidates-set with [color!= Firm-color][set source "referral"]] 
create-Firm-Link-with one-of candidates-set [set source "referral"] 
Hire-formal ;; if there are no workers available through refrral, formal hiring is used 
] 
end 
;; hire new worker through formal methods (random) 
to Hire-formal 
create-Firm-Link-with one-of persons with [count Finn-Link-neighbors= 0] [set source "formal"] 
end 
to set-Probability-To-Fire 
let PO 
ask Finns with [count Finn-Link-neighbors> 0] 
[ 
end 
set P count Firm-Link-neighbors with [color= red] I count Finn-Link-neighbors 
ask Finn-Link-neighbors 
[ 
ifelse color = red 
[set my-prob-to-frre prob-to-frre * (1 + homophily-level *(minority-proportion- P))] 
[set my-prob-to-frre prob-to-frre * (1 + homophily-level * (P- minority-proportion))] 
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;; compute indexes of work seg 
to compute-work-seg 
letT count Firm-Links ; count of all working persons 
let C count persons with [color= red and count Firm-Link-neighbors> 0] ; count of all minority working persons 
if C = 0 [ SET workplace-seg-diss 1 
SET workplace-seg-gini 1 
stop] 
let P cIt 
let tk 0 
let ckO 
let pk 0 
let tj 0 
let cj 0 
let pj 0 
let gini 0 
let diss 0 
ask Firms[ 
;; Gini segregation index 
;; Index of dissimilarity 
set tk count Firm-Link-neighbors 
set ck count Firm-Link-neighbors with [color= red] 
set pk ckl tk 
set diss diss + (tk * abs (pk- P) ) 
ask Firms[ 
set tj count Firm-Link-neighbors 
set cj count Firm-Link-neighbors with [color= red] 
set pj cj I tj 
set gini gini + (tk * tj * abs (pk- pj)) 
] 
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set gini gini I (2 * T * T * P * (1 - P)) 
set diss diss I (2 Ｇｾ＠ T * P * (1 - p)) 
SET workplace-seg-gini gini 
ifelse diss >= DStar [set Diss (diss- DStar) I (I - DStar)] [set diss 0] 
ifelse gini >= GStar [set gini (gini- GStar) I (1 - GStar)] [set gini 0] 
SET workplace-seg-diss diss 
SET workplace-seg-gini* gini 
end 
'" '""'" '"'' '" "'' "' ''"' ,, ',,,'" "'" """'' 
to compute-soc-seg 
;; to Compute segregation of the social network of agents based on Freeman (1978) Index 
let rn n-of-persons ; count of all persons 
let rng n-of-persons * minority-proportion ; count of all minority persons 
let n count Social-Links 
let Estar count Social-Links with [[color] of end I !=[color] of end2] 
let Exp-Estar (n * 2 * rng * (rn- rng) ) I (m * (rn- I)) 
letS Exp-Estar- Estar ;; segregation index 
ifelse S < 0 [set S 0] [set S S I Exp-Estar] 
SET social-seg S 
end 
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----- -- - ------ ------ ---------- ---------------------------------------------------- ---------
to do-plots 
set-current-plot "Segregation" 
set-current-plot-pen 11 social-seg 11 
plot social-seg 
set-current -plot -pen 11 workplace-seg-gini" 
plot workplace-seg-gini 
set -current-plot -pen 11 workplace-seg-gini *" 
plot workplace-seg-gini* 
set-current-plot "unemployment" 
set-current-plot-pen "unemployment-red" 
plot unemployment-red 
set-current-plot-pen "unemployment-green" 
plot unemployment-green 
set-current-plot "link -origin" 
set-current-plot-pen "work" 
plot p-links-work 
set-current-plot-pen "other-links 11 
plot p-links-net 
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set-current-plot-pen 11random" 
plot p-links-random 
set-current-plot "homophily" 
set-current-plot-pen "H-red" 
plot A vg-Homophily-red 
set-current-plot-pen "H-green" 
plot A vg-Homophily-green 
set-current-plot-pen 11H-total 11 
plot Avg-Homophily-total 
end 
to compute-unemployment 
set unemployment-red (count persons with [count Firm-Link-neighbors = 0 and color= red]) I count persons with [color= red] 
set unemployment-green (count persons with [count Firm-Link-neighbors= 0 and color= green]) I count persons with [color= green] 
end 
to compute-links-source 
let tot-links count Social-Links 
set p-links-work count Social-Links with [source= "workplace"] I tot-links 
set p-links-net count Social-Links with [source= "network11 ] I tot-links 
set p-links-random count Social-Links with [source= "random11 ] I tot-links 
end 
to fire-workers 
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let temp 0 ;; random number 
let Firm-Linkage 0 
ask persons with [count my-Firm-Links> 0] ; only fire working agents 
end 
[set temp random-float 1 
set Firm-Linkage [age] of one-of my-Firm-Links 
if temp < my-prob-to-fue or Firm-Linkage> 50 [ask my-Firm-Links [die] ] 
] 
to compute-Avg-Homophily 
set Avg-Homophily-red mean [homophily-level] of persons with [color= red] 
set Avg-Homophily-green mean [homophily-level] of persons with [color:::: green] 
set Avg-Homophily-total mean [homophily-level] of persons 
end 
;; The values of Dsta and GStar are read from external text file, and have been calculated using another simulation model 
to set-DStar 
set DstarO 
set GStar 0 
file-open "data.txe' 
while [not file-at-end?] 
[ 
if n-of-persons = file-read and minority-proportion = file-read and n-of-Firms = file-read and num-of-jobs = file-read [ 
set Dstar file-read 
set Gstar file-read 
file-close 
Stop] 
file-close 
show "No Gstar or Dstar found for the specified parametrs, both are assumed to be zero" 
end 
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NetLogo Code to Compute G* and n* 
;; This model is used to generate G* and D* for some combinations of frrm size, number of jobs, number of persons , and minority proportion. 
;; For NetLogo 4.0.3 
;; By Mohamed Abdou 
;; Nov2008 
;; agents have a colour/group affiliation (primitive; no need to declare) 
breed [persons person] 
breed [frrms frrm] 
undirected-link-breed [flinks flink] ;; person-to-frrm link 
Firms-own [n-of-jobs] 
globals [ 
workplace-seg ;; level of segregation in workplaces 
minority-proportion 
] 
n-of-persons 
n-of-frrms 
num-of-jobs 
diss 
gini 
Dstar 
Gstar 
;; Dissimilarity Index 
; ; Gini Index 
;; Dissimilarity index in case of randomness 
;; Gini index in case of randomness 
;;; Main Procedures;;; 
to go 
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\, let Sim-count l 
let fimme "" ;; file name to be exported 
let tick-count 0 
while [Sim-count <= 68] 
[ 
clear-all 
set-parameters (sim-count) 
set tick-count 1 
while [ticks< 200] 
[ 
create-society 
create-workplaces 
compute-work -seg 
do-plots 
set Dstar Dstar + diss 
set Gstar Gstar + gini 
tick 
] 
set Dstar Dstar I ticks ;; DStar is set to the average value for the 200 runs 
set Gstar Gstar I ticks ;; GStar is set to the average value for the 200 runs 
set fname (word "c:/Mohamedlmodel/Dstarlplot" sim-count ".csv") ;; export the results to .csv file 
export-plot "Segregation" fname 
set Sim-count Sim-count + 1 
stop 
end 
to create-society 
---- ---·---· - ----
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clear-turtles 
create-persons minority-proportion * n-of-persons [ set color red] 
create-persons (1 -minority-proportion)* n-of-persons [set color green] 
end 
to create-workplaces 
clear-links 
create-frrms n-of-frrms [set n-of-jobs num-of-jobs] 
;; minority group 
;; majority group 
ask n-of (num-of-jobs * n-of-frrms) persons [ create-flink-with one-of firms with [(count flink-neighbors) < n-of-jobs] 
end 
to compute-work-seg 
let T count flinks ; count of all working persons 
let C count persons with [color= red and count flink-neighbors != 0] ; count of all minority working persons 
if C = 0 [ SET workplace-seg 1 
stop] 
let P cIt 
letkO 
letj 0 
let tk 0 
let ckO 
let pkO 
let tj 0 
let cj 0 
let pj 0 
let who_min 0 
let who_max 0 
set gini 0 
set diss 0 
;; Gini segregation index 
;; Index of dissimilarity 
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ask min-one-offrrms [who] [set who_min who] 
set who_max who_min + n-of-fmns - 1 
set k who_min 
while [k <= who_max] 
[ 
ask firm k [ 
set tk count persons with [flink-neighbor? myself] 
set ck count persons with [flink-neighbor? myself and color= red] 
set pk ck I tk 
set diss diss + (tk * abs (pk- P) 
set j who_min 
while [j <= who_max] 
[ 
ask firrnj [ 
set tj count persons with [flink-neighbor? myself] 
set cj count persons with [flink-neighbor? myself and color= red] 
set pj cj I tj 
set gini gini + (tk * tj * abs (pk- pj)) 
setj j + 1 
] 
set kk+ 1 
] 
set gini gini I (2 * T * T * P * (1 - P)) 
set diss diss I (2 * T * P * (1 - p)) 
end 
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to do-plots 
set-current-plot "Segregation" 
set-current-plot-pen "gini" 
plot gini 
set -current -plot -pen "diss" 
plot diss 
end 
to set-parameters [sim-count] 
if sim-count = 1 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 5 set num-of-jobs 16 ] 
if sim-count = 2 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-frrms 8 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 3 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 8 ] 
if sim-count = 4 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 5 ] 
if sim-count = 5 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-frrms 5 set num-of-jobs 16 ] 
if sim-count = 6 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-frrms 8 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 7 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 8 ] 
if sim-count = 8 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 5] 
if sim-count = 9 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 5 set num-of-jobs 16 ] 
if sim-count = 10 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 8 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 1 I [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-firms 10 set num-of-jobs 8] 
if sim-count = 12 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 5] 
if sim-count = 13 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 5 set num-of-jobs 16] 
if sim-count = 14 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 8 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 15 [ set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 8 ] 
if sim-count = 16 [set n-of-persons 100 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 5] 
if sim-count = 17 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-frrms 5 set num-of-jobs 32] 
if sim-count = 18 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-firms 10 set num-of-jobs I 6] 
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if sim-count = 19 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fums 16 set num-of-jobs 10 ] 
if sim-count = 20 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 8] 
if sim-count = 21 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fums 5 set num-of-jobs 32] 
if sim-count = 22 [ set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0 2 set n-of-firms 1 0 set num-of-jobs 16 ] 
if sim-count = 23 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 24 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 8] 
if sim-count = 25 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-fums 5 set num-of-jobs 32] 
if sim-count = 26 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 16] 
if sim-count = 27 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 16 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 28 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 20 set num-of-jobs 8] 
if sim-count = 29 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-fmns 5 set num-of-jobs 32 1 
if sim-count = 30 [ set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-fmns 10 set num-of-jobs 16 ] 
if sim-count = 31 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-fmns 16 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 32 [set n-of-persons 200 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 20 set num-of-jobs 8] 
if sim-count = 33 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-firms 5 set num-of-jobs 80] 
if sim-count = 34 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 10 set num-of-jobs 40] 
if sim-count = 35 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-firms 20 set num-of-jobs 20] 
if sim-count = 36 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-firms 40 set num-of-jobs 10 1 
if sim-count = 37 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 02 set n-of-frrms 5 set num-of-jobs 80 1 
if sim-count = 38 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 10 set num-of-jobs 40 1 
if sim-count = 39 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 02 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 20 ] 
if sim-count = 40 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-firms 40 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 41 [ set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-firms 5 set num-of-jobs 80 ] 
if sim-count = 42 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 40] 
if sim-count = 43 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 20 ] 
if sim-count = 44 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 40 set num-of-jobs 10 1 
if sim-count = 45 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 5 set num-of-jobs 80] 
if sim-count = 46 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 10 set num-of-jobs 40 ] 
if sim-count = 47 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 20 set num-of-jobs 20] 
if sim-count = 48 [set n-of-persons 500 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-firms 40 set num-of-jobs 10 ] 
if sim-count = 49 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0 .1 set n-of-firms 10 set num-of-jobs 80] 
if sim-count =50 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-frrms 20 set num-of-jobs 40] 
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end 
if sim-count = 51 [ set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 40 set num-of-jobs 20 ] 
if sim-count =52 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 50 set num-of-jobs 16] 
if sim-count =53 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.1 set n-of-fmns 80 set num-of-jobs 10 ] 
if sim-count =54 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 10 set num-of-jobs 80] 
if sim-count =55 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 40] 
if sim-count =56 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 40 set num-of-jobs 20] 
if sim-count = 57 [ set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 50 set num-of-jobs I 6 ] 
if sim-count =58 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.2 set n-of-fmns 80 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count =59 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-firms 10 set num-of-jobs 80] 
if sim-count = 60 [ set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-fmns 20 set num-of-jobs 40 ] 
if sim-count = 61 [ set n-of-persons 1 000 set minority-proporti<:m 0.3 set n-of-frrms 40 set num-of-jobs 20 ] 
if sim-count = 62 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-frrms 50 set num-of-jobs 16] 
if sim-count = 63 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.3 set n-of-firms 80 set num-of-jobs 10] 
if sim-count = 64 [ set n-of-persons 1 000 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 10 set num-of-jobs 80 ] 
if sim-count = 65 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 20 set num-of-jobs 40] 
if sim-count = 66 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 40 set num-of-jobs 20] 
if sim-count = 67 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-frrms 50 set num-of-jobs 16] 
if sim-count = 68 [set n-of-persons 1000 set minority-proportion 0.4 set n-of-fmns 80 set num-of-jobs 10] 
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